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Abstract
This thesis examines the impact of different risk sharing arrangements under incomplete 
financial markets on macroeconomic outcomes.
The first two chapters are joint work with Giacomo Rodano. In the first chapter, we 
examine the effects of Chapter 7 of the US bankruptcy law on entrepreneurs. The latter 
are subject to production risk. They can borrow and in case they fail they can default on 
their debt. We examine the optimal wealth exemption level and the optimal credit market 
exclusion duration in this environment.
In addition to unsecured credit, entrepreneurs can also obtain secured credit in the second 
chapter. Secured credit lowers the cost of a generous bankruptcy regime because agents who 
are rationed out of the unsecured credit market can still obtain secured credit. Therefore, 
the optimal exemption level is relatively high.
In the third chapter, I investigate the effects of wealth exemptions on interest rates if 
entrepreneurs can choose the riskiness of their project. The default possibility leads to a kink 
in the value function which makes agents locally risk-loving.
In the fourth chapter, I focus on consumers only. In particular, I show that wealth 
exemptions are of particular importance in a model with expense shocks. Wealth exemptions 
encourage people to save more so that aggregate savings rise. The model is also consistent 
with the fact that consumer bankruptcy cases are not correlated with wealth exemption 
levels.
The fifth chapter is joint work with Rigas Oikonomou. We compare two environments: on 
the one hand the standard one in which a household consists of one member and, on the 
other hand, one in which a household consists of two members who share their risks perfectly. 
We investigate the differences between the two models in labor market flows and volatilities 
of labor market statistics in response to productivity shocks.
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Preface
This thesis examines the impact of different risk sharing arrangements under incomplete 
financial markets on macroeconomic outcomes. In particular, I focus on environments in 
which heterogeneous agents can only trade one period non-contingent contracts. I examine 
the degree of risk sharing that is possible in such restricted environments. In the first four 
chapters, I analyze how the possibility to default, which makes debt partially contingent, 
affects macroeconomic outcomes. In the last chapter; I analyze how perfect risk-sharing 
within a household consisting of two members affects business cycle fluctuations.
The first two chapters are joint work with Giacomo Rodano. In the first chapter, we 
examine the effects of Chapter 7 of the US bankruptcy law on entrepreneurs. We develop 
a quantitative general equilibrium model of occupational choice that examines the effects 
of the US personal bankruptcy law on entrepreneurship. The model explicitly incorporates 
US personal bankruptcy law and matches empirical features of the US economy regarding 
entrepreneurship, wealth distribution, and bankruptcy filings by entrepreneurs. The option 
to declare bankruptcy encourages entrepreneurship through insurance since entrepreneurs 
may default in bad times. However, perfectly competitive financial intermediaries take tis 
possibility of default into account. Consequently, they charge higher interest rates which 
reflect these default probabilities. Thus, personal bankruptcy provides insurance at the 
cost of worsening credit conditions. Our quantitative evaluation shows that in the current 
US bankruptcy law the latter effect dominates. Halving the wealth exemption level from 
the current level would increase entrepreneurship, the median firm size, welfare, and social 
mobility, without increasing inequality. On the other hand, we show that without the 
possibility to default would entrepreneurship and welfare would be reduced.
In addition to unsecured credit, entrepreneurs can also obtain secured credit in the second 
chapter. We show that secured credit alters the results dramatically. The reason is that if 
secured credit is not available, a high exemption level leads to tight endogenous borrowing 
limits. This implies that some, in particular poor, agents will be excluded from borrowing 
because their ex post incentive to default is too high. However, if they can waive their right to 
default by using secured credit, i.e. by providing collateral, the negative effect of a generous
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bankruptcy law is lessened. Consequently, the optimal exemption level is a significantly 
higher.
In the third chapter, I investigate the effects of wealth exemptions on interest rates if 
entrepreneurs can choose the riskiness of their projects. Agents can become entrepreneurs 
or workers. Both, the default option and the occupational choice problem lead to kinks in 
the value function. This makes entrepreneurs locally risk-loving. Thus, some entrepreneurs 
choose riskier projects than necessary. Therefore, the model predicts that interest rates are 
not monotonically increasing in the wealth exemption level. This is consistent with empirical 
evidence.
In the fourth chapter, I focus on consumer bankruptcy. I develop a heterogenous agent 
life-cycle model to examine the effects of the US personal bankruptcy law on bankruptcy 
filings and welfare. In addition to facing uncertainty over their labor income, agents also face 
wealth shocks that stem from unexpected changes in family composition or from unexpected 
medical expenses. I allow agents to borrow and save simultaneously. Under chapter 7 of the 
US bankruptcy law, consumers can keep all wealth up to an exemption level. I show that 
introducing exemption levels is of particular relevance in the presence of wealth shocks. My 
quantitative evaluations show that changes in the exemption level have an impact only for 
very low exemption levels. Thus, ignoring them might bias welfare results. But this impact 
fades out rather quickly. The reason is that almost no household is affected by medium to 
high exemption levels because those households who might default do not have much wealth. 
I do not find, and this is consistent with the data, a strong positive relationship between the 
exemption level and default rates. With less than 0.1% of annual consumption, the welfare 
changes due to changes in the exemption level are rather small.
The fifth chapter is joint work with Rigas Oikonomou. We compare two incomplete markets 
environments: We compare two environments: on the one hand the standard one in which a 
household consists of one member and, on the other hand, one in which a household consists 
of two members who share their risks perfectly. We investigate whether joint search within 
the household unit can help reconcile the business cycle properties of aggregate employment, 
unemployment and labor force participation. Our main conclusion is that joint insurance 
through adjustments in family labor supply can have a big impact on the business cycle 
properties of key labor market statistics. However, the model still falls short of completely 
explaining the low cyclicality in the labor force participation rate.
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Chapter
Personal Bankruptcy Law and 
Entrepreneurship: A Quantitative 
Assessment
1.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurs employ half of all workers in the US and they create three quarters of all new 
jobs. 1 Over time, successful small entrepreneurial firms grow into big firms and drive the 
technological progress. For example, four of the 20 largest companies in 2007, Microsoft, 
Cisco Systems, Google and Dell, were born in the last generation. Personal bankruptcy 
law is important for entrepreneurs because if an entrepreneur’s firm is not incorporated he 
is personally liable for all the debts of his firm. And even if the firm is incorporated, the 
entrepreneur very often has to provide personal guarantees to secure a loan [Berkowitz /  
White 2004]. Ten percent of entrepreneurs go out of business each year, and out of these 
around twenty percent through bankruptcy.
This paper investigates quantitatively the effects of personal bankruptcy law on entrepreneur­
ship. We focus on two key features of the personal bankruptcy procedures: the wealth exemp­
tion level and the duration of the credit market exclusion period. The wealth exemption level 
determines how much wealth a person can keep in case of a default. The length of the credit 
market exclusion period determines when someone who has defaulted in the past regains 
access to credit.
Bankruptcy introduces some contingency in a world of incomplete credit markets in which
1 We thank Alex Michaelides for his continuous support and valuable comments, and Francesco Caselli and 
Maitreesh Ghatak for helpful comments at various stages of this research. We are also grateful to  Daniel 
Becker, Wouter Den Haan, Emmanuel Frot, Alberto Galasso, Bernardo Guimaraes, Christian Julliard, Rachel 
Ngai, and participants at the LSE macro and development seminars, the 2008 EEA meeting and the 2008 
SCE meeting.
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only simple debt contracts are available. However, it provides only partial contingency 
and does not complete the markets fully. This contingency provides insurance against 
entrepreneurial failure at the cost of worsening credit conditions. If the bankruptcy law does 
not allow default under any circumstances, i.e. if there is full commitment, credit will be 
available at low interest rates because borrowers can not default. This comes at the expense 
of borrowers having no insurance against business failure. If, however, the bankruptcy law 
makes default very easy, borrowers might be insured against bad outcomes. But in order to 
compensate for the default risk banks have to charge higher interest rates or ration credit 
altogether. In both extreme cases the equilibrium outcome can be one of almost no credit. 
In the former case there is no demand for credit whereas in the latter there is no supply of 
credit. In this world many firms axe inefficiently small, especially those owned by poorer 
entrepreneurs. This trade-off is at the center of recent public discussions and policy changes 
in Europe and the US. In Europe the bankruptcy law is much harsher than in the US. Many 
countries like for example Germany, Netherlands and the UK, made it more lenient with 
the explicit aim of fostering entrepreneurship.2 The policy changes in the US went into the 
opposite direction. Following the huge increase in personal bankruptcy filings, US Congress 
in 2005 passed a law making personal bankruptcy less beneficial for filers. Even though the 
focus of the discussion has been on consumer bankruptcy, the effects on entrepreneurship 
are important because around 80,000 failed entrepreneurs file for bankruptcy each year. Our 
paper quantitatively assesses the relative strength of these two opposing forces, insurance 
versus credit conditions, on the number of entrepreneurs, on the access of poor agents to 
entrepreneurship, on firm size, and on welfare, inequality and social mobility.
We build an infinite horizon heterogeneous agent model which has an occupational choice 
problem at its core. Agents differ with respect to their entrepreneurial productivity and 
their working productivity. Each period they decide whether to become an entrepreneur 
or a worker, based on a noisy signal of their productivities. Cagetti /  De Nardi [2006] also 
have this occupational choice at the center of their model. Their model is able to explain 
the US wealth distribution, in particular the extreme skewness at the top. However, in their 
model entrepreneurship is a risk-free activity because there is no uncertainty about current 
productivities. Thus there is no default in equilibrium and there is no insurance role for 
bankruptcy. In our model default exists because a significant fraction of entrepreneurs files 
for bankruptcy.
Starting with Athreya [2002], there is a growing literature on consumer bankruptcy. For 
example, Livshits et al. [2007a] compare the US system under which future earnings are 
exempt after consumers have declared bankruptcy with a European type of system under 
which future earnings are garnished to repay creditors. They find that the welfare differences 
between the systems depend on the persistence and variance of the shocks. Chatterjee et al. 
[2007] show that a recent tightening of the law in the US implies large welfare gains.3 We
2 In a companion paper, we are currently investigating the effects of introducing a US type of law in Europe.
3 Other papers in this growing literature are Athreya [2006], Athreya /  Simpson [2006], Li /  Sarte [2006], 
Mateos-Planas /  Seccia [2006].
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differ from all these papers by focusing on entrepreneurs.4 Moreover, as Chatterjee et al. 
[2007], we focuses on the wealth distribution because the benefits of bankruptcy depend 
crucially on the wealth of an agent.
There are two closely related papers that analyze the effects of bankruptcy on entrepreneur­
ship in a quantitative setting similar to our paper.5 Akyol /  Athreya [2007] use an overlapping 
generations, partial equilibrium framework. They have heterogeneity in human capital. Their 
main results is that the current system is too generous. Meh /  Terajima [2008] have a similar 
framework (partial equilibrium OLG model) in which they analyze bankruptcy decisions of 
both consumers and entrepreneurs. Our paper differs from these in the following way: We 
have two types of shocks, one persistent and one transitory. This allows us to capture the 
feature that many agents enter and exit entrepreneurship frequently. This fact has been 
emphasized by Quadrini [2000]. Our model is a general equilibrium model. The importance 
of general equilibrium effects has been shown by Li /  Sarte [2006].
Our model is able to replicate key macroeconomic variables of the US economy: capital 
output ratio, fraction of entrepreneurs in the population, exit rate, bankruptcy filings of 
entrepreneurs, wealth of entrepreneurs compared to workers. Based on this model we conduct 
two experiments to assess whether the current exemption level and the current exclusion 
period are optimal. Our main result is that the current system is too lenient with respect to 
the exemption level.
There are significant welfare gains from halving the current exemption level. These are 
in the order of 1.4% of annual consumption per household which corresponds to $700 in 
2007. The welfare gains from lowering the exemption level do not only occur from an ex ante, 
expected utility, perspective but also across the entire wealth distribution. Both the rich and 
the poor would gain. The cause of this result is that the current system provides too much 
insurance. This worsens credit conditions for entrepreneurs so much that there are fewer of 
them. Entrepreneurship increases from 7.6% of the population to 8 .6 % if the exemption level 
is halved because credit gets cheaper. However, completely abolishing bankruptcy would lead 
to a welfare loss in the order of $60 per household since some insurance is valuable.
The effects of changing the exclusion period are small. Reducing it from six to two years 
yields a welfare gain in the order of $90 annually per household. Reducing the exclusion 
period allows the talented entrepreneurs who have defaulted in the past to regain access to 
credit sooner and therefore run bigger firms. In contrast to increasing the exemption level, 
this form of insurance, is less harmful for credit conditions since it does not reduce the amount 
the banks recover in the event of default. However, since the number of talented defaulters is 
small compared to all defaulters, these effects are quantitatively small.
4 Zha [2001] is a theoretical investigation of similar issues. However his model abstracts from occupational 
choice, that we show to be the crucial channel through which bankruptcy law affects entrepreneurship. 
Moreover he does not calibrate his model to the US economy. Therefore his simulations give only qualitative 
suggestions.
5 These two papers and ours’ were developed independently. We published our first version in June 2007 on 
our website.
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Our results axe consistent with the empirical finding of Berkowitz /  White [2004] who 
show that in states with higher exemption levels credit conditions are worse. Our results are 
partially consistent with the findings of Fan /  White [2003]. They show that entrepreneurship 
increases when the exemption level is increased from a very low level. However we differ for 
high exemption levels: we find that high exemption levels lead to a decline in entrepreneurship 
while they find the opposite.
The paper is organized as follows, Section 1.2 provides an overview of US bankruptcy law 
and presents data on entrepreneurial failure. In Section 1.3 we present our model and discuss 
the equilibrium condition. In Section 1.4 we discuss our calibration strategy and present the 
baseline results. Section 1.5 explains the main mechanism of the model. In Section 1.6 we 
conduct the policy experiments and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Entrepreneurial failure and personal bankruptcy in the US
Personal bankruptcy procedures in the US consist of two different procedures: Chapter 7 
and Chapter 13. Under Chapter 7, all unsecured debt is discharged immediately. Future 
earnings cannot be garnished. This is why chapter 7 is known as providing a "fresh start". 
In exchange for this a person fifing for bankruptcy has to surrender all wealth in excess of 
an exemption level. The exemption level varies across US states, ranging from $11,000 in 
Maryland to unlimited for housing wealth in some states, for example Florida. Following the 
literature, we calculate the population-weighted average across states. The resulting average 
exemption level is $77,591 in 1993.6
Under Chapter 13 agents can keep their wealth, debt is not discharged immediately and 
future earnings are garnished. Entrepreneurs are better off under Chapter 7 for three reasons: 
they have no non-exempt wealth, their debt is discharged immediately and they can start a 
new business straight away, since their income will not be subject to garnishment (see White, 
2007). 70% of total bankruptcy cases involving entrepreneurs are under chapter 7. Therefore 
we will focus on Chapter 7 only.
Persons can file for bankruptcy only once every six years. The bankruptcy fifing remains 
public information for ten years. But there is no formal rule about bankruptcy filers being 
excluded from credit. However,in practice, we observe that bankruptcy filers have difficulties 
obtaining credit for a periods ranging from 3 to 8  years after the fifing [Athreya 2 0 0 2 ].
The US. Small Business Administration reports an exit rate of on average 9.7% per annum 
for small firms in the period from 1990-2005.7 Out of these failing firms 9.3% exit through
6 The wealth exemption level does not change much over time. We choose 1993 because it is in the middle of 
the sample years for our data on entrepreneurship wealth distribution and bankruptcies.
7 The U.S. Small Business Administration splits small firms into employer and non-employer firms. Employer 
firms have at least one employee working in the firm. There are roughly five million employer and 15 million 
non-employer firms in the U.S. Since the focus of our paper is on entrepreneurs who own and manage the firm 
we use only the data for employer firms since non-employer firms have in many cases the owner not working in
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bankruptcy, according to the official data from the Administrative Office of the Courts.8 
Unfortunately, the official data on personal bankruptcy caused by a business failure seem to 
be severely downward biased. Lawless /  Warren [2005] estimate that the true number could 
be three to four times as big. Their own study is based on an in-depth analysis of bankruptcy 
filers in five different judicial districts. Their explanation of this discrepancy is the emergence 
of automated classification of personal bankruptcy cases. Almost all software used in this 
area has "consumer case" as the default option. Thus reporting a personal bankruptcy case 
as a "business related" case requires some - even though small - effort while being completely 
inconsequential for the court proceedings. In addition to their own study they report data 
from Dun h  Bradstreet according to which exit through bankruptcy is at least twice the 
official number9.
In the calibration of our model we set the baseline exemption level equal to $77,591. The 
baseline exclusion period is set to six years. We calibrate the model such that the ratio of 
bankruptcies over exits is equal to 2 0 %.
1.3 The model
Our economy is populated by a unit mass of infinitely lived heterogeneous agents. Agents face 
idiosyncratic uncertainty, but there is no aggregate uncertainty. At the beginning of every 
period, agents decide whether to become workers or entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur must 
decide how much to invest and, if he is allowed to, how much to borrow. An entrepreneur 
who has defaulted in the past is not allowed to borrow for some time. Since we focus on the 
implications of personal bankruptcy for entrepreneurs, workers are not allowed to borrow. 
Agents have only a noisy signal of their productivities and are subject to uninsurable risk. 
After the shocks are realized, production takes place. At the end of the period borrowers 
decide whether to repay or whether to default and how much to consume and how much 
to save. If they default, they will be borrowing constrained in the next period. Thus, they 
cannot borrow but they can still save. Anticipating this behavior banks vary the interest rate 
charged for each loan taking into account the individual borrower’s default probability. The 
remainder of this section presents the details of the model.
the firm. To ensure consistency across our three databases, when we use data from the Survey of Consumer 
Finance (SCF) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) we define entrepreneurs as business owners 
who manage a firm with at least one employee.
8 W hile one can obtain exit rates from the PSID data (Quadrini, 2000), it is impossible to obtain reliable 
bankruptcy data from the PSID. There is only one wave in which respondents were asked about past 
bankruptcies.
9 Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) is a credit-reporting and business information firm. D&B compiles its own 
independent business failure database. Until the emergence of automated software for law firms and courts in 
the mid 1980s, the official business bankruptcy data and the index compiled by D&B have a positive and 
significant correlation of 0.73. From 1986-1998 this correlation coefficient becomes negative and insignificant. 
Extrapolating from the historic relationship between the D&B index and personal bankruptcy cases caused by 
business failures leads to the conclusion that the official data underreport business bankruptcy cases at least 
by a factor of two.
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1.3.1 Bankruptcy law and credit status
Agents who have borrowed can declare bankruptcy. In the event of a default the agent’s 
debt is discharged, and at the same time any assets in excess of an exemption level X  are 
liquidated. There are transaction costs in the liquidation process so that banks can only 
obtain a fraction /  of each unit of capital they liquidate.
An agent who has declared bankruptcy in the past can save but he cannot borrow for a 
certain period of time. We call this agent borrowing constrained and we denote his credit status 
as BC . We assume that every borrowing constrained agent, whether worker or entrepreneur, 
faces a credit status shock at the end of the period. This probability captures the duration of 
the credit market exclusion period. With probability (1 — q) the agent remains borrowing 
constrained. With probability g the agent can borrow again. He becomes an unconstrained 
agent with credit status U N 10, g is calibrated such that the average exclusion period is six 
years, the value observed in the data.
1.3.2 Households
Our economy is populated by a unit mass of infinitely lived heterogeneous agents. Each 
agent differs according to the level of assets a, the entrepreneurial productivity 9, the working 
productivity </?, and the credit status S  € {UN,  BC} .
Preferences
For simplicity we abstract from labor-leisure choice. All agents supply their unit of labor 
inelastically either as workers or as entrepreneurs. There is no disutility of labor. Agents 
discount the future at the rate (3. Therefore they maximize the following utility function
OO 'j
£ /? '« (< * )[  ( i- i)
t= 0  )
Productivities
Each agent is endowed with a couple of stochastic productivity levels: one as an entrepreneur 
6 and one as a worker (/?. We make the simplifying assumption that the working and 
entrepreneurial ability processes are uncorrelated. At the beginning of each period the agent 
knows only his past productivities </?_i and 0 _ i, but his productivity as a worker and as
entrepreneur during the current period, denoted by (p and 0, are revealed only after he has
taken the occupational choice and investment decisions.
10 The length of the exclusion period is transformed into a probability in order to avoid an additional state 
variable that keeps track of the numbers of years left before the solvency status is returned to UN. This 
procedure is standard in the literature, see Athreya [2002] and Chatterjee et al. [2007].
U — E
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The workers’ ability process. Following the literature11 we assume that labor productivity 
follows the following AR(1 ) process12:
logy?* =  (1  -  p) fl + p l o g ( f t- i  +  et (1 -2 )
where Et is iid and e ~  N  (0, a£). If the agent becomes a worker his labor income during 
current period is given by wip.
The entrepreneurs’ ability process. In contrast to the case of working ability, there are no 
reliable estimates of the functional form for the case of entrepreneurial ability. Therefore, 
following Cagetti /  De Naxdi [2006], we will assume a parsimonious specification where 
entrepreneurial productivity follows a 2-state Markov process with 0L =  0 and 0H >  0 and 
transition matrix
tLti ^
MHPe =
P
l - vHH V
(1.3)
We calibrate the 3 parameters (0H, pHH and pLL) to match some observed features of 
entrepreneurial activity in the US economy.
1.3.3 Technology
Entrepreneurial sector Every agent in the economy has access to a productive technology 
that, depending on her entrepreneurial productivity 0 , produces output according to the 
production function
Yt =  O aikf (1.4)
where 0* is agent i's persistent entrepreneurial productivity described above. We assume that 
production is subject to an iid  idiosyncratic shock with Xi £ {0 , 1 }, where Xi — 0  happens 
with probability px. This iid shock represents the possibility that an inherently talented 
entrepreneur (i.e. an agent with high and persistent 0 *) might choose the wrong project or 
could be hit by an adverse demand shock. Quadrini [2000] shows that the entry rate of 
workers with some entrepreneurial experience in the past, is much higher than the entry rate 
of those workers without any experience. Therefore it seems that entrepreneurs come mostly 
from a small subset of total population. If their firms fail, they are very likely to start a new 
firm within a few years. The iid  shock Xi helps us to capture this difference in the entry 
rates.
Corporate sector Many firms axe both incorporated and big enough not to be subject to 
personal bankruptcy law. Therefore we follow Quadrini [2000] and Cagetti /  De Nardi [2006] 
and assume a perfectly competitive corporate sector which is modelled as a Cobb-Douglas
11 See for example Storesletten et al. [2004].
12 In the simulation we discretize this process by methods based on Tauchen [1986].
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production function
F ( K c, Lc) =  A K tL 1-< (1.5)
where K c and Lc are capital and labor employed in this sector. Given perfect competition 
and constant returns to scale the corporate sector does not distribute any dividend. Capital 
depreciates at rate 6 in both sectors.
1.3.4 Credit market
We assume that there is perfect competition in the credit market. Therefore banks must 
make zero profit on any contract13. The opportunity cost of the lending to entrepreneurs is 
the rate of return on capital in the corporate sector. This is also equal to the deposit rate. 14 
Banks offer one period non-contingent debt contracts. The only agent who interacts with 
banks is the unconstrained entrepreneur. Banks know everything about the agent: his assets 
and his productivities. For any given value of (a, 0- i ,  (p~i) and for any amount lent b, by 
anticipating the behavior of the entrepreneur, the banks are able to calculate the probability 
of default and how much they will get in the case of default. Perfect competition implies that 
they set the interest rate, r (a, 0_i, <p~i, b), such that they break even. Therefore, banks offer 
a menu of one period debt contracts which consists of an amount lent b and a corresponding 
interest rate r (a, 0 _ i, <f-i, b) to each agent (a, 0 _ i ,  <p~i).
1.3.5 Timing
At the beginning of the period, agents who have defaulted in the past and who have not received 
the positive credit status shock are borrowing constrained. The other agents are unconstrained. 
All agents face an occupational choice: they choose whether they become entrepreneurs 
or workers. However they make this decision without knowing their productivities (9, ip). 
Since these productivities follow a Markov process they use past productivities (0_i, <p~i) to 
forecast their current productivities (</?,#)•
Workers deposit all their wealth at the banks, receiving a rate of return rd. After produc­
tivities are realized and production has taken place, they choose consumption and savings. At 
the end of the period the borrowing constrained worker receives the credit status shock. With 
probability g he remains borrowing constrained next period (i.e. S' =  BC).  With probability 
(1 — g) he becomes unconstrained next period (i.e. S' =  UN).
The borrowing constrained entrepreneur can choose how much to invest in his firm before 
the current 9 is realized. He deposits the remaining wealth at the bank. Thus the entrepreneur
13 In many papers on consumer bankruptcy banks cross-subsidize loans. This implies however that a bank 
could make positive profits by denying credit to the most risky borrowers, (see Athreya [2002] and Li /  Sarte 
[2006]). For an approach similar to ours, see Chatterjee et al. [2007].
By the law of large numbers average ex post profits will be zero too
14 In our model the banks are isomorphic to a bond market in which each agent has the possibility to  issue 
debt.
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faces a portfolio choice between investing in his own firm (risky asset) or in a safe bank 
deposit. But he can not borrow. After (0, p) and x  3X6 realized and production has taken 
place, he chooses consumption and savings. At the end of the period he receives the credit 
status shock.
The unconstrained entrepreneur can borrow from perfectly competitive banks. Before 
knowing (0 , p) and x, he chooses his capital stock by deciding how much to borrow (or invest 
at rate rd). In case the entrepreneur borrows, by picking from the menu { 6 , r (a, 0 _ i, v?_i.&)} 
offered by banks, he invests everything in his own firm. After (0, <p) and x  3X6 realized and 
production has taken place, the entrepreneur can decide whether to repay his debt and be 
unconstrained next period (i.e. S' =  UN) or whether to declare bankruptcy and be borrowing 
constrained next period(i.e. S' =  BC).  After that he chooses consumption and savings.
Summarizing, the timing is as follows:
1. The agent enters the period with a state (a, 0_i , p~ i ,  S );
2. The agent chooses whether to become a worker or an entrepreneur;
3. Unconstrained entrepreneurs choose from the menu {b,r  (a, 0_i, &)} offered by
perfectly competitive banks;
4. Real and financial investment decisions axe taken;
5. Productivities (0, ip) and the iid shock x  £ {0 , 1 } are realized and production takes 
place;
6 . Bankruptcy decisions are taken by the unconstrained entrepreneurs;
7. Consumption and saving decisions axe taken;
8 . The credit status shocks for all borrowing constrained agents are realized;
9. End of period: the new state is (a', 0, p, S').
Since the credit state S  consists only of the two states B C  and UN,  we define the individual 
state variable as (a, 0_i, p~i) ,  and we solve for two value functions V UN ( a , 6 - i , p - i )  and 
V BC (a, 0_i, p - \ )  one for each credit status.
1.3.6 The problem of the borrowing constrained agent
This agent cannot borrow, but he can save at an interest rate rd. At the beginning of the 
period he can choose whether to become an entrepreneur, which gives utility N BC (a, 0_i, p~i)  
or a worker which yields utility W BC (a, 0_i, p - \ ) .  Therefore the value of being a borrowing 
constrained agent with state (a, 0 _i,<^_i) is
V BC (a, 0_i, p - { )  =  max (a, 0_i, p - i ) , W BC (a, 0_i, </?-i)} (1.6)
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where the "max" operator reflects the occupational choice.
Worker At the beginning of the period the borrowing constrained worker deposits all his 
wealth at the bank. Then (0, p) are realized, production takes place and he receives labor 
income wp. At the end of the period, he chooses consumption and saving, taking into account 
that he will receive a credit status shock. With probability g he will be still borrowing 
constrained next period with an utility V BC (a', 0, p), while with a probability (1 — g) he 
will become unconstrained with an utility V UN (a',0,p).  Therefore the expected utility of a 
borrowing constrained worker with wealth a and productivities (0 _i,(/?_i) is
W BC ( a , 0 - i , p - i )  =
( max.{u(c) + / 3 [ g V BC (a',0,p) +  ( l - g ) V UN (a' , e ,p) ] }  1 (1.7)
E \y s.t. c +  a' =  w p  +  f 1 +  rd) a
Entrepreneur At the beginning of the period the borrowing constrained entrepreneur chooses 
the amount of capital, k E [0 , a], to invest in his firm and the amount a — k to deposit at the 
bank. After (0, p) and the shock \  3X6 realized he will decide how to allocate the resources 
x6ku +  (1 — 6) k +  1^ +  rd) (a — k) among consumption and savings. Therefore the optimal 
value of the borrowing constrained entrepreneur is
N BC (a, 9- U ¥>_,) =
( m ax {u(c)  +  D [ev BC (a’, e, <p) +  (1 — e) v UN K  e, v ) ] } I ( i.s )  
max E  < a >c >
o<fc<a y s.t. c +  a ' =  +  (1  — 5 ) k  +  ^1 +  r dj  (a — k)  J
where the expectation operator E  {•} now considers also the temporary shock X-
1.3.7 The problem of the unconstrained agent
At the beginning of the period the unconstrained agent faces the following occupational choice
V UN ( a , 0 - i , p - i )  =  max { \ V UN (a, 0 - i , p - i )  , N un ( a , 0 - i , p - i ) J  (1.9)
where W UN (a, 0 - i , p - i )  is the utility of becoming a worker and N un (a, 0 - i , p - i )  of becom­
ing an entrepreneur.
Worker The problem of the unconstrained worker is identical to the borrowing constrained 
one except that the agent will be unconstrained in the future for sure. His utility is
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f max \u  (c) +  (3Vun  (a', 0, p ) \  1
W UN (a, 0-i ,<p-i)  — \ c’a' 1 (  . M  (1.10)
y s.t. c + a' =  wip + (1 + r dJ a J
Entrepreneur The unconstrained entrepreneur decides how much to invest in his firm
k = a +  b by choosing how much to borrow (b > 0) or save at rate rd (b < 0). If he borrows
he can choose from the menu ( 6 , r (a, 0_i, <p~i, b)} offered by the banks. After (6, y?) and the 
shock x  are realized he can choose whether to declare bankruptcy (default) or whether to 
repay and how much to consume and save. He solves the problem backwards.
If he repays his debt, he has to choose how to allocate his resources, x0kv +  (1 — (5) k — 
b [1 +  r (a, 6 - i , (fi-i, 6 )], between consumption and savings. Given that the decision of repaying 
is done when current productivities (6 , (p) and the shock x  are known, his utility from repaying 
is given by
N pay (a, b, 6, <p, x) =  m ax \u {c)  +  (3VUN (a', 0,y?)| (1.11)
c,a' < J
s.t. a ' + c = x0kv + (1  — 6) k — b [1 +  r (a, 0 _ i ,  <p~i, 6 )] (1 -1 2 )
k =  a +  b (1.13)
If he defaults, his debt is discharged. But he loses all his assets in excess of the ex­
emption level X . Thus, the resources to allocate between consumption and savings are 
min {x6ku +  (1 — 6) k , X} .  Moreover if he defaults he will be borrowing constrained next 
period. Therefore by declaring bankruptcy he gets
N bankr (a,b,8, tp,x) =  m ax{«(c) +  /?VBC(a ',0 ,VO} (1.14)
c,a' *■ J
s. t .a'  +  c =  min {x0ku +  (1 — £) k, X }  (1-15)
k =  a +  6 (1-16)
He will declare bankruptcy if N bankr (a, b, 0,ipx) > N pay (a, 6, 6, ip, x) and vice versa. Thus, 
at the beginning of the period the agent choose the optimal amount of b from the menu 
{b, r  (a, 0_i, y?_i,&)} anticipating his future behavior. Therefore his utility is given by
N on  ( a ^ - u v - i )  =
L / F18*  . , ,E \m ax{NPay (a,b,S,‘P , x ) ,N bankr (a,b,e,ifi,x)}]
where the max operator inside the square brackets reflects the bankruptcy decision, and 
the max operator outside the square brackets reflects the borrowing decision.
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1.3.8 The zero profit condition for the banks
We assume that the banks observe the state variables (a, 9 - i ,  tp-\)  at the moment of offering 
the contract. For any given state (a,0_i,</?_i) and for any given loan 6 , the bank knows 
in which states of the world the agent will declare bankruptcy by solving the problem of 
the agent. Therefore it is able to calculate exactly the probability that a certain agent 
with characteristics (a, 9-i , ip~i)  will default for any given loan b. Denote this probability 
(a, e - u t p - u  b).
If the agent repays the bank receives [1 +  r(a, 0_i, &)] b. If the agent defaults the bank
sells the firm’s undepreciated capital and it does not obtain the full value, but only a fraction 
/ .  This captures two features. First, since business wealth is not exempt under Chapter 7, 
the agent will try to move as much wealth as possible out of his firm into exempt wealth, 
e.g. housing. Second, as for example shown by Ramey /  Shapiro [2001], the sales value of 
business assets is below their value with the firm. Therefore the bank receives: nothing if 
x9kv 4 - /  (1 — <5) (a — b) < X  while it receives x^kv +  f  (1 — 5) (a +  b) — X  otherwise.
The zero profit condition for the bank is given by
- 7 r banfcr(a,0_i,<£_i,6)] [1 +  r (a ,  0_i, </?_!,&)] 6+ ^
7rba”fcr(a,0_1,^_1,6)max{x^1' +  /  (1 -  <$) (a 4- 6) -  X , 0} y
=  (1  +  rd)b (1.18)
1.3.9 Equilibrium
Let 77 =  (a, 9-i ,  <p~i, S) be a state vector for an individual, where a denotes assets, 9- \  
entrepreneurial productivity, (f- \  working productivity and S  the credit status. From the 
optimal policy functions (savings, capital demand, default decisions), from the exogenous 
Markov process for productivity and from the credit status shocks, we can derive a transition 
function, that, for any distribution n (77) over the state provides the next period distribution 
/ /  (77). A stationary equilibrium is given by
• a deposit rate of return rd and a wage rate w
• an interest rate function r  (77)
• a set of policy functions g (77) (consumption and saving, capital demand, bankruptcy 
decisions and the occupational choice)
• a constant distribution over the state 77, /i* (77) 
such as, given rd and w:
• g (77) solves the maximization problem of the agents;
• the corporate sector representative firm is optimizing;
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• capital, labor and goods market clear:
— capital demands come both from entrepreneurs and from the corporate sector, 
while supply comes from saving decisions of the agents;
— labor demand comes from corporate sector, while labor supply come from the 
occupational choice of the agents;
• the function r  (rj) reflects the zero profit condition of the banks
• The distribution p* (rj) is the invariant distribution associated with the transition 
function generated by the optimal policy function g (rj) and the exogenous shocks.
The model has no analytical solution and must be solved numerically. The algorithm used 
to solve the model and other details are presented in the appendix.
1.4 Calibration and baseline results
1.4.1 Parametrization 
Fixed parameters
Following standard practice in the literature we try to minimize the number of parameters of 
the model used to match the data. We therefore select some parameters which have already 
been estimated in the literature. We choose p =  0.95 for the auto-regressive coefficient of the 
earnings process15. The variance of the earnings process is chosen to match the Gini index of 
labor income as in PSID data which is 0.3816. The process is approximated using a 4-state 
Markov chain, using the Tauchen [1986] method as suggested by Adda /  Cooper [2003]17. 
Total factor productivity is normalized to 1, while the share of capital in the Cobb-Douglas 
technology for the Corporate sector is set to £ =  0.36. The depreciation rate is set S =  0.08. 
Felicity is assumed to be CRRA with coefficient of relative risk aversion a =  2.
These parameters are summarized in table 1.1:
15 In a life cycle setting, Storesletten et al. [2004, 2001] find p  in the range between 0.95 and 0.98. We choose 
p — 0.95 to take into account that the agents in our model are infinitely lived. Since the intergenerational 
auto-regressive coefficient is lower. Solon [1992] estimates it around 0.4.
16 The exact value of the variance is a l  =  .08125. This is higher than the estim ate of Storesletten et al. 
[2004] of about 0.02. We abstract from many important factors that are empirically relevant for the earnings 
distribution, e.g. human capital, life-cycle savings. Therefore, in order to generate the observed inequality, we 
choose a higher variance of the earnings process.
17 Floden [2008] shows that for highly correlated processes the m ethod of Adda /  Cooper [2003] achieves a 
higher accuracy than the original methods of Tauchen [1986] and Tauchen /  Hussey [1991].
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Table 1.1: The fixed parameters
Parameter Sym bol B aseline
TFP A
£
6
1 (normalization)
Share of capital 
Depreciation rate 
CRRA a
0.36
0.08
2
ipi =  0.316, </?2 =  0.745 
</?3 =  1.342, </?4 =  3.163Working productivities < (f2  < if3  < <£>4
Transition matrix
0.8393 0.1579 0.0028 0.0000 
0.1579 0.6428 0.1965 0.0028 
0.0028 0.1965 0.6428 0.1579 
0.0000 0.0028 0.1579 0.8393
Bankruptcy policy parameters
The two policy parameters are the exemption level X  and the probability g of remaining 
borrowing constrained. The law does not state any formal period of exclusion from credit 
after bankruptcy filing. For our baseline specification, we set g =  0.2 which corresponds 
to an average exclusion period from credit of 5 years18. The exemption level differs across 
US states. Using state-level data for 1993, we calculate the population-weighted average 
exemption level across states . 19 ("homestead" plus "personal property" exemption). The 
resulting average exemption level is $77,591, taking an average household labor income of 
$45,000 corresponds to a value of 1.72 for the exemption/wage ratio. Table 1.2 summarizes 
the bankruptcy parameters:
Calibrated parameters
We are left with the following 7 parameters to be calibrated: high entrepreneurial productivity 
(9H), entrepreneurial productivity transition matrix {pHH ,pLL), concavity of entrepreneurial 
production function (u), capital specificity ( /) , discount factor (/?) and the probability of the 
transitory shock ( px).
We choose these 7 parameters such that the model matches the following 7 moments of
18 This choice is in line with the consumer bankruptcy literature which sets the average length of exclusion in 
this range. Athreya [2002] sets this at 4 years, Li /  Sarte [2006] to 5 years, Chatterjee et al. [2007] to 10 years.
19 We took the data from Berkowitz /  White [2004] and top-coded the unlimited homestead exemption to the 
maximum state exemption.
Table 1.2: the bankruptcy parameters
Param eter Sym bol V alue
Exemption /  wage
Exclusion period (expressed as probability)
X / w  1.72
g 0.2
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the US economy. First we want the model to match the capital-output ratio (K/Y) in US 
economy. In the literature we find values ranging from 2.5 to 3.1 We target it to be 2.8 
and we check the sensitivity of the results to different values. We target the fraction of 
exits through bankruptcy (bankruptcy/exit). Given the discussion in Section 2 we set this 
equal to 20%.20 The fraction of entrepreneurs in the total population is 7.6% in the Survey 
of Consumers Finances.21 Based on data from the US Small Business Administration the 
exit rate of entrepreneurs is equal to 9.3%. Therefore we set the baseline target at 9.3%. 
However the exit rate based on the PSID is higher (around 13.6%).22 Therefore we check the 
sensitivity of results to higher values.
Quadrini [2000] points out that the entry rate for workers who had some entrepreneurial 
experience in the past is much higher than the entry rate for those without any experience. It 
seems that entrepreneurs come mostly from a small subset of total population. If their firms 
fail, they are very likely to start a new firm within a few years. In the PSID the ratio of entry 
rate of experienced entrepreneurs over the average entry rate is 13. This is an important 
target because the bankruptcy law affects the possibility and the speed of re-entry for failed 
entrepreneurs.
Since the benefits of bankruptcy depend crucially on the wealth of an agent we match some 
features of the wealth distribution. The US wealth distribution is extremely skewed with the 
top 40% of richest households holding around 93% of total assets.23 The Gini coefficient is 
very high, at around 0.8. There is a large literature that tries to match the wealth distribution 
in the US. The most difficult part is to match the extremely rich agents at the top end of 
the distribution. But, as we show below, for our model it is particularly important to match 
the lower end of the distribution. Therefore we target the share of wealth held by the richest 
40%. As a last target we choose to match the ratio of the median wealth of entrepreneurs to 
the median wealth in the whole population. This target captures features of both the wealth 
distribution and entrepreneurial productivity and technology. We set the target to 5.6 as 
found in the SCF.24
The targets are summarized in the second column of table 4.
1.4.2 The baseline calibration
We first present the baseline version of the model. Table 1.3 reports the value of the calibrated 
parameters in the baseline specification
while table 1.4 reports the value of the targets and the actual results achieved in the
20 Given the uncertainty about the estimates we check the sensitivity of results to changing this target to 10% 
and to 30%.
21 See Appendix B for data sources, definitions and further details.
22 One possible explanation for this difference could be that the PSID undersamples wealthy households. 
Therefore successful entrepreneurs are likely to be undersampled.
23 See Appendix B for details.
24 This ratio ranges from 4.8 to 5.6 in the SCF according to definitions of entrepreneurs and samples adopted.
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Table 1.3: the calibrated parameters
Param eter Sym bol B enchm ark Value
High entrepreneurial productivity eH 0.52
Entrepreneurial productivity transition ph h ,p ll 0.95 , 0.9937
Concavity of entrepreneurial technology V 0.875
Capital specificity f 0.4
Discount factor (3 0.865
Probability of transitory shock ppc 0.185
baseline specification.
Table 1.4: the baseline calibration targets
M om ent Target M odel
Fraction of Entrepreneurs (in %) 7.6 7.6
Ratio of medians (in %) 5.6 4.34
Share of net-worth of top 40% 93.0 89.4
K /Y 2.8 2.687
Exit Rate (in %) 9.3 9.4
Bankruptcy/Exit (in %) 20.0 22.0
Entry rate of experienced/Average entry rate 13.0 8.3
The equilibrium rate of return on capital in the corporate sector (rd) is 7.81%. Since the 
equilibrium wage is 1.0207, each unit in our model correspond approximately to $44,000 in 
1993. Less than one percent (0.79%) of the total population is borrowing constrained. Even 
though our model does not replicate exactly the ratio of medians and the share of the wealth 
held by the richest 40%, it captures the main features that entrepreneurs are several times 
richer than workers and that most of the wealth is held by the richest. Table 1.5 shows 
that our model does not replicate the wealth concentration at the top end of the wealth 
distribution. In particular the richest one percent hold 16% of total wealth in our model 
while they hold 35% in the data25. However for the purpose of our policy experiments it is 
important that the model replicates the middle and lower part of the wealth distribution 
since bankruptcy law affects almost exclusively these agents.
Table 1.5: wealth distribution: data and model
percentage w ealth  in top
1% 5% 20% 40% 60%
US data (SCF 1995) 35 56 81 93 99
Benchmark model 16 38 65 84 95
Even though our model does not replicate the difference in the entry rate between experi­
25 This is the reason that the Gini coefficient of wealth is 0.64 in the model, while it is 0.8 in the data. Cagetti 
/  De Nardi [2006] and Castaneda et al. [2003] show that life-cycle savings and the bequest motive are essential 
to match the wealth distribution. Introducing these features in the model would be computationally too costly.
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enced and inexperienced workers exactly it captures the fact that the former are many times 
more likely to enter entrepreneurship than the latter.
Quadrini [2000] reports that around 40% of total capital is invested in the entrepreneurial 
sector. In our baseline specification this fraction is slightly higher, around 45%. However the 
US. Small Business Administration estimates that the share of the entrepreneurial sector in 
terms of employment is 50%.
1.5 Investigating the m odel’s mechanisms
1.5.1 Occupational choice
The key ingredient of the model is occupational choice. Figure 1.1 represents the occupational 
choice of an unconstrained agent with high entrepreneurial productivity and low working 
productivity. The dotted line shows the value function of becoming a worker, whereas the 
solid line shows the value function of becoming an entrepreneur26.
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Figure 1.1: Occupational choice (5 =  UN, 0- i  =  6H =  0.316)
The first result is that, otherwise identical agents choose differently according to their 
wealth: poor agents become workers while rich agents become entrepreneurs. This result 
is standard in the occupational choice under credit market imperfections literature [see for
26 The value functions have kinks since the actual value function for an unconstrained agent is given by the 
upper envelop of the two functions in Figure 1.1. Therefore discounted utility tomorrow is kinked as well. The 
kinks do no coincide exactly with the intersection of the two functions. However the kinks must be close to 
the intersection of the two curves exactly because the value function tomorrow is identical for entrepreneur 
and worker.
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example Banerjee /  Newman 1993]. The main reasons are that poor agents have smaller 
firms and face higher interest rates. They have smaller firms because, being poor, they need 
to borrow more but they face higher rates on the loans. The cost of financing is higher for the 
poor for two reasons. First, they have a higher incentive to default. Defaulting rich agents 
have to give up all their wealth above the exemption level. Second, in the event of default 
the bank gets less when the agent is poor. Thus, to break even, the bank has to charge a 
higher interest rate. That is, in this model, wealth acts as collateral.
1.5.2 The behavior of the unconstrained agents
The second important ingredient is the decision of the unconstrained entrepreneurs. The 
solution of the entrepreneurs’ problem is represented in Figure 1.2:
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Figure 1.2: interest rate and firm size (0_i =  dH, ~  1.341)
The upper panel shows credit demand (debt) of the entrepreneur, the middle panel 
represents the corresponding interest rate charged and the lower panel capital demand (firm 
size). As shown above the poorer agents (e.g. agents with assets a =  2) become workers while 
all the others become entrepreneurs (a >  3.5). The very rich entrepreneurs (e.g. a =  14) will 
never find it profitable to default. Their wealth is so high that defaulting is too costly for 
them. Therefore they can borrow at rate rd. The "middle class" entrepreneurs (e.g. a =  6) 
will instead default if their productivity 6 drops to 0L or a bad shock (x =  0) happens, since 
the cost of bankruptcy is lower for them. Then the bank, in order to break even, must charge 
a higher interest rate. The interest rate depends (negatively) on the assets of the entrepreneur, 
because in the event of default the bank will be able to seize the difference between the 
assets of the entrepreneur and the exemption level. Capital demand for the "middle-class"
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entrepreneurs is increasing because the cost of borrowing is declining. The discontinuity in 
all three functions between "middle-class" and rich entrepreneurs (around a = 10.5) is due to 
the change in the default decision. Those who default are insured against the bad outcome 
whereas those who do not default are not. This explains why relatively poorer agents (e.g. 
a =  10) have slightly bigger firms than relatively richer agents (e.g. a — 11).
1.5.3 A first look at the effects of bankruptcy
Bankruptcy affects the problem of the unconstrained agents, because it changes credit 
conditions and the extent of insurance available. We examine these effects with the following 
experiment. We compare the behavior of the unconstrained agents and the banks in two 
different situations: one in which bankruptcy is allowed and one in which bankruptcy is 
absent. Figure 1.3 shows the capital demand function and the interest rate function in these 
situations.
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Figure 1.3: Firm size and interest rate (S =  UN, 0- i  =  0H,(p~i =  1.314)
The effects of allowing bankruptcy depend on the wealth of the agent. First, the behavior 
of the very rich (e.g. a =  12) is not affected. They are entrepreneurs and they repay their 
debt even in the bad states. As explained above, even if bankruptcy is available, it is too 
costly for them. Second, allowing bankruptcy affects the behavior of the less rich agents 
(e.g. a =  8). They are entrepreneurs in both situations. But when bankruptcy is allowed 
they borrow more because they can and will default in the bad states. Therefore their firms 
are bigger (upper panel). This insurance comes at expense of higher interest rates (lower 
panel). Anticipating default in the bad states the banks have to charge higher interest rates 
in order to break even. We call this increase in the firm size the intensive margin. Third,
a s se ts
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the occupational choice of even less rich agents (e.g. a =  4) is affected. When bankruptcy 
is not allowed they are not insured against bad outcomes. Therefore they do not want to 
borrow, even though they could borrow at rate rd. They become workers. When bankruptcy 
is allowed they are insured against bad outcomes. Therefore they borrow, even though they 
have to pay a high interest rate. This increases the rewards of entrepreneurship enough to 
change their occupational choice. We call this increase of the number of entrepreneurs the 
extensive margin. Fourth, the occupational choice of the very poor agents (e.g. a =  2) is not 
affected, they are workers in both situations.
In this particular experiment abolishing bankruptcy reduces entrepreneurship and firm 
size, the intensive and the extensive margins are negative. The negative effect of lowering the 
amount of insurance available dominates the positive effect of better credit conditions.
1.6 The effects of bankruptcy reforms
We now turn to analyze the effects of changes in the bankruptcy law. We conduct 2 different 
experiments:
1. we change the exemption level from zero, which corresponds to eliminating bankruptcy 
completely, to a very high level, twice the current level;
2. we change the length of the credit market exclusion period from two to 20 years.27
We will focus our attention mainly on changes in the following variables: entrepreneurship, 
the poors’ access to entrepreneurship, welfare, distributional issues and social mobility.
1.6.1 Changing the exemption level
Our first policy experiment is to analyze the effects of changing the exemption level. First 
we inspect the changes in the policy functions and later we analyze the quantitative results. 
Figure 1.4 reports capital demand (upper panel) and the interest rate (lower panel) for 3 
different values of X/ w.  It shows the effects of increasing the exemption level from X / w  =  0, 
which corresponds to completely eliminating bankruptcy to an intermediate one ( X / w  =  0.875) 
and to the actual one (X/ w =  1.72).
Increasing the exemption level, from zero to 0.875 has two effects. Both, the firms get 
bigger (intensive margin) and more agents enter entrepreneurship (extensive margin). The 
insurance effect is dominating. Further increasing the exemption level, to the current level of 
1.72, has three effects. First, agents with assets around 3, who were entrepreneurs before, 
become workers because credit conditions worsen so much that they outweigh the increase
27 In the model this corresponds to changing the probability of receiving a positive solvency shock g from 0.5 
to 0.05.
1.6 The effects of bankruptcy reforms 35
T
T340- 
« 3S E 30 
-2U  25 
1 20
f:
— X/w = 0 
— X/w = 0.875
'[• .... X/W = 1.72 -
f
iL -
I
J- - - - - - - - - - - 1— - J--------- :--------- ;--------- i------------------ )---------l______ 1______0 1- - -- - -- - -- i---*— ------- - - - - - - - - 1- ----------------1- - - - --- ------1- ----------------1- - --- -----------1- - - - - --------1------------------- ------------------- .
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
assets
Figure 1.4: Firm size and interest rates, different exemption levels (6- \  =  dH,<p-i =  1.342)
in insurance. The extensive margin is negative. Second, agents with assets around 6 axe 
charged higher interest rates for the same reasons. Thus they run smaller firms. For these 
agents the intensive margin is negative. Third, agents with assets around 10 switch from 
never defaulting to defaulting in the bad states. Now they runs bigger firms, even if credit 
conditions are worse, because of the insurance effect. For these agents the intensive margin is 
positive.
The magnitude of these effects depends on the number of agents affected. The extensive 
margin is unambiguously positive. The sign of the intensive margin, however, is ambiguous. 
It depends on the wealth distribution. The increase in capital demand of agents with asset 
around 10 is bigger than the decrease in capital demand of agents with asset around 6. But 
the overall effects depend on the number of agents in these areas of the wealth distribution.
Table 1.6 reports the variables of interest for 5 values of X/ w.  Column 2 reports results 
when bankruptcy is absent (X/ w =  0). Column 4 reports results for the baseline calibration 
(X / w  =  1.72) and column 6 for doubling the current exemption level (X / w  =  3.5).
The first pattern to notice is that no bankruptcy and extremely generous bankruptcy law 
produce very similar results (see column 2 and column 6). When bankruptcy is absent the 
demand for risky loans (loans with high interest rate due to high positive default probability) 
is zero. Entrepreneurial activity is so risky that only relatively rich agents, who always repay 
and get credit at rate rd, become entrepreneurs. When bankruptcy law is very generous, the 
banks have to charge such high interest rates on risky loans that nobody demands them. 
Again, only rich agents become entrepreneurs. This also explains that the ratio of medians is 
highest in the case of no bankruptcy and very generous bankruptcy law. Even though for
assets
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Table 1.6: the effects of changes in the exemption level
X /w 0 0.875 1.72 2.625 3.5
Exit rate (in %) 9.5 9.9 9.4 9.6 9.6
Fraction of Entrepreneurs (in %) 7.4 8.1 7.6 7.4 7.4
Bankruptcy/Exit (in % ) 0 45.9 22.2 0.2 0.3
Capital/Output 2.677 2.693 2.677 2.677 2.677
Median assets of Entr/ Median assets 4.467 4.157 4.347 4.429 4.429
Share of Capital in entr. sector (in %) 47.8 49.4 47.9 47.8 47.8
Gini of Assets 0.635 0.636 0.635 0.635 0.635
Share of assets in top 40% of pop (in %) 89.0 89.3 89.0 89.0 89.0
Median output in entrepreneurial sector 15.05 14.55 14.58 15.05 15.05
Welfare ( %-change in cons .-equivalent) -0.07 1.26 0 -0.05 -0.05
Welfare of the POOR -0.09 1.27 0 -0.07 -0.06
Welfare of the RICH -0.02 1.23 0 0.03 0
each level of assets entrepreneurs borrow less and therefore have smaller firms, the median 
firm size is bigger under extreme bankruptcy laws, see Figure 1.528. The reason for this result 
is again that only rich agents, who have bigger firms, become entrepreneurs.
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Figure 1.5: Firm size distribution for different exemption levels
Next we investigate the effects of increasing the exemption level gradually from X / w  =  0 
to X / w  — 3.5 on entrepreneurship, the poors’ access to entrepreneurship, welfare, wealth 
distribution and social mobility. As can be seen in table 1.6 almost all variables follow a 
hump-shaped pattern.
28 We smoothed the firm size distribution by creating ten equally sized bins to make the figure easier to read.
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Entrepreneurship Increasing the exemption level first increases and then decreases the 
fraction of entrepreneurs. The insurance effect dominates the credit market conditions effect 
for low exemption levels. The opposite is true for high exemption levels. The exit rate and 
the fraction of exits through bankruptcy follow the behavior of the fraction of entrepreneurs. 
The fraction of exits through bankruptcy first increases from zero percent to 46% when the 
exemption level increases from X / w  =  0 to X / w  =  0.875. As insurance is higher, a bigger 
fraction of exits happens through bankruptcy. When the exemption level increases further, 
from X / w  =  0.875 to X / w  =  3.5 the fraction falls gradually back to zero percent because 
only the rich, who never default, become entrepreneurs.
The impact of different exemption levels on the investment behavior of entrepreneurs can 
be understood from the firm size distribution, see Figure 1.629.
— X/w=0 
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size (output)
Figure 1.6: Firm size distribution (different exemption levels)
Increasing the exemption level from X / w  =  0 to X / w  =  0.875 leads to the creation of more 
small firms due to positive extensive and intensive margins, see also Figure 1.4. When we 
further increase the exemption level to X / w  =  1.72 some of these new small firms disappear 
because the negative effect on credit market conditions dominates.
Access to entrepreneurship of the poor Next we turn to how bankruptcy law affects the 
determinants of entry into entrepreneurship. There is allocative inefficiency in our model 
because insurance markets are missing. Part of this inefficiency is reflected in some poor 
highly productive agents not becoming entrepreneurs, either because they receive too little
29 As shown in Figure 1.5, the firm size distribution for higher exemption levels is identical to the case X / w  =  0. 
Therefore in Figure 1.6 we report only the cases: X / w  =  0, X / w  =  0.875, and X / w  =  1.72.
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insurance or because the conditions at which credit is available are too bad. Table 1.7 
reports the effects of different exemption levels on the minimum assets needed for the highly 
productive (0_\ =  0H) agent to become an entrepreneur.
Table 1.7: minimum wealth for entrepreneurship
X /w 0 0.875 1.72 2.625 3.5
( f-1=  0.316 0.481 0.160 0.421 0.381 0.361
ip-1= 0.745 1.323 0.842 1.263 1.323 1.323
(p-!=  1.342 3.768 2.946 3.507 3.768 3.768
<P-1= 3.163 16.032 15.030 15.230 16.032 16.032
The rows show these values for the levels of working productivity The attractive­
ness of becoming a worker is increasing in working productivity. Thus, in order to enter 
entrepreneurship, the expected profits must be higher for an agent with high working produc­
tivity. Since richer agents need to borrow relatively less and since they receive better credit 
conditions, their expected profits are higher. This implies that, to become an entrepreneur, 
an agent with high working productivity must be richer than an agent with low working 
productivity.
At each level of working productivity the wealth level at which an agent enters entrepreneur­
ship is lowest when X /w  =  0.875. Thus, even from an efficiency point of view a less generous 
bankruptcy law would improve upon the status quo. However, abolishing bankruptcy com­
pletely would make it more difficult for the poor to become entrepreneurs, thereby worsening 
allocative efficiency.
Welfare Following Aiyagari /  Mcgrattan [1998], to assess welfare we first calculate expected 
utility in each bankruptcy policy regime separately
V  =  f  V(V)dp*(rj) (1.19)
Jv
where rj =  (a, 0_i, S) and p* (rj) is the equilibrium steady state distribution. Thus, 
expected utility is measured over all asset levels, productivities and the credit status. This 
utilitarian social welfare function weights all households equally. Then we calculate the 
constant, at all states and dates, amount of consumption, consumption equivalent, that 
yields expected utility V .30 We compare two bankruptcy policy regimes by calculating the 
percentage change in consumption equivalent that makes agents indifferent between the two 
regimes. For example, for a given regime Q, that yields utility V®, this percentage change in
30 Thus, we first calculate a constant c that yields that same utility as V.  Given CRRA preferences this is the 
solution to:
 ^ l-<r J l - 0
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consumption equivalent is given by
Q _  (  y q  +  i / [ ( i - , ) ( i - f l ]  \ _
where a positive implies that regime Q increases welfare with respect to the baseline 
regime.
Table 1.6 shows that welfare follows the same hump-shaped pattern as the other variables. 
In particular welfare is highest for exemption level X / w  =  0.875. Thus, halving the current 
exemption level would increase welfare by 1.26%, which corresponds to an increase in annual 
consumption of approximately $700 for the average household.
Table 1.6 also shows that there are no adverse distributional effects. Both, rich and poor 
agents31 gain from reducing the exemption level from the current one.
Wealth distribution and social mobility Entrepreneurs are relatively less rich compared to 
the entire population when X / w  =  0.875. This is shown by the ratio of median assets in table 
1.6. This is again due to the fact that there are more poor entrepreneurs when X / w  =  0.875 
than for any other exemption level. However changing the exemption level has little effect on 
the wealth distribution: it does not change significantly the Gini coefficient and the share of 
wealth held by the richest agents. The changes in entrepreneurship and firm sizes are too 
small to significantly affect the wealth distribution.
We investigate the effects on social mobility by dividing all agents in 3 wealth classes: 
poor, middle-class and rich, where each class accounts for 1/3 of total population. Then we 
compute the transition between these classes over a 10 year horizon for the different values of 
the exemption level. The results are reported in tables 1.8 to 1.1032.
Table 1.8: 10-years transition matrix: X / w  =  0
poor middle-class rich
poor 0.721 0.246 0.033
middle-class 0.277 0.482 0.241
rich 0.004 0.270 0.726
These tables show that there is slightly more mobility in the intermediate case ( X / w  =
0.875) since the probabilities along the main diagonal are smaller. As shown in table 1.7, 
for intermediate exemption levels poorer agents have more insurance and therefore enter 
entrepreneurship. Thus, in our model, entrepreneurship is a vehicle of social mobility. This is 
consistent with the findings of Quadrini [2000].
31 We define a poor agent as one with assets less than the median. Comparing the top and bottom quintiles 
yields similar results.
32 Again, results for X / w  — 2.625 and X / w  =  3.5 are not reported. They are very similar to the case with  
X / w  =  0.
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Table 1.9: 10-years transition matrix: X / w  =  0.875
poor middle-class rich
poor 0.717 0.249 0.034
middle-class 0.279 0.478 0.243
rich 0.004 0.274 0.722
ble 1.10: 10-years transition matrix: X / w  =  1
poor middle-class rich
poor 0.720 0.248 0.032
middle-class 0.276 0.480 0.244
rich 0.005 0.271 0.724
1.6.2 Changing the exclusion period
The second policy experiment we conduct is to change the length of time an agent who has 
defaulted is excluded from borrowing33. As discussed above we model this as changes in the 
probability of a favorable credit status shock: g. Therefore a low g represents a long exclusion 
period while a high g represents a short exclusion period.
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Figure 1.7: Utility and capital demand of borrowing constrained and unconstrained en­
trepreneur
Table 1.11 reports the effects of gradually increasing the exclusion period from two years 
(g =  0.5) to 20 years (g =  0.05) on the main variables. The baseline value of five years
33 The length of the exclusion period is determined mainly by banks in the US, but in principle this could be 
regulated by a law.
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(g =  0.2) is reported in column four.
Table 1.11: the effects of changes in the exclusion period
Q 0.5 0.25 0.2 0.1 0.05
Exit rate (in %) 9.3 9.4 9.4 9.6 9.8
Fraction of Entrepreneurs 
(in %)
7.7 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.4
Bankruptcy/Exit (in %) 23.6 22.7 22.2 21.1 20.1
Capital/Output 2.686 2.680 2.678 2.668 2.654
Median assets of Entr/ 
Median assets
4.431 4.388 4.329 4.225 4.156
Share of capital in entr. 
sector (in %)
48.8 48.0 47.8 46.7 45.4
Gini of Assets 0.065 0.065 0.063 0.064 0.063
Share of assets in top 40% 
of pop. (in %)
89.2 89.1 89.0 88.8 88.6
Median output in 
entrepreneurial sector
14.991 14.535 14.576 13.701 12.289
Welfare ( %-change in 
cons.-equivalent)
0.12 0.02 0 -0.18 -0.43
Welfare of the POOR 0.05 -0.04 0 -0.09 -0.28
Welfare of the RICH 0.34 0.21 0 -0.46 -0.84
Table 1.11 shows that reducing the length of the exclusion period increases welfare, and 
the fraction of entrepreneurs monotonically. However these changes are quantitatively much 
smaller than in the case of changing the exemption level. The main implication of increasing 
q is to allow highly productive, failed agents to regain access to credit earlier. Figure 1.7 
shows the difference in utility and the difference in firm size for a highly productive agent 
between being borrowing constrained and being unconstrained.
One important difference between changing the exemption level and changing the exclusion 
period is that the credit market conditions effects are smaller. Both, increasing the exemption 
level and lowering the exclusion period, increase the attractiveness of defaulting. However, 
the latter does not affect the amount recovered by banks in the event of a default. Therefore 
the interest rates charged by banks do not change for most agents, see for example the agents 
with assets between four and ten in Figure 1.8. These agents default in the bad states for 
all values of g. However agents with assets around 10.5 change their behavior. Instead of 
repaying their debt in all states, as they do when g =  0.05, they default in the bad states 
when g =  0.5 because defaulting is more attractive. Therefore they borrow more and have 
bigger firms. For similar reasons, agents with assets around 3.5 enter entrepreneurship only
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when g increases.
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Figure 1.8: C apital dem and and interest rate, different g (0_i =  0 H i =  1.341)
Some of the defaulters are hit by the very persistent change in entrepreneurial productivity. 
Therefore only a fraction of defaulters are still highly productive as entrepreneurs. This 
implies that the overall effects are small.
Next we investigate the effects of increasing the exclusion period from 2 years (g — 0.5) 
to 20 years (g =  0.05) on entrepreneurship, the poors’ access to entrepreneurship, welfare, 
wealth distribution and social mobility in detail.
Increasing the exclusion period from 2 years (g =  0.5) to 20 years (g =  0.05) lowers the 
fraction of entrepreneurs. As shown in Figure 1.8, poorer agents do not enter entrepreneurship 
as often as before because the cost of defaulting is higher. The median firm size decreases 
because relatively rich entrepreneurs change their behavior. When they are hit by a bad shock 
they do not default anymore. This implies that they are fully exposed to the production risk. 
Therefore they operate smaller firms.
The wealth levels needed to become an entrepreneur, one for each level of working produc­
tivity, are reported in table 1.12.
Increasing the exclusion period implies that more wealth is needed to enter entrepreneurship. 
Therefore it makes access to entrepreneurship more difficult for poor but highly productive 
agents. But these changes axe small, in particular when compared to the changes when the 
exemption level is lowered.
Increasing the exclusion period also reduces welfare. Note that even though the Gini 
coefficient is highest for the shortest exclusion period (p =  0.5), welfare for both, rich and
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Table 1.12: minimum wealth for entrepreneurship
Q 0.5 0.25 0 .2 0 .1 0.05
i p - i =  0.316 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.48
</?_!= 0.745 1.26 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28
ip -!=  1.342 3.47 3.53 3.53 3.59 3.63
tp-1=  3.163 15.63 15.73 15.73 15.73 15.63
poor, is highest in this case as well. Lowering the exclusion period from the current five 
years to two years would increase welfare by 0 .1 2 %, which corresponds to an increase in 
annual consumption of approximately $70 for the average household. Increasing the exclusion 
period to 20 years would yield a welfare loss of approximately 0.43%, which corresponds to a 
decrease in annual consumption of approximately $230 for the average household.
As tables 1.13 to 1.15 show there are hardly any changes in social mobility.
Table 1.13: 10-years transition matrix: g =  0.5
poor middle-class rich
poor 0.721 0.248 0.032
middle-class 0.276 0.480 0.244
rich 0.005 0.270 0.725
Table 1.14: 10-years transition matrix: g =  0.2
poor middle-class rich
poor 0.721 0.247 0.032
middle-class 0.276 0.479 0.244
rich 0.005 0.271 0.724
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Table 1.15: 10-years transition matrix: q =  0.05
poor middle-class rich
poor 0.720 0.248 0.032
middle-class 0.276 0.480 0.244
rich 0.005 0.271 0.724
1.7 Conclusion
We explore quantitatively the effects of personal bankruptcy law on entrepreneurship in a 
general equilibrium setting with heterogeneous agents. We developed a dynamic general 
equilibrium model with occupational choice which explicitly incorporates the US bankruptcy 
law. Our model endogenously generates interest rates that reflect the different default 
probabilities of the agents. It accounts for the main facts on entrepreneurial bankruptcy, 
entrepreneurship, wealth distribution and macroeconomic aggregates in the US.
We used the model to quantitatively evaluate the effects of changing the US bankruptcy law. 
The simulation results show that reducing the exemption level would increase the fraction of 
entrepreneurs and welfare. These effects are significant: halving the exemption level would 
have positive welfare effects in the order of 1.4% of average consumption. All households, 
rich and poor, would be better off. However eliminating bankruptcy completely would reduce 
the number of entrepreneurs and welfare. The key mechanism driving most of our results 
is the occupational choice of agents. The fraction of entrepreneurs would increase by one 
percentage point if the exemption level were reduced by 50%.
We are currently extending our research program along two dimensions. First, we are 
incorporating the transition to the new steady state. So far, our results are based on a 
comparison of steady-states. Transitional effects might be important to evaluate welfare. In 
addition it might explain why the current law is too lenient. It could be that some groups 
lose during the transition and therefore oppose changes.
Second, we are expanding our model to incorporate explicitly a European type of bankruptcy 
law. The laws in European countries are much harsher than the law in the US. For example 
in Italy, debt is never discharged. A defaulter is liable forever. We are analyzing the effects 
of introducing a US type of law on the Italian economy.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Computational strategy
The state vector for an individual is given by 77 =  (a, 0_i, (p~i, S). The aggregate state variable 
is a density fit (a? #-i> V>-i, S)  over the states. We assume that a take value on a grid Ga of
dimension na. Therefore the dimension of the individual state space is n =  na x uq x  x 2 
where tiq =  2 is the number of states for the entrepreneurial productivity and =  4 is the 
number of states for the working productivity.
In order to solve the model we use the following approach:
Algorithm 1 Our solution algorithm is:
1. Assign all parameters values
2. Guess a value for the endogenous variable r.
3. Given r the FOC of the corporate sector uniquely pin down the wage rate w. The
representative competitive firm in the corporate sector will choose K c and Lc such that
rd =  (A K i-1Ll~( = i A ( j T \ € (1.8-1)
w = ( l - O ^ I £ <  = ( l - O A 0 | y  (1.8-2)
Therefore r uniquely pins down and in turn uniquely pins down w.
4- Given (r, w) we solve for the optimal value functions and corresponding policy functions 
by value function iteration. The details of the zero profit conditions for the banks are 
presented in the next subsection.
a) First we solve for the following policy functions3^ :
• Saving policy function: a' (a, 0_i, (p~i,0, ip, S , OCC) which for any state today
(19 - i , ip-1) and for any state tomorrow (9 , <p), for any given level of assets a, 
for any given credit status S  E { U N , B C }  and for any occupational choice 
OC  E {W  =  0, E =  1} gives us the optimal saving decision of the agent;
• Capital demand function k (a, 0_i, S, OCC) for entrepreneurs;
• default decision d (a, 0_i, <p~i, 6, ip, S, O C C ) for unconstrained entrepreneur;
34 Note that given our timing the saving and bankruptcy decisions are taken when the uncertainty about 0'and 
<p' has been resolved, therefore they appear as argument of the policy function.
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b) The above policy functions allow us to calculate the implied value functions 
F (a ,0 _ i,^ _ l55,O CC)
c) This in turn allows us to solve for the occupational choice function
=  1 V (a, 6- i ,  <£_i, S, E ) > V  (a, 0_i, S, W )
(1.8-3)
O C (a, 0_i, <£>_i, S) =
— 0 otherwise
5. The policy functions, the exogenous transition matrix for the shocks (both for 0_i and 
for <p~i) and the credit status shock q  allow us to derive the probability that an agent 
in a certain state Tj will be in the state rj next period, for any give state 77. Given the 
dimension of the state, all these probabilities form a transition matrix Pv of dimension 
n x n.
6. The transition matrix P  ^ maps the current distribution35 i i v  into a next period distribu­
tion p!n
=  Pf) * (1.8-4)
We calculate the steady state distribution over the state p* by solving for a
t i  =  p v x t i  (L8-5)
7. Prom this we can derive the market clearing conditions
• the saving for the whole economy
na ng n<p 2
S A  (r) =  £  £  £  Y .  <H x  (<*. 0-ij> P - i v ,  S u )  (1.8-6)
2=1 j  — 1 V=1 U=1
• the supply of labor
LS (r) =  5 3  t i  (a*’ ^ -1J’ ^ - lv’Su) x t1 _  0C * (a*’ O-i j ’V-iviSu)] <P-iv (1-8-7)
i , j ,v,u
• the demand of capital from the entrepreneurial sector
^ E N T R  ( r )  =  P*  f a i ’ Q - l j ’ T - l v f S u )
i , j ,v,u (1 .8 -8 )
X O C (cii, 0 —\ j , (p—i v , S u )  X k {fl i ,  0 —i j ,  *^ ix)
where k (o^ , 0—\j, Su  ^ — k Q—\j, ip—\v , Su, OC  (ct^  *S'u)]
35 Note that in our framework the distribution of household over the state /i^, is vector of dimension n  whose 
elements sum up to 1.
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8. Labor market clearing implies that labor supply Ls (r) is equal to labor demand L6:. 
Plugging this into the FOC (1.8-1) of the corporate sector we get the capital demand in 
the corporate sector:
9. Now we look at capital market clearing:
K dENTR(r) +  K t ( r )  =  SA(r )ENTR (1.8- 10)
10. If there is not equilibrium at point 9 we adjust the interest rate, go back to point 3, and
iterate until the market clears36.
Value function iteration
Given the presence of kinks in the problem we use a value function iteration algorithm to 
solve for the value functions. We approximate the value functions using cubic splines.
The iteration goes as follows.
1 . We guess a value function both for the U N  and the B C  agent: V BC0 (a, 6- and
2. Given the guesses, we solve for 4 value functions, two for the workers 
( W B C  (a, 6- i ,  <p~i) and W UN (a, 0_i, and two for the entrepreneurs
( N bc  (a,0_i,<p_i) and N un  (a, 0- 1 , ip-i)).  The only non standard problem is to 
find N UN (a ,0_i , <p~i) where we take the zero profit condition of the bank into account. 
The solution is described in the next subsection.
3. Form the function we can derive a new guess for the value function
V BC1 (a, ,¥)_,) =  max { N BC (a, v _ , ) , W BC (a, 0 - i, V- i ) }  (1.8-11)
V UK1 ( a . e . u f - i )  =  m * x { N UN(a,e-1,<p-l ) , W UN(a,e-u<P-i)}  (1-8-12)
4. Therefore we can construct an iteration of the form
V BCi  (a, rj) 1 [ V BCi +1 (a, 77)
V UNi  (a,ry) J [  V UN>+1 (a, 77) (1.8-13)
36 In practice we first run a grid search over different values for r  and then bisect until we get market clearing.
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The zero profit condition
In the derivation of the optimal choice of the unconstrained entrepreneur we assume that he 
can borrow from a perfectly competitive banking sector: that is there is free entry in the sector. 
This implies that the bank makes zero profit on each contract. What we need is a menu of 
contracts that the bank offers, where each contract is an amount lent b (a, 0 _i, y?-i) and an 
interest rate r (a, 0 _ i, ip~i, b) that, give the assumption of perfect symmetric information, can 
depend on the individual state of the agent
Banks will get repaid if the type-(a, 0_i, <p~\) agent finds it optimal not to declare 
bankruptcy at the end of the period, given the amount lent. We denote the probability of 
bankruptcy as 7rbankr (a, 0_i, ip~i, b). Therefore the zero profit condition is given by
/  6 )] [1 +  r (a ,0 _ ! ,<£>_!,&)]b+ \  =
y +7Tbankr(a, rj) max {xQku +  /  (1  — 8) (a — b) — X,  0} J
In order to find the equilibrium interest rate r (a, 0_i, c/?_i, b) charged to each type of agent 
we must find the probability that the agent defaults. However, it is important to note that the 
contracts the bank offers must all make zero profits in expectations, also the out-of-equilibrium 
contracts (i.e. those the agent does not choose).
We solve the problem of unconstrained entrepreneurs over a grid. For any given type 
(a, 9 - i , ip~i) we find the optimal choice given a grid of possible levels of loans: bi € [6min, bmax\. 
Given each value of bi >  0 (if bi < 0 the agent saves so he does not need the bank and gets 
an interest rate r ) there are only three possibilities37:
• The agent always repays, both in the event of bad and in the event of a good shock to
entrepreneurial productivity. In this case 7rbankr (a,0- i , ip- i ,b)  =  1, and therefore the
only interest rate compatible with zero profits is r.
• The agent repays only in the case of a bad shock. In this case we know that 
nbankr ^ =  i  — pHH and irbankr (a,0L,(p-i,b'j =  1 — pLL and we can 
calculate, for any b, the unique interest rate r  (a, 0 _ i, <^_i, b) such that the bank breaks 
even.
• The agent never repays so he never gets credit.
Therefore our strategy is, for any bi € [&min,&max]
1 . First we check what happens if the agent is offered the rate rd.
2. If the agent always repays we are done.
3. If the agent does not repay we check what would he do if he was offered the unique
37 This is under the assumption of only two state for entrepreneurial talent and that this is the only case that 
matters.
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interest compatible with his defaulting only in the bad state. If he actually defaults 
only in the bad state, we are done.
4. If at point 3 we find out that given the interest rate the agent will always default (in 
the good and in the bad state) we know that the agent will never get credit so we set 
his utility to — oo.
5. We do this for all the b{ E [&min5 bmax\ and then the agent picks the b{ that maximizes 
his utility.
1.8.2 Data on Entrepreneurship
To calibrate the model and to select a value for the targets we need a definition of an 
entrepreneur. Given the need to target bankruptcy, we are bounded in the choice by the 
availability of data on business bankruptcy filings. The main source for data on business 
bankruptcy is The Small Business Economy (2006) by the US Small Business Administration, 
Office of Advocacy38. Their definition of entrepreneurs (see Table 1.8-1) is a business owner 
who actually runs his business and has at least one employee. Given this definition the main 
data on entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs’ termination and bankruptcy are reported in table 1 .8 -1 .
To get the fraction of entrepreneurs in the population we apply the same definition of 
entrepreneurs to several waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances (1989-2004). We define an 
household as entrepreneurial if the head owns and runs a business with at least one employee. 
The fraction of the population engaged in entrepreneurial activity, for several waves of the 
SCF is reported in the last column of table 1.8-2. According to our definition, the fraction 
of entrepreneurial household in total population is given by 7.62%. This number does not 
differ from the numbers obtained by using other definitions of entrepreneurship used in the 
literature39
Using the same definition we calculate the median net worth for entrepreneurial household 
and for the total population, using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. The results 
are reported in table 1.8-3 which reports the median wealth based on other definition of 
entrepreneurship as well.
The corresponding ratio of the median entrepreneurial wealth to the median wealth in 
total population is 5 .6640.
38 The original sources of data are:
• for the employers, from the Bureau of Census and U.S. Department of Commerce
• for employer’ births and terminations, from the Census Bureau
• for bankruptcies, from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (business bankruptcy filings).
39 Cagetti /  De Nardi [2006] define as entrepreneurial an household whose head owns and runs a business and 
declares herself as self-employed. Gentry /  Hubbard [2004] define as entrepreneurial an household who owns 
and runs a business with a total market value of at least 5000$.
40 Using other definitions of entrepreneurship the ratio of median wealth of entrepreneurs is lower: 4.8 and 5.3
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Table 1.8-1: entrepreneurship exit and bankruptcy
Year Entrepreneurs Exit Exit Rate Bankruptcy Bankruptcy/Exit
1990 5073795 531400 0.105 64853 0 .1 2 2
1991 5051025 546518 0.108 71549 0.131
1992 5095356 521606 0 .1 0 2 70643 0.135
1993 5193642 492651 0.095 62304 0.126
1994 5276964 503563 0.095 52374 0.104
1995 5369068 497246 0.093 51959 0.104
1996 5478047 512402 0.094 53549 0.105
1997 5541918 530003 0.096 54027 0 .1 0 2
1998 5579177 540601 0.097 44367 0.082
1999 5607743 544487 0.097 37884 0.070
2 0 0 0 5652544 542831 0.096 35472 0.065
2 0 0 1 5657774 553291 0.098 40099 0.072
2 0 0 2 5697759 586890 0.103 38540 0.066
2003 5767127 540658 0.094 35037 0.065
2004 5865400 544300 0.093 34317 0.063
2005 5992400 544800 0.091 39201 0.072
Average 5493734 533328 0.097 49136 0.093
SOURCE: US Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy (2006)
Table 1.8-2: fraction of entrepreneurs in total population
year Cagetti and De Nardi Gentry-Hubbard Our definition
1989 0.076 0.067 0.085
1992 0.081 0.096 0.081
1995 0.067 0.071 0.068
1998 0.074 0.074 0.073
2 0 0 1 0.078 0.081 0.076
2004 0.075 0.084 0.075
Average 0.075 0.079 0.076
SO U R CE: Survey o f Consum er F inances (1989-2004)
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Table 1.8-3: median net worth of total population and of entrepreneurial household
year
Tot
Population
Cagetti 
and De Nardi Gentry-Hubbard Our definition
1989 47060 265000 318680 275500
1992 49600 208680 234250 300100
1995 57650 213300 226820 245801
1998 71700 331650 342600 371800
2 0 0 1 86610 458000 495400 528900
2004 93001 536000 562500 606160
average 67603.5 335438.3 363375 388043.5
SOURCE: Survey of Consum er Finances (1989-2004)
In the literature another source of data on entrepreneurship is the Panel Study on Income 
Dynamics [Quadrini 2000]. Given the panel structure it is particularly useful to calculate 
exit and entry rates. However, one major drawback is that it undersamples rich households, 
and therefore entrepreneurs. Unfortunately PSID does not report the number of employees 
per firm. We cannot use our definition. In the literature on entrepreneurship that uses 
PSID, Quadrini [2000], two definitions are adopted. According to the first an entrepreneur is 
someone who declares himself self employed (SELF). According to the second an entrepreneur 
is someone who owns a business (OWN). Both these definitions are less stringent than the one 
adopted above. Column 2 and 3 of table 1.8-4 report the fraction of entrepreneurs in PSID 
according to these definitions. The first definition yields an average fraction of entrepreneurs 
of 11%. The second definition yields a fraction of 13%. This is much higher than the figure 
derived from SCF data. Therefore we also use a third definition which is more restrictive: an 
agent is an entrepreneur if both he owns a business and is self employed. This yields a lower 
fraction of entrepreneurs, equal to 8 %.
Given this discrepancy we avoid using PSID data unless it is strictly necessary. As a check 
of the SBA data we calculate the exit and entry rates according to the 3 definitions above. 
The entry rate in period t is defined as the ratio of the number of total households in the 
sample who were workers in period t — 1 and were entrepreneurs in period t over the total 
number of workers in period t — 1. The exit rate in period t  is the ratio of those who were 
entrepreneurs in period t — 1 and are worker in period t  over the total number of entrepreneurs 
in period t — 1. The results are reported in table A5.
These numbers are much higher than the number from the number of SBA. The reason is 
that the PSID undersamples rich household. Since successful entrepreneurs are richer and do 
not exit, this results could be biased. Therefore, we choose as the target for the exit rate 
9.3%.
Quadrini [2000] points out that the entry rate of workers who have some entrepreneurial
when using Cagetti /  De Nardi [2006] and Gentry /  Hubbard [2004] definitions respectively.
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Table 1.8-4: fraction of entrepreneurs
year SELF O W N B O T H
1969 0 .1 1 0.08 0.06
1970 0 .1 0 0.09 0.06
1971 0 .1 0 0.09 0.06
1972 0 .1 0 0.09 0.05
1973 0 .1 0 0.09 0.06
1974 0 .1 0 0.08 0.05
1975 0 .1 0 0.08 0.06
1976 0 .1 0 0.09 0.07
1977 0 .1 0 0.09 0.06
1978 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0.06
1979 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0.06
1980 0 .1 0 0.09 0.07
1981 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0.06
1982 0 .1 1 0 .1 0 0.07
1983 0 .1 1 0 .1 1 0.07
1984 0 .1 2 0 .1 2 0.08
1985 0.13 0.14 0.09
1986 0 .1 2 0.15 0.09
1987 0.13 0.15 0.09
1988 0.13 0.16 0 .1 0
1989 0.13 0.15 0.09
1990 0.13 0.14 0.09
1991 0.13 0.14 0.09
1992 0.13 0.15 0.09
1993 0.13 0.13 0.08
1994 0.13 0.14 0.08
1995 0 .1 2 0.13 0.08
1996 0 .1 2 0.16 0.09
1997 0.13 0.17 0.09
average 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 2 0.08
SOURCE: PSID (1969-1997)
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Table 1.8-5: Exit and entry rates (different definitions of entrepreneurship)
year
Z
Z0
EH
X!
W
fn
wCfi
EHi—i
X
W
XH
0
X
EHh—1
X
W EN
TR
Y 
o
w
n I*
a cn
hos
EH
X
H
XH
0
PQ
H
EW
1970 0.17 0.13 0.13 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 1
1971 0.16 0 .1 1 0.13 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 1
1972 0.19 0.15 0.18 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 1
1973 0 .2 2 0.14 0.15 0.03 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
1974 0.28 0.13 0 .2 1 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 1
1975 0 .2 2 0 .1 0 0.14 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
1976 0.15 0.08 0 .1 1 0.03 0 .0 1 0 .0 2
1977 0 .2 0 0 .1 2 0 .2 1 0.03 0 .0 2 0 .0 1
1978 0 .2 2 0 .1 0 0.13 0.03 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
1979 0.18 0 .1 1 0.15 0.03 0 .0 2 0 .0 1
1980 0.27 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 1 0 .0 1
1981 0 .2 2 0 .1 0 0.16 0.03 0 .0 1 0 .0 1
1982 0.23 0.07 0.14 0.03 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
1983 0.16 0.09 0 .1 1 0.03 0 .0 2 0 .0 1
1984 0 .2 0 0 .1 1 0.13 0.03 0 .0 1 0 .0 1
1985 0.18 0 .1 2 0.13 0.04 0.03 0 .0 2
1986 0 .2 0 0.14 0.13 0.04 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
1987 0.18 0 .1 2 0 .1 1 0.04 0 .0 2 0 .0 1
1988 0 .2 0 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.03 0 .0 2
1989 0.24 0.15 0.16 0.04 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
1990 0 .2 0 0.13 0.15 0.04 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
1991 0 .2 2 0 .1 1 0.15 0.04 0.03 0 .0 2
1992 0.23 0 .1 2 0.17 0.05 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
1993 0.25 0.13 0 .2 0 0.03 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
1994 0 .2 2 0.15 0 .2 1 0.04 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
1995 0.25 0.13 0.18 0.04 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
1996 0.19 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0.04 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
1997 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.03 0 .0 2 0 .0 1
average 0 .2 1 0 .1 2 0.15 0.03 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
SOURCE: PSID (1969-1997)
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experience in the past is much higher than the entry rate of those who has not got any 
experience. Using the PSID data we replicate his results. An agent is defined as "experienced" 
worker in t — 1 if he is a worker in period t-1  and has been an entrepreneur in any of the three 
periods before (t — 2 , t — 3, t — 4). All the remaining workers in period t — 1 are defined as 
non-experienced. The entry rate for experienced and non experienced workers, as well as the 
overall entry rate are reported in table 1 .8 -6 .
Table 1.8-6: Entry rates (experienced and non experienced workers)
year to ta l pop non experienced experienced
1974 0.015 0.009 0.313
1975 0.017 0 .0 1 2 0.298
1976 0.014 0 .0 1 0 0.280
1977 0.018 0 .0 1 2 0.311
1978 0.014 0.009 0.216
1979 0.013 0 .0 1 0 0.171
1980 0 .0 1 1 0.008 0.190
1981 0.015 0 .0 1 0 0.268
1982 0.014 0 .0 1 0 0.197
1983 0.014 0.009 0.265
1984 0.023 0.017 0.324
1985 0.019 0.014 0.264
1986 0.014 0 .0 1 0 0.182
1987 0 .0 2 0 0.017 0.136
1988 0.017 0 .0 1 2 0.192
1989 0.018 0.013 0.140
1990 0.017 0.013 0.167
1991 0.019 0.013 0.196
1992 0.017 0 .0 1 2 0.185
1993 0.018 0 .0 1 0 0.230
1994 0.019 0 .0 1 1 0.247
1995 0.017 0 .0 1 1 0 .2 0 0
1996 0 .0 1 2 0.008 0.167
average 0.016 0 . 0 1 1 0.223
SOURCE: PSID  (1969-1997)
The entry rate of experienced workers is 14 times higher than the entry rate of the total 
population.41
1.8.3 Formal definition of equilibrium
In our model the state space is given by 4 elements: the asset level a , the entrepreneurial 
productivity 0 , the worker productivity ip and the credit status S. We discretize the asset
41 If we restrict the sample period to 1989 to 1996,in order to be compatible with other data sources the ratio 
falls to 11. We set this as the target.
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state space, assuming that assets can values on a grid of na elements Ga C Given
the Markov approximation for the productivities processes we have that 9 can take =  2 
values, 9 G © =  jo, 0H^, and p  can take =  4 values ip G {p \ ,  p 2 , P>3 , T*} =  r . Moreover 
S  G {BC,  U N }  =  S. Following Huggett [1993], we can define the state space for the 
households a s f i  =  C?a x 0 x $ x E ! .  Letting an be the Borel cr-algebra on f2 and letting 
the optimal policy functions P F { u )  , u  G Q, (assets decisions, occupational choice, capital 
demand, bankruptcy decision) we have that the policy functions and the exogenous stochastic 
process imply a tran sition  function  T  (a;, c ) , Vc G an on the measurable space (Q,cj). This 
transition function implies a stationary probability measure p (<;), G an that describes the 
distribution of households’ assets holdings, productivity levels, and credit status. Stationarity 
implies
After this bit of notation we can formally state the following definition of stationary 
equilibrium:
D efin ition  2  A s ta tio n a ry  equilibrium  of the model is a four-tuple {PF(w),/i(^), 
(r, w) , r (u) }  such that:
1. P F  (u) is optimal for given (r ,w )
2. p  (<;) is the stationary distribution associated with the transition function generated by 
PF{uS), given (r , w )
3. The corporate sector representative firm is optimizing, given (r, w )
(1.8-15)
w
r (AKt- 'L l-* = (A ( g )  “
(1 -  0  A K iL-t =  (1 -  0  A ( g ) ? (1.8-17)
(1.8-16)
4- r  (uj) reflects the zero profit condition for the banking sector
5. Labor market and capital market clears.
Chapter
Personal Bankruptcy Law, Debt Portfolios 
and Entrepreneurship
2.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurs employ half of all workers in the US and they create three quarters of all new 
jobs . 1 Over time, successful entrepreneurs, for example Bill Gates in 1978 or Larry Page 
and Sergey Brin in 1997, grow their small firms into big enterprises, for example Microsoft 
and Google today. Personal bankruptcy law is important for entrepreneurs because if an 
entrepreneur’s firm is not incorporated he or she is personally liable for all the unsecured 
debts of this firm. 2 Many entrepreneurs fail each year, and axound 60,000 file for bankruptcy.
This paper investigates quantitatively the effects of personal bankruptcy law on entrepreneur­
ship. Bankruptcy introduces some contingency in a world of incomplete credit markets where 
only simple debt contracts are available. This contingency provides insurance against en­
trepreneurial failure at the cost of worsening credit conditions. If the bankruptcy law does not 
allow default under any circumstances, credit will be available at lower interest rates because 
borrowers will not default. This comes at the expense of borrowers having no insurance 
against business failure. If, however, the bankruptcy law makes default very easy, borrowers 
might be insured against bad outcomes. But in order to compensate for the default risk, 
banks have to charge higher interest rates or ration credit all together. In our model, as 
in the real world, entrepreneurs can also obtain secured credit. This modifies the trade-off 
between insurance and credit conditions by allowing agents, if they want to, to obtain cheap
1 We thank Alex Michaelides for his continuous support and valuable comments, and Francesco Caselli and 
Maitreesh Ghatak for helpful comments at various stages of this research. We are also grateful to  Orazio 
Attanasio, Daniel Becker, Chris Caroll, Wouter Den Haan, Eric Hurst, Bernardo Guimaraes, Christian Julliard, 
Winfried Koeniger, Tom Krebs, Dirk Krueger, Rachel Ngai, Vincenzo Quadrini, Victor Rios-Rull, Alwyn  
Young and participants at Fifth European Workshop in Macroeconomics, the Heterogenous Agent Models in 
Macroeconomics workshop in Mannheim 2009 and the NBER 2009 Summer Institute EFACR workshop.
2 Meh /  Terajima [2008] report that unsecured debt accounts for around on ethird of all debt.
56
2.1 Introduction 57
(secured) credit even in a world with a very generous bankruptcy law. We find that allowing 
entrepreneurs to obtain both, secured and unsecured credit, has quantitatively important 
effects on the model economy.
The trade-off between insurance and credit conditions is at the center of recent public 
discussions and policy changes in Europe and the US. In Europe, the bankruptcy law is much 
harsher than in the US. Many countries, for example Germany, the Netherlands and the 
UK, have made legislation more lenient with the explicit aim of fostering entrepreneurship.3 
The policy changes in the US went in the opposite direction. Following the huge increase in 
personal bankruptcy filings, US Congress in 2005 passed a law making personal bankruptcy 
less beneficial for filers. Even though the focus of this discussion has been on consumer 
bankruptcy, the effects on entrepreneurship are important because around 60,000 failed 
entrepreneurs file for bankruptcy each year. Our paper quantitatively assesses the relative 
strength of these two opposing forces: insurance versus credit conditions, on the number of 
entrepreneurs, on the access of poor agents to entrepreneurship, on firm size, and on welfare, 
inequality and social mobility.
We build an infinite horizon heterogeneous agent model, which has an occupational 
choice problem at its core. Agents differ with respect to their entrepreneurial and working 
productivity. During each period, they decide whether to become an entrepreneur or a worker. 
Cagetti /  De Nardi [2006] also have this occupational choice at the center of their model, 
which is able to explain US wealth distribution, in particular its extremely skewed nature at 
the top. However, in their model, entrepreneurship is a risk-free activity because there is no 
uncertainty about current productivities. Thus there is no default in equilibrium and there is 
no insurance role for bankruptcy. We have default in our model because in the US 2.25% of 
all entrepreneurs file for bankruptcy.
Despite the importance of personal bankruptcy law for entrepreneurship, there is little 
quantitative literature on this topic. Starting with Athreya [2 0 0 2 ], the literature so far has 
focused almost exclusively on consumer bankruptcy. For example, Livshits et al. [2007a] 
compare the US system under which future earnings are exempt after consumers have 
defaulted with a European type of system under which future earnings are garnished to 
repay creditors. They find that the welfare differences between the systems depend on the 
persistence and variance of the shocks. Chatterjee et al. [2007] show that the recent tightening 
of the law in the US implies large welfare gains.4 In this literature there are few papers that 
focus on secured and unsecured borrowing. Athreya [2006] finds that welfare is increasing 
in the wealth exemption level. Hintermaier /  Koeniger [2008] examine the reasons for the 
increase in consumer bankruptcies in a model with durable and nondurable goods.
There are three closely related papers that analyze the effects of bankruptcy on entrepreneur­
ship in a quantitative setting similar to our paper. Akyol /  Athreya [2007] use an overlapping
3 In a companion paper, we are currently investigating the effects of introducing a US type of law in Europe.
4 Other papers in this growing literature are Athreya [2006], Athreya /  Simpson [2006], Li /  Sarte [2006], 
Mateos-Planas /  Seccia [2006].
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generations, partial equilibrium framework with heterogeneity in human capital. Their main 
results is that the current system is too generous. Meh /  Terajima [2008] have a similar 
framework (partial equilibrium OLG model) in which they analyze bankruptcy decisions of 
both consumers and entrepreneurs. Mankart /  Rodano [2007] have a model with temporary 
and permanent productivity shocks. The main result of all three papers is that the current 
system is too generous.5
Our model is able to replicate key macroeconomic variables of the US economy: the capital 
output ratio, the fraction of entrepreneurs in the population, the exit rate, the bankruptcy 
filings of entrepreneurs, the wealth of entrepreneurs compared to workers. Based on this 
model, we can conduct a policy experiment to assess whether the current exemption level 
(how much wealth a person can keep in case of a default) is optimal.
Our main result is that the current system is too harsh with respect to the exemption 
level. There are welfare gains from increasing the current exemption level to the optimal one. 
Entrepreneurship would increase from 7.2% of the population to 7.4% if the exemption level 
were increased because of the increased insurance effect. Moreover, eliminating bankruptcy 
exemptions would lead to a reduction of welfare and a reduction in entrepreneurship to 6 .6 % 
of the population.
Our results are strikingly different from other papers in the literature. Meh /  Terajima 
[2008], Akyol /  Athreya [2007] and Mankart /  Rodano [2007] find that the current system  
is too generous6. The main difference is that all these paper do not allow entrepreneurs to 
obtain secured, in addition to unsecured, credit.
In a counterfactual experiment we find that if we exclude secured credit we get similar 
results as the previous literature: the current law appears to be too lenient. The reason is 
the following. When we exclude secured credit some agents are credit rationed because their 
incentive to default is too high. Therefore they become workers. Increasing the exemption 
level worsens this problem. If instead these agents can obtain secured credit (i.e. pledge 
collateral), they can run bigger firms and therefore find it profitable to become entrepreneurs. 
Excluding secured credit from the analysis overstates the role of credit rationing. Thus, the 
policy conclusion reached in the previous literature might be premature.
Our results, as those from Meh /  Terajima [2008], Akyol /  Athreya [2007] and Mankart 
/  Rodano [2007] are consistent with the empirical finding of Berkowitz /  White [2004] who 
show that in states with higher exemption levels, credit conditions are worse. But our paper 
is also consistent with the findings of Fan /  White [2003] that show that entrepreneurship is 
higher in states with a more lenient bankruptcy law. This is not true in the work of Meh /  
Terajima [2008], Akyol /  Athreya [2007] and Mankart /  Rodano [2007].
Moreover, we use Epstein-Zin preferences. This allows us to distinguish between risk aversion
5 Zha [2001] is a theoretical investigation of similar issues. However his model abstracts from occupational 
choice, which we show to be the crucial channel through which bankruptcy law affects entrepreneurship.
6 This result is also common to most papers in the consumer bankruptcy literature.
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and intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This is particularly interesting, given that the 
costs of a generous bankruptcy system, in terms of higher interest rates, depend mainly on the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, while the benefits, in terms of insurance, depend on 
risk aversion. Our choice of preferences allows us to examine these effects separately. We find 
that the optimal exemption level increases with the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. 
This result is quite intuitive since agents who are more willing to substitute consumption 
across time are less affected by the higher borrowing rates resulting from higher exemption 
levels. We also find that the optimal exemption level increases with risk aversion. The more 
risk averse agents are the more they value insurance.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 show the importance of secured credit. 
Section 2.3 provides an overview of US bankruptcy law and presents data on entrepreneurial 
failure. In Section 2.4 we present our model and discuss the equilibrium condition. In Section 
2.5 we discuss our calibration strategy and present our results. Section 2.6 concludes. Details 
of the computational algorithm are presented in section 2.7.
2.2 A static example
In this section, we develop a static example that demonstrates the importance of secured 
borrowing in any analysis of the optimal wealth exemption level. In particular, we show that 
secured credit mitigates the consequences of credit rationing.
2.2.1 Environment
Entrepreneurs have access to the following linear technology with fixed project size: K  =  1, 
Y  =  A K  =  A  and
A =
2 w.p. 0.5 
1 w.p. 0.5
Suppose there axe two risk-averse entrepreneurs in this economy: a poor one with a =  0.1 
and a rich one with a =  0.5. The former has to borrow b =  0.9 and the latter b =  0.5 to 
finance the project. We assume that the risk free rate is zero. The first-best outcome would 
be one in which entrepreneurs are fully insured against the production risk and therefore 
would enjoy the same amount of consumption in both states.
2.2.2 Policy regime 1: X=0
If the wealth exemption level is 0, both agents will always repay. Therefore, they borrow at 
the risk-free rate. The outcome for the poor agent is =  1 — 0.9 =  0.1 in the bad state and
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Cp =  2 — 0.9 =  1.1 in the good state. The outcome for the rich agent is c f  =  1 — 0.5 =  0.5 
in the bad state and d? =  2 — 0.5 =  1.5 in the good state. Note that while both agents get 
credit none of them is insured against the bad outcome.
2.2.3 Policy regime 2: X=1 and no secured credit
If the wealth exemption level is 1, both agents have an incentive to default in the bad state. 
Therefore, they can not borrow at the risk-free rate. Financial intermediaries will set the 
interest rate according to their zero profit condition. Under the assumption that agents 
default only in the bad state the interest rate is given by:
ttd 0 +  ( l  — 7rD  ^ ( l  +  r)& =  6 =>r =  l
The question is now whether the agents repay in the good state or whether they prefer to 
default also in the good state. If the poor agent repays he obtains Cp =  2 — (1 4-1) x 0.9 =  0.2. 
Therefore, he will also default in the good state. This implies that financial intermediaries 
cannot break even on a poor agent; consequently he will get no credit at all. The rich agent 
obtains, upon repaying, =  2 — (1 +  1) x 0.5 =  1.0. Thus, he is just indifferent between 
repaying and defaulting, therefore, he repays. The rich agent is better off with X  =  1 than 
with X  =  0 because now he is fully insured against production risk. His consumption is the 
same in both states.
This demonstrates the trade-off of a generous bankruptcy law. Some, relatively rich, agents 
gain because they obtain more insurance. Others, relatively poor, agents lose because they 
are unable to obtain credit because their ex post default incentive is too high.
2.2.4 Policy regime 3: X=1 and secured credit
Now, we also introduce secured credit. Secured credit in this example means that the agent 
offers his project returns as collateral, i.e. he waives his right to default. This is in line with 
the law. Secured debt can not be discharged in a bankruptcy case. The rich agent does not 
want to borrow secured because he achieves his first-best outcome with unsecured credit. The 
poor agent, however, can now borrow b =  0.9 secured. This means he will have the same 
consumption allocation as in the case of X  =  0.
Thus, secured credit lowers the cost of a high (generous) exemption level. Therefore, the 
optimal exemption level in a model with secured credit will be higher than in a model with 
unsecured credit only.
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2.3 Entrepreneurial failure and personal bankruptcy in the US
Personal bankruptcy procedures in the US consist of two different procedures: Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 13. Under Chapter 7, all unsecured debt is discharged immediately, while a secured 
creditor can fully seize the assets pledged as collateral. Future earnings cannot be garnished. 
This is why Chapter 7 is known as providing a "fresh start". At the same time, a person filing 
for bankruptcy has to surrender all wealth in excess of an exemption level. The exemption 
level varies across US states, ranging from $11,000 in Maryland to unlimited for housing 
wealth in some states, for example Florida. Therefore, we calculate the population-weighted 
median across states. The resulting average exemption level is $47,800 in 1993.7
Under Chapter 13 agents can keep their wealth, debt is not discharged immediately and 
future earnings are garnished. Entrepreneurs are better off under Chapter 7 for three reasons: 
they have no non-exempt wealth, their debt is discharged immediately and they can start a 
new business straight away, since their income will not be subject to garnishment [see White 
2007]. 70% of total bankruptcy cases involving entrepreneurs are under Chapter 7. Therefore 
we will focus on Chapter 7 only.
Persons can file for bankruptcy only once every six years. The bankruptcy filing remains 
public information for ten years. Therefore, agents have difficulties obtaining unsecured credit 
for some time after having defaulted. Secured credit, credit that is collateralized, is always 
available.
The US. Small Business Administration reports an exit rate of on average 9.7% per annum 
for small firms in the period from 1990-2005.8 Out of these failing firms 9.3% file for 
bankruptcy, according to the official data from the Administrative Office of the Courts. 9 
Unfortunately, the official data on personal bankruptcy caused by a business failure seem to 
be severely downward biased. Lawless /  Warren [2005] estimate that the true number could 
be three to four times as big. Their own study is based on an in-depth analysis of bankruptcy 
filers in five different judicial districts. Their explanation of this discrepancy is the emergence 
of automated classification of personal bankruptcy cases. Almost all software used in this 
area has "consumer case" as the default option. Thus reporting a personal bankruptcy case 
as a "business related" case requires some - even though small - effort while being completely 
inconsequential for the court proceedings. In addition to their own study they report data
7 The wealth exemption level does not change much over time. We choose 1993 because it is in the middle of 
the sample years for our data on entrepreneurship wealth distribution and bankruptcies.
8 The U.S. Small Business Adminstration splits small firms into employer and non-employer firms. Employer 
firms have at least one employee working in the firm. There are roughly five million employer and 15 million 
non-employer firms in the U.S. Since the focus of our paper is on entrepreneurs who own and manage the firm 
we use only the data for employer firms since non-employer firms have in many cases the owner not working in 
the firm. To ensure consistency across our three databases, when we use data from the Survey of Consumer 
Finance (SCF) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) we define entrepreneurs as business owners 
who manage a firm with at least one employee.
9 W hile one can obtain exit rates from the PSID data [Quadrini 2000], it is im possible to  obtain reliable 
bankruptcy data from the PSID. There is only one wave in which respondents were asked about past 
bankruptcies.
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from Dun & Bradstreet according to which business bankruptcies are at least 
number. 10
In the calibration of our model we set the baseline exemption level equal 
baseline exclusion period is set to two year. 11 We calibrate the model such 
rate of entrepreneurs is 2.25%.
2.4 The model
Our economy is populated by a unit mass of infinitely lived heterogeneous agents. Agents face 
idiosyncratic uncertainty, but there is no aggregate uncertainty. At the beginning of every 
period, agents decide whether to become workers or entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur must 
decide how much to invest, how much to borrow secured and, if he is allowed to, how much 
to borrow unsecured. An entrepreneur who has defaulted on unsecured credit is excluded 
from unsecured credit for two year but is allowed to obtain secured credit. Since we focus on 
the implications of personal bankruptcy for entrepreneurs, workers are not allowed to borrow. 
Agents productivities evolve over time and agents axe subject to uninsurable production risk. 
After the shocks axe realized, production takes place. At the end of the period unsecured 
borrowers decide whether to repay or whether to default and how much to consume and 
how much to save. If they default, they will be borrowing constrained in the next period. 
Anticipating this behavior, banks who give unsecured credit vary the interest rate charged for 
each loan taking into account the individual borrower’s default probability. The remainder of 
this section presents the details of the model.
2.4.1 Credit and bankruptcy law
Agents can get two types of credit: secured and unsecured. Both types of credit are subject 
to a limited commitment problem . 12 After getting credit, all borrowers have two options: 
take all liquid assets, their own wealth plus the amount borrowed, and run or start the 
entrepreneurial activity. If they run the agents can keep a fraction A of the liquid assets. If 
the agents start the entrepreneurial activity then the only difference is that secured credit
10 Dun &; Bradstreet (D&B) is a credit-reporting and business information firm. D&B compiles its own 
independent business failure database. Until the emergence of automated software for law firms and courts in 
the mid 1980s, the official business bankruptcy data and the index compiled by D&B have a positive and 
significant correlation of 0.73. From 1986-1998 this correlation coefficient becomes negative and insignificant. 
Extrapolating from the historic relationship between the D&B index and personal bankruptcy cases caused by 
business failures leads to the conclusion that the official data under report business bankruptcy cases at least 
by a factor of two.
11 We choose a short exclusion period because there is evidence that entrepreneurs obtain unsecured credit 
even after defaulting. However as a robustness check, we set the exclusion period to six years and the results 
do not change much.
12 We introduce this lim ited commitment problem to  obtain reasonable leverage ratios. A s pointed out by 
Heaton /  Lucas [2002] models without information asymmetries yield counterfactually large leverage ratios.
twice the official
to $47,800. The 
that the default
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must be repaid (and it has priority in the bankruptcy proceedings), while unsecured credit is 
subject to Chapter 7 bankruptcy procedure, if the agent exercises his default option.
In the event of a default the agent still must repay her secured debt. Unsecured debt, 
however, is discharged. Any assets remaining after repaying the secured debt which is in 
excess of an exemption level X  are liquidated.
An agent who has defaulted in the past is excluded from the market for unsecured credit 
for a certain period of time. During this period he still can obtained secured credit and 
can become an entrepreneur. We call this agent borrowing constrained and we denote his 
credit status as BC. It is important to note that this agent is not fully excluded from the 
credit market. He can still obtain secured credit. However he cannot obtain unsecured credit. 
We assume that every borrowing constrained agent, whether worker or entrepreneur, faces 
a credit status shock at the end of the period. With probability (1 — g) the agent remains 
borrowing constrained. With probability q the agent regain access to unsecured credit. He 
becomes an unconstrained agent with credit status U N .13 This probability g captures the 
duration of exclusion period from the market of unsecured borrowing. It is calibrated such 
that the average exclusion period is two year.
2.4.2 Households
Our economy is populated by a unit mass of infinitely lived heterogeneous agents. Agents 
differ with respect to their level of assets a, their entrepreneurial productivity 6, their working 
productivity <p, and their credit market status S  € {U N , B C }.
Preferences
For simplicity we abstract from labor-leisure choice. All agents supply their unit of labor 
inelastically either as workers or as entrepreneurs. In order to disentangle the effects of risk 
aversion from that of the elasticity of inetertemporal substitution we assume that agents 
have Epstein-Zin preferences. A stochastic consumption stream { q } £ ^ 0 generates an utility 
{ut } ^ 0 according to
ut = u  (ct) + p u  (c e *  [ c r 1 (« ,+ ,)])
where (3 is the discount rate and CE* [C/ _ 1  (ut+i)] =  T- 1  [E*r (ut+i)] is the consumption 
equivalent of ut+i given information at period t. The utility function U (c) =  c1 -^ /  ( l  — 
aggregates consumption across dates and ip is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
The utility function T (c) =  c1-7/  (1 — 7 ) aggregates consumption across states and 7  is the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion.
13 The length of the exclusion period is transformed into a probability in order to avoid an additional state  
variable that keeps track of the numbers of years left before the solvency status is returned to UN. This 
procedure is standard in the literature, see Athreya [2002] and Chatterjee et al. [2007].
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Productivities
Each agent is endowed with a couple of stochastic productivity levels which are known 
at the beginning of the period: one as an entrepreneur 9, and one as a worker <p. We 
make the simplifying assumption that the working and entrepreneurial ability processes are 
uncorrelated.
The workers’ ability process Following the literature, we assume that labor productivity 
follows the following AR(1 ) process
logyot =  (1  -  p) /x +  plogy?f-i +  et
where et is iid and e ~  N  {0,cre). If the agent becomes a worker his labor income during 
current period is given by wip.
The entrepreneurs’ ability process In contrast to the case of working ability, there are no 
reliable estimates of the functional form for the case of entrepreneurial ability. Therefore, 
following Cagetti /  De Nardi [2006], we will assume a parsimonious specification where 
entrepreneurial productivity follows a 2-state Markov process with 0L =  0 and 0H >  0 and 
transition matrix
p L L  1 -  V L L
Pf) =0 1 - p H H  p H H
We calibrate the 3 parameters (0H, pHH and pLL) to match some observed features of 
entrepreneurial activity in the US economy.
2.4.3 Technology
Entrepreneurial sector Every agent in the economy has access to a productive technology 
that, depending on her entrepreneurial productivity 9, produces output according to the 
production function
Y  =  9ku 
k =  x l
where 9 is the agent’s persistent entrepreneurial productivity described above.
We assume that investment is subject to an iid  idiosyncratic shock. Each unit of the 
numeraire good which is invested in the entrepreneurial activity is transformed in x  units 
of capital with logx ~  N  (0, ax) This iid shock represents the possibility that an inherently 
talented entrepreneur (i.e. an agent with high and persistent 9) might choose the wrong
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project or could be hit by an adverse demand shock. Quadrini [2000] shows that the entry 
rate of workers with some entrepreneurial experience in the past, is much higher than the 
entry rate of those workers without any experience. Therefore it seems that entrepreneurs 
come mostly from a small subset of total population. If their firms fail, they are very likely 
to start a new firm within a few years. The iid shock x  helps us to capture this difference in 
the entry rates.
Corporate sector Many firms are both incorporated and big enough not to be subject to 
personal bankruptcy law. Therefore we follow Quadrini [2000] and Cagetti /  De Nardi [2006] 
and assume a perfectly competitive corporate sector which is modeled as a Cobb-Douglas 
production function
F (K c,L c) =  A K iL l~ i
where K c and Lc are capital and labor employed in this sector. Given perfect competition 
and constant returns to scale the corporate sector does not distribute any dividend. Capital 
depreciates at rate 5 in both sectors.
2.4.4 Credit market
We assume that there is perfect competition (free entry) in the credit market. Therefore 
banks must make zero expected profit on any contract. The opportunity cost of lending to 
entrepreneurs is the rate of return on capital in the corporate sector. This is also equal to 
the deposit rate. 14 Agents can get two types of credit: secured credit and unsecured credit. 
Secured credit represents collateralized borrowing. Thus, it is available at the risk free rate 
plus a small transaction cost (rs =  r 9 +  r s). Unsecured credit requires higher transaction 
costs (ru > ts) that reflect the higher information costs which are present in the real world 
and from which we abstract in the model.
Both types of contracts are subject to a limited commitment constraint. Instead of investing 
the money in the entrepreneurial firm the agent can take the money and run away with a 
fraction A of the credit plus assets. Anticipating this behavior, banks will never lend any 
amount such that the agent prefers to run. 15
There are no information asymmetries in the credit market. Banks know the agent’s assets, 
the amount he borrowed secured s and his productivities. For any given value of (a, s, 6 , <p) 
and for any amount lent unsecured 6 , by anticipating the behavior of the entrepreneur, banks 
are able to calculate the probability of default and the recovery rate in case of default. Perfect 
competition implies that they set the interest rate, r  (a, s, 6, (p, 6 , X ), such that they expect 
to break even. This interest rate depends on the exemption level X  because it affects the 
incentives to default and the amount the bank recovers in this event. Therefore banks offer a
14 In our model, banks axe isomorphic to a bond market in which each agent has the possibility to issue debt.
15 This means that running w ith the money is an out of equilibrium behavior. We introduce it to  lim it the 
leverage ratio to empirically plausible levels.
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menu of one period debt contracts which consist of an amount lent b and a corresponding 
interest rate r (a, s, 9, ip, b, X )  to each agent (a, s, 9, ip).
2.4.5 Timing
Figure 2.1 shows the timing of the model. Given the focus of the paper we choose the timing 
such that workers can never default. Entrepreneurs’ borrowing and default decisions are 
taken within the period. At the beginning of the period all agents face an occupational 
choice: they choose whether they become entrepreneurs or workers. Agents know their current 
productivities (p, 9).
Workers deposit all their wealth at the banks, receiving a rate of return rd. After production 
has taken place, they choose consumption and savings. At the end of the period the borrowing 
constrained worker receives the credit status shock. With probability q he remains borrowing 
constrained next period (i.e. S' =  BC). With probability (1  — g) he becomes unconstrained 
next period (i.e. S' =  UN).
The borrowing constrained entrepreneur chooses how much secured credit s to obtain 
or whether to save. After having obtained secured credit s , the borrowing constrained 
entrepreneur decides whether to take s and his own wealth a and run (with a fraction A of it). 
In this case the bank receives nothing. Anticipating this, the bank will never lend an amount 
s with which the agent would run. The entrepreneur decides how much to invest before 
the iid  shock x  is realized. After x  is realized and production has taken place, he chooses 
consumption and savings. At the end of the period he receives the credit status shock.
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Figure 2.1: Timing of the model
The unconstrained entrepreneur can obtain both: secured credit s and unsecured credit b. 
Before knowing Xi he chooses his capital stock by deciding how much to borrow (or invest 
at rate r d). He obtains secured credit s at the interest rate r s . Unsecured borrowing is 
done by picking from the menu {b, r (a, 9, ip, s, b, X )}  offered by the the banks. As for the 
borrowing constrained, the unconstrained constrained can take a +  b +  s and run. And as 
before, the bank will never lend in a way that induces the agent to run. After x  is realized
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and production has taken place, the entrepreneur must repay his secured debt. Then he can 
decide whether to repay his unsecured debt as well and be unconstrained next period (i.e. 
S' =  UN) or whether to declare bankruptcy and be borrowing constrained next period(i.e. 
S' =  BC).  After that he chooses consumption and savings.
Since the credit status S  consists only of the two states B C  and UN,  we define the 
individual state variable as (a, 9, p),  and we solve for two value functions V UN (a, 9, p)  and 
V BC {a, 9, p)  one for each credit status.
2.4.6 The problem of the borrowing constrained agent
The borrowing constrained agent can only obtain secured credit. Therefore he can either save 
or borrow at a rate rd subject to the limited commitment constraint. At the beginning of the 
period he can choose whether to become an entrepreneur, which gives utility N BC (a, 9, p) 
or a worker which yields utility W BC (a , 9 , p ). Therefore the value of being a borrowing 
constrained agent with state (a, 6, p) is
V BC (a, 6, p) =  max j N BC (a, 0, p ) , W BC (a, 9, p) j
where the "max" operator reflects the occupational choice.
Worker At the beginning of the period the borrowing constrained worker deposits all his 
wealth at the bank and he receives labor income w p. At the end of the period, he chooses 
consumption and saving, taking into account that he will receive a credit status shock in 
addition to productivity shocks. With probability q he will be still borrowing constrained 
next period which yields utility V BC (a', 9, p), while with probability (1 — g) he will become 
unconstrained which yields utility V UN (a', 9, p). His saving problem is the following
W B C (a,9,p)  =  m z x { u { c )  +  p u ( C E t [ eV BC {a',9',p') +  { l - Q ) V UN (a',9' ,p’) ] ) }
s.t. c +  a' =  w p  +  ( l  +  rd>j  a
a' >  0
Entrepreneur At the beginning of the period the borrowing constrained entrepreneur decides 
how much to invest in his firm I  =  a +  s by choosing how much secured credit (s >  0) or save, 
at rate rd (s < 0). Each unit of investment is transformed in x  units of capital, (k =  x-f). 
After he has got credit he could take the money and run away with a fraction A. If he does
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so his utility is given by
T[a + s,0,y>] -  m a x { u ( c )  +  /3U[CEtVBC (a',0V)]}
s.t. c 4- a' =  A (a +  s)
a' >  0
After the shock x  is realized he will decide how to allocate the resources {x^Y 0-\-(l — S ) x l  — 
1^ +  rd j^ s among consumption and savings. His saving problem, after uncertainty is re­
solved,16 is
N bc  (a, e, <p, X, S) =  max [ u  (c) +  &U (CE, [QV BC (a', # , ip') +  (1 -  g) V UN (a', # ,  ip')]) }
s.t. c +  a' =  [x (a + s ) ] l/9 + (1 -  i5)x(a + s )  -  ( l +  s
a' >  0
Therefore the optimal investment decisions of the agent at the beginning of the period is
N bc  (a,6,(p) =  m axf/ (CE* ^NBC (a, ASS) } )
s.t. N BC (a,0,ip) >  T [a +  s, 6, ip\
2.4.7 The problem of the unconstrained agent
At the beginning of the period the unconstrained agent faces the following occupational choice
V UN (a , 0 , ip) =  max j W UN (a, 0, ip) , N un  (a, 0, ip) j
where W UN (a, 0, ip) is the utility of becoming a worker and N un  (a, 0 , <p) of becoming an
entrepreneur.
Worker The problem of the unconstrained worker is identical to the borrowing constrained 
one except that the agent will be unconstrained in the future for sure. His saving problem is 
the following
W UN (a, 0, ip) =  max U (c) +  (3U (CEt [ v UN (a', 0', <//)]) 
s.t. c +  a' =  Wip +  ( l  +  r<i) a
a' >  0
16 We denote with a """ all the value functions, after uncertainty (about x )  is resolved. The value functions 
without are before uncertainty is resolved.
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Entrepreneur The unconstrained entrepreneur decides how much to invest in his firm 
I  =  a 4- 6 +  s by choosing how much to borrow from secured credit (s >  0) from unsecured 
credit (b >  0) or save at rate rd (s <  0). If he borrows unsecured credit he can choose from 
the menu {b, r  (a , 9, ip, b, s, X )} offered by competitive banks. After the shock x  is realized he 
can choose whether to declare bankruptcy (default) or whether to repay and how much to 
consume and save. He solves the problem backwards.
If he repays his unsecured debt, he has to choose how to allocate his resources, 9 [(a +  b +  s) x]^+ 
(1 -  8)(a +  b- \ - s )x ~  b[l  +  r (a,9, ip,b, s ,X) \  -  (1 +  rd)s ,
between consumption and savings. Given that the decision of repaying is done when current 
productivities (9, ip) and the shock x  are known, his utility from repaying is given by
N ™  (a,b,s,6,<p,X) =  m ax{tf(c ) +  /3tf ( C E t [ v ™ ( ^ 0 V ) ] ) }
s.t. a' +  c =  9 [(a +  b +  s) x \v +  (1 -  <5) (a +  b +  s) x ------
- b  [1 +  r  (a, 9 , ip, b, s, X)] -  (1 +  rd)s 
a! >  0
If he defaults, his unsecured debt is discharged. But he must repay any secured debt he 
had and he loses all assets in excess of the exemption level X . Thus, the resources to allocate be­
tween consumption and savings are
min 19 [(a -I- b 4- s ) x]v +  (1 — <5) (a +  & +  s) X ~  (1 +  r<i)s > -X"}- Moreover if he defaults he will 
be borrowing constrained next period. Therefore by declaring bankruptcy he gets
N bar‘kr (a, 6, s, 6, V,x)  =  max { u  (c) +  0 U (CE, [V BC (a', 0', < /)]) }
s.t. a' + c =  min |0  [(a +  (> + s )x ]1/+  (1 — <5) (a +  6 + s ) x  — (1 +  rd)s,
a' > 0
He will declare bankruptcy if N bankr (a, 6, s, 9,(px) > N pay (a, 6, s, 9, (p, x) and vice versa. 
Thus, at the beginning of the period the agent choose the optimal amount of b from the menu 
{6, r  (a, 9, tp, b, X )}  and the optimal s anticipating his future behavior. Therefore his utility 
is given by
N un  (a, 9 , <p) =  max CEt [max { N pay (a, 6, s, 9, <p, x ) , N bankr (a, 6, s, 9, p>, x) }1
s.t. N un  (a, 9, ip) >  T un [a +  s +  b, 9, ip]
where the "max" operator inside the square brackets reflects the bankruptcy decision, and the 
"max" operator outside the square brackets reflects the borrowing decision. The last equation
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represents the limited commitment constraint where
r { a  +  s +  b,6,v} =  m a x { u ( c )  +  0 U[ CEt VBC ( a ' , # , ? ' ) ] }
s.t. c +  a! =  A (a +  s 4- b)
a! >  0
2.4.8 The zero profit condition of the banks
Banks observe the state variables (a,0,p)  at the moment of offering the contract.There is 
perfect competition (free entry) in the credit market therefore banks make zero profit on
each secured and unsecured loan contract. Therefore the bank is indifferent between issuing
secured and unsecured loans. For each unit of secured credit the bank know that the agent 
will repay for sure: free entry will push the interest rate on secured credit to the risk free 
rate plus the transaction cost r s. For any given state (a, 9, p)  and for any given amount of 
secured borrowing the agent is doing (s) and for any unsecured loan (6 ), banks know in which 
states of the world the agent will file for bankruptcy. Therefore, they are able to calculate 
the probability that a certain agent with characteristics (a, and secured loan s, will 
default for any given amount b. This default probability, 7rbanfcr (a , 9 , p , b , s , X ), depends on 
the exemption level X  because X  affects the incentive to default directly.
If the agent repays banks receive [1 +  r (a ,0 ,p ,b , s ,X) ]b .  If the agent defaults banks 
sells the firm’s un-depreciated capital. Therefore they receive: nothing if 9 [(a 4- b 4- s ) x\u +
( 1  — 6) (a 4- b + s) x~  ( l  + s <  X ,  while banks receive 0 [(a 4- b 4- s) x]v+0- — 5) (a +  b +  s) x~  
1^ 4- rd j^ s — X  otherwise.
The zero profit condition of the banks is given by
/  [l -  7vbankr(a, 0, <p, 6 , s, X )] [1 +  r(a, 9, <p, 6 , s, X)]  6 +
+ivbankr(a,9,<p,b,s,X)
 ^ max {9 [xl}" +  (I -  6) x l  -  ( l  +  rd) s  —X ,o }
where I  =  a +  b +  s
2.4.9 Equilibrium
Let 77 =  (a, 9 , ip, S ) be a state vector for an individual, where a denotes assets, 0 entrepreneurial 
productivity, p  working productivity and S  the credit status. From the optimal policy 
functions (savings, capital demand, default decisions), from the exogenous Markov process for 
productivity and from the credit status shocks, we can derive a transition function, that, for 
any distribution /x (77) over the state provides the next period distribution n' (77). A stationary 
equilibrium is given by
\
=  (1  +  r d) ( l  +  r “ )6 ,
/
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• a deposit rate of return rd and a wage rate w
• an interest rate function
• a set of policy functions g (77) (consumption and saving, secured and unsecured borrowing, 
capital demand, bankruptcy decisions and occupational choice)
• a constant distribution over the state 7 7 , g* (7 7)
such that, given rd and w and a bankruptcy regime X  and g:
• g(rj) solves the maximization problem of the agents;
• the corporate sector representative firm is optimizing;
• capital, labor and goods market clear:
— capital demand comes from both, entrepreneurs and the corporate sector, while 
supply comes from the saving decisions of the agents;
— labor demand comes from the corporate sector, while labor supply comes from the 
occupational choice of the agents;
• the interest rate function reflects the zero profit condition of the banks
• The distribution g* (77) is the invariant distribution associated with the transition 
function generated by the optimal policy function g (7 7) and the exogenous shocks.
The model has no analytical solution and must be solved numerically. The algorithm used 
to solve the model and other details are presented in the appendix.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Parametrization 
Fixed parameters
Following standard practice in the literature we try to minimize the number of parameters of 
the model used to match the data. We therefore select some parameters which have already 
been estimated in the literature. We choose p =  0.95 for the auto-regressive coefficient of the 
earnings process.17 The variance of the earnings process is chosen to match the Gini index 
of labor income as observed in the PSID, where it is 0.38.18 The process is approximated
17 In a life cycle setting, Storesletten et al. [2004] and Storesletten et al. [2001] find p  in the range between 
0.95 and 0.98. We choose p  = 0.95 to take into account that the agents in our model are infinitely lived and 
that the intergenerational auto-regressive coefficient is lower. Solon [1992] estimates it around 0.4.
18 The exact value of the variance is = .08125. This is higher than the estimate of Storesletten et al. 
[2004] of about 0.02. We abstract from many important factors that are empirically relevant for the earnings
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using a 4-state Markov chain, using the Tauchen [1986] method as suggested by Adda /  
Cooper [2003].19 Total factor productivity is normalized to 1, while the share of capital in 
the Cobb-Douglas technology for the corporate sector is set to £ =  0.36. The depreciation 
rate is set 6 =  0.08. These parameters are summarized in table 2.5-1.
Table 2.5-1: The fixed parameters
Param eter Sym bol B aseline
TFP A 1 (normalization)
Share of capital £ 0.36
Transaction cost secured credit T S 0.01
Transaction cost unsecured credit T U 0.05
Depreciation rate 5 0.08
Working productivities V
’ <pi =  0.316, (fi2 =  0.745 ' 
y?3 =  1.342, =  3.163
' 0.8393 0.1579 0.0028 0.0000
Transition matrix P*
0.1579 0.6428 0.1965 0.0028 
0.0028 0.1965 0.6428 0.1579 
0.0000 0.0028 0.1579 0.8393
Preference parameters
The option to default provides agents with an insurance against bad outcomes. The value of 
this insurance depends crucially on the agents attitudes towards risk. As described above, the 
price of this insurance are worsened credit conditions. Agents who still borrow face higher 
interest rates. Thus, the value of the costs of the insurance depends mainly on the agents 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Therefore, we separate these two parameters and 
conduct our main policy experiment for different values of these parameters. In the baseline 
model, we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion <7 =  3 and the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution ip =  1.1. Later on we investigate values for cr ranging from 1.5 to 4.5 and ip 
ranging from 0.5 to 1.5. Table 2.5-2 summarizes preferences.
Table 2.5-2: Preference parameters
Param eter Sym bol Value
CRRA a  3
IES ip 1.1
distribution, e.g. human capital, life-cycle savings. Therefore, in order to generate the observed inequality, we 
need a higher variance of the earnings process.
19 Floden [2008] shows that for highly correlated processes the method of Adda /  Cooper [2003] achieves a 
higher accuracy than the original methods of Tauchen [1986] and Tauchen /  Hussey [1991].
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Bankruptcy policy parameters
The two policy parameters axe the exemption level X  and the probability g of being able 
to obtain unsecured credit again. The law does not state any formal period of exclusion 
from unsecured credit after a bankruptcy filing. For our baseline specification, we set g =  0.5 
which corresponds to an average exclusion period from credit of two years. This is lower 
than most values in the consumer bankruptcy literature.20 We think that this is warranted 
since there is evidence the entrepreneurs have access to unsecured credits relatively fast 
after having defaulted, see for example Lawless /  Warren [2005]. However, we conduct a 
robustness check and also investigate a considerably longer exclusion period of six years. 
The exemption level differs across US sates. Using US state-level data for 1993 we calculate 
the median across states of the total exemption21 ("homestead" plus "personal property" 
exemption). The resulting median exemption level is $47,800, taking an average household 
labor income of $48,600 corresponds to a value of 0.98 for the exemption/wage ratio.22 Table
2.5-3 summarizes the bankruptcy parameters.
Table 2.5-3: the bankruptcy parameters
Param eter Sym bol V alue
Exemption/wage X / w  0.98
Unsecured credit exlsuion (expressed as probability) g 0.5
Calibrated parameters
We are left with the following 7 parameters to be calibrated: high entrepreneurial productivity 
(0H), entrepreneurial productivity transition matrix (pHH,pLL), concavity of entrepreneurial 
production function (z/), fraction of cash on hand with which an agent can run (A), discount 
factor (/?) and the variance of the transitory shock (<rx).
We choose these 7 parameters such that the model matches the following 7 moments of the 
US economy. First we want the model to match the capital-output ratio (K /Y) in the US 
economy. In the literature we find values ranging from 2.8 to 3.1. We target it to be 3.0. We 
target the fraction of defaults. Given the discussion in Section 2 we set this equal to 2.25%. 
The fraction of entrepreneurs in the total population is 7.3% in the Survey of Consumers 
Finances.23 Based on PSID data the exit rate of entrepreneurs is equal to 15%. The median 
leverage ratio of entrepreneurs 24 in the SCF is around 15%.
20 Athreya [2002] sets the exclusion period to 4 years, Li /  Sarte [2006] to 5 years, Chatterjee et al. [2007] to 
10 years.
21 We took the data from Berkowitz /  White [2004] and top-coded the unlimited homestead exemption to the 
maximum state exemption.
22 As a further robustness check, we increase the exemption level by 50% and the results do not change
23 See Mankart /  Rodano [2007, appendix B] for data sources, definitions and further details.
24 Leverage is defined as the ratio of debt to the sum of debt and equity.
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Since the benefits of bankruptcy depend crucially on the wealth of an agent we match some 
features of the wealth distribution. The US wealth distribution is extremely skewed with the 
top 40% of richest households holding around 94% of total assets. As a last target we choose 
to match the ratio of the median wealth of entrepreneurs to the median wealth in the whole 
population. This target captures features of both the wealth distribution and entrepreneurial 
productivity and technology. We set the target to 6.3 as found in the SCF. The targets are 
summarized in the second column of Table 2.5-5.
2.5.2 The baseline calibration results
We first present the baseline version of the model. Table 2.5-4 reports the value of the 
calibrated parameters in the baseline specification.
Table 2.5-4: the calibrated parameters
Param eter Sym bol Benchm ark Value
High entrepreneurial productivity eH 0.662
Entrepreneurial productivity transition p H H p LL 0.890 , 0.989
Concavity of entrepreneurial technology V 0.876
Fraction with which agent can run A 0.963
Discount factor P 0.895
Variance of transitory shock 0.346
Table 2.5-5 reports the value of the targets and the actual results achieved in the baseline 
specification.
Table 2.5-5: the baseline calibration targets
M om ent Target M odel
Fraction of Entrepreneurs (in %) 7.3 7.3
Ratio of medians (in %) 6.3 6.1
Share of net-worth of top 40% 94.0 94.1
K /Y 3.0 3.0
Exit Rate (in %) 15.0 15.0
Bankruptcy Rate (in %) 2.25 2.25
Median leverage (in %) 15.0 15.0
The marginal product of capital in the corporate sector (r d) is 2.9%. Less than one percent 
(0.79%) of the total population is in the constrained state. Our model does replicate the 
ratio of medians and the share of the wealth held by the richest 40% fairly well. It captures 
the main features that entrepreneurs are several times richer than workers and that most of 
the wealth is held by the richest. The Gini coefficient of wealth is 0.83 in the model, slightly 
higher than the data (0.8). For the purpose of our policy experiments it is important that
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the model replicates the middle and lower part of the wealth distribution since bankruptcy 
law affects almost exclusively these agents.
Another feature that we do not target but that our model captures fairly well is the 
difference in the entry rate between workers with previous business experience and those 
without previous business experience. Based on PSID data25, those who had some experience 
within the past three years are 13 times as likely to enter entrepreneurship than the average 
worker. In the model this ratio is 10.
Quadrini [2000] reports that around 35-40% of total capital is invested in the entrepreneurial 
sector. In our baseline specification this fraction is slightly lower, around 31.3%.
2.5.3 Investigating the model's mechanisms 
Occupational choice
The key ingredient of the model is occupational choice. Figure 2.2 represents the occupational 
choice of an unconstrained agent with high entrepreneurial productivity and low working 
productivity.
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Figure 2.2: Occupational choice (S — UN,0  =  0H,ip =  <pz)
The dotted line shows the value function of becoming a worker, whereas the solid line 
shows the value function of becoming an entrepreneur.
The first result is that, otherwise identical agents choose differently according to their 
wealth: poor agents become workers while rich agents become entrepreneurs. This result 
is standard in the occupational choice under credit market imperfections literature [see e.g. 
Banerjee /  Newman 1993]. The main reasons are that poor agents have smaller firms and
25 See Mankart /  Rodano [2007, appendix B]
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face higher interest rates. They have smaller firms because, being poor, they need to borrow 
more but they face higher rates on the loans. The cost of financing is higher for the poor 
for two reasons. First, they have a higher incentive to default. Defaulting rich agents have 
to give up all their wealth above the exemption level. Second, in the event of default the 
bank gets less when the agent is poor. Thus, to break even, the bank has to charge a higher 
interest rate. That is, in this model, wealth acts as collateral.
The behavior of the unconstrained agents
The second important ingredient is the decision of the unconstrained entrepreneurs. The 
solution of the entrepreneurs’ problem is represented in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: interest rate and firm size (6 — dH, <p =  ^2 )
The top panel shows demand for unsecured debt (6). The second panel shows demand for 
secured debt (s). The third panel shows the corresponding price of unsecured credit26 The 
bottom panel shows the resulting firm size ((a +  b +  s)). Poorer agents (e.g. agents with 
assets a < 0.8) become workers while all the others become entrepreneurs (a > 0.8). The 
very rich entrepreneurs (a > 2.4) will never find it profitable to default. Their wealth is so 
high that defaulting is too costly for them. Therefore they borrow only secured since secured 
credit is cheaper than unsecured.27 The "middle class" entrepreneurs (e.g. a =  2) will instead 
default if the shock is sufficiently bad, since the cost of bankruptcy is lower for them. In 
order to break even, the bank charges a higher interest rate, i.e. the unsecured credit is more
26 For readability, we show the price of credit instead of the interest rate.
27 The transaction cost for secured credit is lower than for unsecured credit.
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expansive. The interest rate depends (negatively) on the assets of the entrepreneur, because 
in the event of default the bank will be able to seize the difference between the assets of the 
entrepreneur and the exemption level. Capital demand for the "middle-class" entrepreneurs 
is increasing because of the cost of borrowing is declining. The spikes in the demand for 
unsecured credit reflect the discretization of the investment shock.
A first look at the effects of bankruptcy
Bankruptcy affects the problem of the unconstrained agents, because it changes credit 
conditions and the amount of insurance available. We examine these effects with the following 
experiment. We compare the behavior of the unconstrained agents in two different situations: 
one in which bankruptcy is allowed and one in which bankruptcy is absent. Figure 2.4 shows 
the policy functions in these situations.
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Figure 2.4: Firm size and interest rate (5 =  UN, 9 =  0H, p  =  p 2 )
The effects of allowing bankruptcy depend on the wealth of the agent. First, the default 
behavior of the rich (e.g. a > 2.4) is not affected. They are entrepreneurs and they repay 
their debt even in the bad states. As explained above, even if bankruptcy is available, it is too 
costly for them. They demand a little bit more secured credit due to a general equilibrium 
effect. Second, allowing bankruptcy affects the behavior of the less rich agents (e.g. a =  1.5). 
They are entrepreneurs in both situations. But when bankruptcy is allowed they borrow 
more unsecured because they are better insured at cost of more expansive credit. We call 
this increase in the firm size the intensive margin. Third, the occupational choice of even
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less rich agents (e.g. a =  1) is affected. When bankruptcy is not allowed they are not 
insured against bad outcomes. Therefore they do not want to borrow, even though they 
could borrow at rate rs. They become workers. When bankruptcy is allowed they are insured 
against bad outcomes. Therefore they borrow, even though they have to pay a high interest 
rate. This increases the rewards of entrepreneurship enough to change their occupational 
choice. We call this increase in the number of entrepreneurs the extensive margin. Fourth, the 
occupational choice of the very poor agents (e.g. a < 0.7) is not affected, they are workers in 
both situations.
In this particular experiment abolishing bankruptcy reduces entrepreneurship and firm 
size, the intensive and the extensive margins are negative. The negative effect of lowering the 
amount of insurance available dominates the positive effect of better credit conditions.
2.5.4 Changing the exemption level
Our main policy experiment is to analyze the effects of changing the exemption level.
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Figure 2.5: Changes in the exemption levels
Figure 2.5 shows the effects of changing the exemption level on welfare, entrepreneurship, 
exit rates and defaults. Table 2.5-6 reports the variables of interest for 3 values of X/w.  
Column 2 reports results when bankruptcy is very harsh (X / w  =  0). Column 3 reports 
results for the baseline calibration (X / w  =  0.98) and column 4 for the optimal exemption 
level (X/ w =  7.3).
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Welfare Increasing the exemption level from zero increases welfare. The insurance effect 
is dominating the worsening credit market effect. More agents become entrepreneurs (see 
also Table 2.5-6) and welfare increases. However, increasing the exemption level beyond the 
optimal level worsens credit market conditions so much that agents borrow less, and therefore 
fewer agents find it profitable to become entrepreneurs. The current exemption level in the 
US, X / w  =  0.98, is too low. The bankruptcy law is too harsh. The welfare gains in increasing 
the exemption level are substantial. The change in consumption equivalent (see row 10 in
2.5-6 ) is 2.2% of annual consumption. The rich and the poor both gain from increasing the 
exemption level.
Entrepreneurs Increasing the exemption level increases the fraction of entrepreneurs by 0.2 
percentage points. Thus, there is a positive extensive margin. In particular, the optimal 
exemption level allows entrepreneurs who have defaulted to remain entrepreneurs because 
they can keep more assets in the default case. However, as can be seen in figure 2.5, the 
entrepreneurship rate peaks earlier than welfare. This implies that the intensive margin, i.e. 
bigger firms, is important in explaining the welfare results. As expected the default rate is 
increasing in the exemption level. The exit rate however is declining in the exemption level. 
The reason for this is that entrepreneurs who have defaulted keep enough assets to remain 
entrepreneurs despite being excluded from unsecured credit.
Table 2.5-6: the effects of changes in the exemption level
X /w 0 0.98 7.3
Exit rate (in %) 15.1 15.0 12.9
Fraction of Entrepreneurs (in %) 6.7 7.2 7.4
Bankruptcy/Exit (in %) 0 15.0 73.8
Capital/Output 3.02 3.02 3.02
Median assets of Entr/ Median assets 7.2 6.3 7.3
Share of Capital in entr. sector (in %) 30.9 31.4 33.2
Gini of Assets 0.84 0.84 0.83
Share of assets in top 40% of pop (in %) 94.6 94.6 94.5
Median output in entrepreneurial sector 9.7 8.9 11.4
Welfare in CE -0.5 0.0 2.2
Welfare of rich in CE -0.9 0.0 2.46
Welfare of poor in CE 0.1 0.0 2.02
Access to entrepreneurship of the poor Next we turn to how bankruptcy law affects the 
determinants of entry into entrepreneurship. There is allocative inefficiency in our model 
because insurance markets are missing. Part of this inefficiency is reflected in some poor 
highly productive agents not becoming entrepreneurs, either because they receive too little 
insurance or because the conditions at which credit is available are too bad. Table 2.5-7 
reports the effects of different exemption levels on the minimum assets needed for the highly 
productive (0_\ =  9H) agent to become an entrepreneur.
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The rows show these values for the levels of working productivity (ip). The attractiveness 
of becoming a worker is increasing in working productivity, i.e. the outside option of 
entrepreneurs is increasing in working productivity. Thus in order to enter entrepreneurship, 
the expected profits must be higher for an agent with high working productivity. Since richer 
agents need to borrow relatively less and since they receive better credit conditions, their 
expected profits are higher. This implies that, to become an entrepreneur, an agent with high 
working productivity must be richer than an agent with low working productivity to enter 
entrepreneurship.
Increasing the exemption level to the optimal induces agents with high levels of labor 
productivity to enter entrepreneurship earlier. Poorer agents however will enter only when 
they are richer. The reason for this is that the credit market conditions worsen so much that 
they can obtain only secured credit and therefore lose the insurance coming from unsecured 
credit.
Table 2.5-7: minimum wealth for entrepreneurship
MINIMUM WEALTH 
FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP
X /w 0 0.98 7.3
ip =  0.316 0.32 0.28 0.32
ip =  0.745 1.14 0.86 1.08
ip =  1.342 2.34 2.24 2.20
ip =  3.163 6.87 6.83 6.75
2.5.5 Modeling of credit markets matter
Almost all paper in the bankruptcy literature allow unsecured borrowing only.28 Notable 
exceptions are Athreya [2006] and Hintermaier /  Koeniger [2008] in the consumption litera­
ture. The reason is that the computational burden of allowing for secured credit as well is 
considerable. However, according to data from Sullivan et al. [1989], seemed borrowing is as 
important as unsecured borrowing.29.
Not only is secured credit empirically relevant, but also, as we show in this section, it is 
crucial for the results. To show this, we set up a model identical to the one discussed so far 
except that there is no seemed credit available, neither for the borrowing constrained nor for 
the unconstrained entrepreneur. This implies that the former cannot borrow at all and must 
finance his projects with his own wealth. We first recalibrate the model and then conduct 
the same policy experiment as before. The results in figure 2.6 are striking. The optimal 
bankruptcy law now would be to abolish bankruptcy completely. This would increase welfare 
and lead to a higher number of entreprenems.
28 See for example Akyol /  Athreya [2007], Meh /  Terajima [2008], Athreya [2002], Livshits et al. [2007a], 
Chatterjee et al. [2007], Athreya /  Simpson [2006], Li /  Sarte [2006], Mateos-Planas /  Seccia [2006].
29 Mean secured debt over mean total debt is about 55%
2.5 Results 81
122.84
122.82«ra 122.8
122.78
0.5 2.5
0 .0 7 5 ^
0.074
5  0 .0 7 3 : 
Ul
2 0.072  
0.0711
0.07
0.5
Exemption
Figure 2.6: Welfare effects of changes in X if only secured credit available
Table 2.5-8: calibration unsecured credit only
M om ent Target U nsec credit only Sec and U nsec
Entrepreneurs (in %) 7.3 7.17 7.44
Exit Rate (in %) 15.0 13.55 12.76
Table 2.5-8 shows what happens if we use the calibrated parameters of the model without 
secured borrowing and now allow secured borrowing. Since the financial market is now 
relatively more complete, we see that there are more entrepreneurs and fewer exits.
The reason for this can be seen in figure 2.7. All agents is region (2) are not able to obtain 
unsecured credit because their default incentive is too high. If secured credit is not available, 
these agents become workers. However, if secured credit is available, these agents can borrow 
secured and so become entrepreneurs. Agents in region (3) use secured credit to run bigger 
firms.
This mechanism explains why the optimal exemption level in a model with secured and 
unsecured credit is much higher than the optimal exemption level in a model with only 
unsecured credit. Absent secured credit, an increase in the exemption level prices out many 
more agents. It would expand regions (1) and (2). Thus, the agents become workers because 
they are credit rationed. The availability of secured credit dampens this negative effect.
Another way of looking at this is the following. The optimal policy is a very harsh 
bankruptcy law. This implies that the agents do not value the insurance that is provided by 
the bankruptcy law. They would like to have less insurance but therefore have better credit 
market conditions. This means essentially that the agents want a commitment device that 
takes away the default option. One way to achieve his is to make the law harsher. Another 
way, however, is to use secured credit. Secured credit is the commitment device that the 
agents want.
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Figure 2.7: Policy functions with secured credit
As already mentioned, most previous papers do not include secured credit in their models 
and most of them find that the current bankruptcy law is too lenient.30 Our results imply 
that these results might not be robust towards including secured borrowing.
2 .5 .6  Robustness
In this section, we show the effects of changing the agent’s preferences. We separate the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution from the coefficient of relative risk aversion because 
they have different effects. With a standard utility function, one is the inverse of the other. In 
this case, an increase in risk aversion as for example examined in Athreya [2006] conflates two 
effects. On the one hand, since agents are more risk averse, they value insurance more so the 
optimal exemption level is likely to be higher. On the other hand, with standard preferences, 
an increase in risk aversion simultaneously lowers the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. 
Thus, agents are less willing to transfer consumption across time. But a higher exemption 
level will increase the interest rate agents face because banks have to charge higher interest 
rates in order to break even. Thus, a decrease in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
is likely to lead to a lower optimal exemption level. By not separating the two, one examines
30 The two other papers (Akyol /  Athreya [2007],Meh /  Terajima [2008]) in the entrepreneurial bankruptcy 
literature find significant welfare gains from making the law harsher. The papers in the consumer bankruptcy 
literature reach similar conclusions.
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only their net effect. It is possible that each of these two effects is big but that they cancel 
each other so that the net effect is small.
Changing EIS
In this subsection we investigate the robustness of the results towards different values of 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The costs of a lenient bankruptcy law axe higher 
interest rates which make substitution across time more costly. If agents’ willingness to 
substitute consumption across period is low (i.e. eis is small), higher interest rates will be 
particularly costly. Therefore the optimal exemption level should be an increasing function of 
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We recalibrate the model once with a low elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution, (ip =  0.6) and once with a high elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution (ip =  1.4). We keep the coefficient of risk aversion constant. The results 
are shown in table 2.5-9. The optimal exemption level is increasing in the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution as expected. While the magnitude of the effects is not huge, they 
are quantitatively significant.
Table 2.5-9: Optimal exemption level for different EIS
C R R A O ptim al X
0.6 6.7
1.1 7.3
1.4 7.9
Changing RRA
In this subsection we investigate the robustness of the results towards different degrees of 
risk aversion. The possibility to default provides insurance against bad outcomes. The value 
agents attach to this insurance depends on their risk aversion. We recalibrate the model once 
with a low coefficient of risk aversion, (cr =  1.5) and once with a high coefficient of relative 
risk aversion (a =  4.5). We keep the elasticity of intertemporal substitution constant since 
we want to isolate the importance of risk attitudes.
The optimal exemption level, the amount of insurance, is increasing in <j . This result is 
qualitatively not surprising. However it is also quantitatively important. If agents were less 
risk averse, the optimal exemption level would be 13% lower. However, the effects are rather 
small in welfare terms. Welfare never changes by more than a fraction of a percent. This is 
due to the fact that all exemption levels are pretty high.
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Table 2.5-10: Optimal exemption level for different CRRA values
C R R A O ptim al X
1.5 6.3
3.0 7.3
4.5 8.7
2.6 Conclusion
This is the first paper to explore quantitatively the effects of personal bankruptcy law on 
entrepreneurship in a general equilibrium setting with heterogeneous agents and secured and 
unsecured credit. First, we developed a dynamic general equilibrium model with occupational 
choice which explicitly incorporates the US bankruptcy law. Our model endogenously 
generates interest rates that reflect the different default probabilities of the agents. Our 
model accounts for the main facts on entrepreneurial bankruptcy, entrepreneurship, wealth 
distribution and macroeconomic aggregates in the US.
Then, we used the model to quantitatively evaluate the effects of changing the US bankruptcy 
law. The simulation results show that increasing the exemption level would increase the 
fraction of entrepreneurs and welfare. These effects are significant: increasing the exemption 
level to the optimal one has positive welfare effects in the order of 2.2% of average consumption. 
All households, rich and poor, would be better off.
The most important contribution of our paper is to show that the modeling of the credit 
market matters. Investigating the optimal exemption level in a model without secured credit 
gives misleading results because it overstates credit rationing.
We are currently extending our research program along two dimensions. First, we are 
incorporating the transition to the new steady state. So far, our results are based on a 
comparison of steady-states. Transitional effects might be important to evaluate welfare. In 
addition it might explain why the current law is too lenient. It could be that some groups 
lose during the transition and therefore oppose changes.
Second, we are expanding our model to incorporate explicitly a European type of bankruptcy 
law. The laws in European countries are much harsher than the law in the US. For example 
in Italy, debt is never discharged. A defaulter is liable forever. We are analyzing the effects 
of introducing a US type of law on the Italian economy.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Computational strategy
The state vector for an individual is given by rj =  (a, 9, <p, S ). The aggregate state is a density 
pt (a, 9, <p, S) over the individual state variables. We assume that a takes on value on a grid Ga 
of dimension na. Therefore the dimension of the individual state space is n =  na x tiq  x  x 2 
where t i q  =  2 is the number of states for the entrepreneurial productivity and =  4 is the 
number of states for the working productivity.
In order to solve the model we use the following:
A lgorithm  3 Our solution algorithm is:
1. Assign all parameters values
2. Guess a value for the endogenous variable r.
3. Given r the FOC of the corporate sector uniquely pin down the wage rate w. The 
representative competitive firm in the corporate sector will choose K c and Lc such as
rd =  (2.7-1)
w =  ( l - t ) A K i L ?  =  ( l - ( ) A ( j £ \  (2.7-2)
Therefore r uniquely pins down and in turn uniquely pins down w.
4■ Given (r , w) we solve for the optimal value functions and corresponding policy functions 
by value function iteration. Within the period we solve backwards in time.
a) We guess a value function V(r))
b) We solve the consumption-savings problem of the constrained and unconstrained 
agent for a grid of cash on hand.
c) We approximate the resulting continuation value functions.
d) Since the worker faces no uncertainty within the period, these value functions give 
us the values for the workers.
e) Given the continuation value, we solve the problem of the unconstrained en­
trepreneur:
• We set up a grid for secured credit.
• For each value of secured credit, we set up a grid for unsecured credit.
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• For each value of unsecured credit, we price the credit according to the zero 
profit condition.
• We identify the optimal grid point and then bisect around that optimal point 
to get a more accurate choice of unsecured credit.
• We calculate the value for each combination of secured.
f)  The problem of the constrained entrepreneur is solved similarly.
g) Occupational choice gives us the updated value functions V(ry).
h) We iterate until convergence.
i) As a byproduct we obtain the policy functions.
5. The policy functions, the exogenous transition matrix for the shocks (both for 0 and for 
(p), the iid investment shock and the credit status shock q induce a transition matrix Pv 
over the state r].
6. The transition matrix maps the any current distribution31 p^ into a next period 
distribution p^ by simply
=  P q  *  f a l , t
We calculate the steady state distribution over the state p* by solving for a
7. From the policy functions and the steady state distribution, we derive the market clearing 
conditions
8. Labor market clearing implies that labor supply Ls (r) is equal to labor demand (that 
comes from corporateL^). Plugging this into the FOC (2.7-1) of the corporate sector we 
get capital demand from corporate sector:
9. Now we look at capital market clearing:
Kentr (r) +  K* (r) = SA (r)
10. If there is not equilibrium at point 9 we adjust interest rate, we go back to point 3 and 
we iterate until market clears32.
31 Note that in our framework the distribution of household over the state fiv , is vector of dimension n  whose 
elements sum up to 1.
32 In practice we first run a grid search over different values for r and then bisect until we get market clearing.
Chapter
Bankruptcy Reform and Endogenous 
Risk-taking by Entrepreneurs
3.1 Introduction
In recent years many European countries have adopted policies to encourage entrepreneurship. 
One of the policy changes has been to make the bankruptcy law more lenient. For example in 
Germany, prior to a law change in 1999, a person who was unable to repay a loan was liable 
for his debt forever. Creditors could garnish part of the income forever. The garnishment 
period is now reduced to six years. In the UK this period was reduced to three years. A 
similar law changed was introduced in the Netherlands. One of the stated objectives was to 
encourage risk-taking by entrepreneurs.
I analyze the effect of changes in the bankruptcy law on risk-taking by entrepreneurs when 
risk-taking is endogenous. In particular, I investigate whether a more lenient bankruptcy law 
really encourages risk-taking. I show that this is not necessarily the case. Consequently, the 
policy changes mentioned above might not have the effects envisioned by policy makers.
It is well understood that making the bankruptcy law more lenient worsens credit market 
conditions and therefore can lower entrepreneurship rates and /  or firm size. However, the 
possibility to default in bad states provides entrepreneurs with insurance. Akyol /  Athreya 
[2007], Mankart /  Rodano [2007, 2009], and Meh /  Terajima [2008] analyze this trade-off in 
quantitative models of the US economy. However in their papers risk-taking is exogenous 
in the sense that agents can not influence the success probabilities of their projects. In this 
paper, I allow agents to influence the riskiness of their projects. They can increase the return 
of their project in good states by accepting lower returns in bad states.
Risk-taking behavior of agents facing an occupational choice problem has been analyzed 
by Hopenhayn /  Vereshchagina [2009]. In their model, entrepreneurs have to finance their
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projects themselves. The occupational choice of the agents leads to a kink in the value 
function. Agents with assets in the neighborhood of this kink will be locally risk-loving. 
Therefore, they will take on more risk even when the expected value of the projects does not 
change.
In my model agents can borrow and default. This introduces another kink in the value 
function. This can also lead agents to take on more risk. In my quantitative model, I 
indeed find that some entrepreneurs choose risky projects. But this result is due to the kink 
stemming from the default option and not due to the occupational choice as in Hopenhayn /  
Vereshchagina [2009]. The reason that occupational choice alone does not lead to increased risk- 
taking is that agents face some uncertainty about their entrepreneurial and labor productivity 
next period. This randomness convexities the continuation value functions to such a degree 
that the kink due to the occupational choice problem gets smoothed out. The kink due to 
the default possibility,however, is not smoothed out and therefore some entrepreneurs are 
locally risk-loving and choose risky projects.
The main result of the paper is that making the bankruptcy law more lenient can lead 
agents, keeping their wealth and productivity constant, to take on less, and not more, risk. 
The reason for this counter-intuitive effect is that agents are able to borrow a lot and choose 
risky projects when the exemption level is low. As the exemption level is increased, the 
default incentives increase and banks might fail to break even on the original loan. There is 
no finite interest rate for which a bank would break even on the original loan size. Therefore 
banks offer the entrepreneur only smaller loans. That makes defaulting less attractive because 
there will be less undepreciated capital left. In this situation an entrepreneur might decide 
to take on less risk. This lower risk-taking will lead to a lower interest rate on the (smaller) 
amount borrowed.
This effect might be an explanation of a finding by Berkowitz /  White [2004]. They examine 
the effects of different exemption levels across US states on credit conditions for small firms. 
Their main finding is that the harsher the bankruptcy law, i.e. the more assets the bank 
can seize in the case of a default, the lesser borrowing constraints, and the lower are the 
interest rates that firms have to pay. However, this relationship is non-monotonic. This 
non-monotonicity might be due to a selection effect, the entrepreneurs with the highest default 
probabilities are rationed out of the credit market, or due to less risk-taking by entrepreneurs. 
In the model, I show that the result is not driven by the selection effect but by the risk-taking 
incentives of the entrepreneurs. The latter makes bankruptcy more attractive might lead 
agents to take on less risks.1
The paper is organized as follows. In section 3 .2 ,1 lay out the baseline model. In section 3.3, 
I present the result for the benchmark case. In section 3.4, I analyze the effects of changing 
the exemption level. In particular, I show that the model can reproduce the worsening of 
credit market conditions observed by Berkowitz /  White [2004]. In section 3.5, I investigate
1 I tried to obtain the data used by Berkowitz /  White [2004]. But, unfortunately, the state level information 
is available only to  members of the Federal Reserves Board of Governors.
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the robustness of the results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 A Quantitative Model
I investigate the optimal risk-taking decision of entrepreneurs in an occupational choice model 
calibrated to the US economy. The model in this section is built on the model in Mankart /  
Rodano [2007].2
The economy is populated by a unit mass of infinitely lived heterogeneous agents. Agents 
face idiosyncratic uncertainty, but there is no aggregate uncertainty. At the beginning of 
every period, agents decide whether to become workers or entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur 
must decide how much to invest, in what technology to invest and, if he is allowed to, how 
much to borrow. The agent can choose among different technologies. The technologies differ 
in their riskiness and returns. An entrepreneur who has defaulted in the past is excluded 
from unsecured credit for some time. Since I focus on the implications of personal bankruptcy 
for entrepreneurs, workers are not allowed to borrow. Agents’ productivities evolve over time 
and agents are subject to uninsurable production risk. However, the amount of risk taken is 
partially endogenous. After the shocks are realized, production takes place. At the end of the 
period borrowers decide whether to repay or whether to default and how much to consume 
and how much to save. If they default, they will be borrowing constrained in the next period. 
Anticipating this behavior, banks who give unsecured credit vary the interest rate charged for 
each loan taking into account the individual borrower’s default probability. The remainder of 
this section presents the details of the model.
3.2.1 Credit and bankruptcy law
Entrepreneurs can obtain unsecured credit to finance their firms. If the entrepreneur decides 
to default he will be subject to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy procedure. All unsecured debt will 
be discharged. But, any assets in excess of the exemption level X  are liquidated and used 
to repay creditors. In order to limit leverage to empirically plausible levels, I introduce a 
borrowing limit as multiple of the entrepreneur’s own assets. This multiple is calibrated to 
obtain a leverage ratio of 15%.3
An agent who has defaulted in the past is excluded from the market for unsecured credit for 
a certain period of time. During this period he still can become an entrepreneur. He has to 
self-finance his project though. I call this agent borrowing constrained and I denote his credit
2 One caveat is in order however, Mankart /  Rodano [2009] show that including secured credit in the analysis 
matters. Due to the computational burden this would imply, I consider only unsecured credit. However, the 
focus of the analysis here is not so much normative as positive. Thus, the emphasis is on the effects of different 
exemption level on risk-taking and not on the optimal exemption level.
3 As has been pointed out by Heaton /  Lucas [2002], models without uncertainty about the type of the agent 
feature implausibly high leverage ratios.
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status as BC . It is important to note that this agent is not fully excluded from the credit 
market. He can still save. I assume that every borrowing constrained agent, whether worker 
or entrepreneur, faces a credit status shock at the end of the period. The agent remains 
borrowing constrained with probability (1 — g). He regains access to credit markets with 
probability g and therefore becomes an unconstrained agent with credit status U N .4 This 
probability g captures the duration of the exclusion period from the market of unsecured 
borrowing. It is calibrated such that the average exclusion period is two years.
3.2.2 Households
The economy is populated by a unit mass of infinitely lived heterogeneous agents. Agents 
differ with respect to their level of assets a, their entrepreneurial productivity 0 , their working 
productivity and their credit market status S  £ {U N , B C }.
Preferences
For simplicity I abstract from the labor-leisure choice. All agents supply their unit of labor 
inelastically either as workers or as entrepreneurs. As has been shown by Mankart /  Rodano 
[2009], disentangling the effects of risk aversion from that of the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution can yield interesting insights. Therefore, I assume that agents have Epstein-Zin 
preferences. A stochastic consumption stream {ct } ^ 0 generates an utility { u t} ^ 0 according 
to
ut = U(ct) + 0U (CEt [U-1 (ut+i)])
where j3 is the discount rate and CE* \U~l {ut+1)] =  T- 1  [E*r (ut+i)] is the consumption 
equivalent of ut+\ given information at period t. The utility function U (c) — c ~ ^ /  
aggregates consumption across dates and 'ip is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
The utility function T (c) =  c1-7/  (1 — 7 ) aggregates consumption across states and 7  is the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Productivities
Each agent is endowed with a couple of stochastic productivity levels which axe known at 
the beginning of the period: one as an entrepreneur 9, and one as a worker '9. I make the 
simplifying assumption that the working and entrepreneurial ability processes are uncorrelated.
4 The length of the exclusion period is transformed into a probability in order to  avoid an additional state  
variable that keeps track of the numbers of years left before the solvency status is returned to UN. This 
procedure is standard in the literature, see Athreya [2002] and Chatterjee et al. [2007].
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The workers’ ability process Following the literature, I assume that labor productivity 
follows the following AR(1 ) process
log &t =  (1  - p ) n  +  plogtft—i +  £t
where £t is iid and £ ~  N  (0, cre). If the agent becomes a worker his labor income during 
current period is given by w&.
The entrepreneurs’ ability process In contrast to the case of working ability, there axe no 
reliable estimates of the functional form of entrepreneurial ability. Therefore, following Cagetti 
/  De Nardi [2006], I assume a parsimonious specification where entrepreneurial productivity 
follows a 2-state Markov process with 0L =  0 and 0H >  0 and transition matrix
[ p LL i  _  pLL
Pa =
e 1 - p HH pHH
I calibrate the 3 parameters (0H, pHH and pLL) to match some observed features of en­
trepreneurial activity in the US economy.
3.2.3 Technology
Entrepreneurial sector Every agent in the economy has access to a set of productive 
technologies that, depending on her entrepreneurial productivity 6, produces output according 
to the production function
Y = dkv 
k =  x l
where 6 is the agent’s persistent entrepreneurial productivity described above, and
logx ~  N  ( 0 , (7^ )  .
The key innovation is that the variance of the project is a choice variable, i.e. agents can 
choose different levels of riskiness. They might want to do this due to the non-convexities 
resulting from the default option and from the occupational choice. Thus, entrepreneurs can 
choose v 3x. However, there is a lower bound on cr£, chosen to match observed default rates.
Corporate sector Many firms axe both incorporated and big enough not to be subject to 
personal bankruptcy law. Therefore, I follow Quadrini [2000] and Cagetti /  De Nardi [2006] 
and assume a perfectly competitive corporate sector which is modeled as a Cobb-Douglas
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production function
F (K c,L c) = A K l L \ S
where K c and Lc are capital and labor employed in this sector. Given perfect competition 
and constant returns to scale the corporate sector does not distribute any dividend. Capital 
depreciates at rate <5 in both sectors.
3.2.4 Credit market
I assume that there is perfect competition (free entry) in the credit market. Therefore, banks 
make zero expected profits on any contract. The opportunity cost of lending to entrepreneurs 
is the rate of return on capital in the corporate sector. This is also equal to the deposit rate.5 
In addition, producing credit incurs a transaction cost r. Agents can obtain unsecured credit 
on which they can default. As already mentioned, there is also an endogenously calibrated 
borrowing limit. While there are no information asymmetries in the credit market about the 
borrowers’ types, there is a hidden action problem. Thus, while banks know the agent’s assets, 
and his productivity levels, banks cannot control the technology the entrepreneur will invest 
in. In particular, they have to take into account that the entrepreneur might choose a riskier 
project. But since banks can predict the behavior of the agent, they know what the agent 
will do and therefore price every loan accordingly. Thus, for any value of (a, 0,0)  and for any 
amount lent b, by anticipating the behavior of the entrepreneur, banks are able to calculate 
the probability of default and the recovery rate in case of default. Perfect competition implies 
that they set the interest rate, r (a ,0 ,0 ,b ,X) ,  such that they expect to break even. This 
interest rate depends on the exemption level X  because it affects the incentives to default and 
the amount the bank recovers in this event. Therefore banks offer a menu of one period debt 
contracts which consist of an amount lent b and a corresponding interest rate r (a, 6 , 0, b, X ) 
to each agent (a, 0, 0).
3.2.5 Timing
Figure 3.1 shows the timing of the model. Given the focus of the paper I choose the timing 
such that workers can never default. Entrepreneurs’ borrowing and default decisions are 
taken within the period. At the beginning of the period all agents face an occupational 
choice: they choose whether they become entrepreneurs or workers. Agents know their current 
productivity levels ('0,0).
Workers deposit all their wealth at the banks, receiving a rate of return rd. After production 
has taken place, they choose consumption and savings. At the end of the period, the borrowing 
constrained worker receives the credit status shock. With probability g he remains borrowing 
constrained next period (i.e. S' =  BC).  With probability (1  — f?) he becomes unconstrained 
next period (i.e. S' =  UN).
5 In the model banks are isomorphic to a bond market in which each agent has the possibility to  issue debt.
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The borrowing constrained entrepreneur chooses two things: he must decide the riskiness 
of the project <t£ and how much of his own wealth he invests in the project respectively how 
much he saves. He must take these decisions before the iid  shock x  is realized. After x  is 
realized and production has taken place, he chooses consumption and savings. At the end of 
the period he receives the credit status shock.
t+1
S , a , 6, X S ',  a', 0',<p'
Occupational 
choice
Credit contract
iid shock 
Production 
Choose W ages 
riskiness
I I
Consumption 
and saving
D . , Credit shock
d ! c 2  New productivities
Figure 3.1: Timing of the model
The unconstrained entrepreneur has to make two additional decisions. At the beginning 
of the period, he has to decide how much to borrow. Competitive banks will offer fairly 
priced loans that take the entrepreneur’s subsequent technology risk choice into account. 
Thus, they offer a menu {6 , r (a, 9, $, b, A )} of credit contracts. The entrepreneur will pick 
the one that implies the highest utility. After x  is realized and production has taken place, 
the entrepreneur must decide whether to repay his debt and be unconstrained next period (i.e. 
S' =  UN) or whether to file for bankruptcy and be borrowing constrained next period(i.e. 
S' =  BC).  After that he chooses consumption and savings.
Since the credit status S  consists only of the two states B C  and UN,  I define the individual 
state variable as (a, 6, fl), and I solve for two value functions V UN (a, 6, tf) and V BC (a, 0, fi) 
one for each credit status.
3.2.6 The problem of the borrowing constrained agent
At the beginning of the period, the borrowing constrained agent can choose whether to 
become an entrepreneur, which gives utility N BC (a, 9, i9) or a worker which yields utility 
W BC (a, 9, i?). Therefore, the value of being a borrowing constrained agent with state (a, 9, i9) 
is
V BC (a, 9, i?) =  max ^NBC (a, 9, tf) , W BC (a, 9, tf) j 
where the "max" operator reflects the occupational choice.
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Worker At the beginning of the period a borrowing constrained s to rker deposits all his 
wealth at the bank. He receives labor income wd. At the end of the period, he chooses 
consumption and saving, taking into account that he will receive a credit status shock in 
addition to productivity shocks. With probability g he will be still borrowing constrained 
next period which yields utility V BC (a', O', d'), while with probability (1  — g) he will become 
unconstrained which yields utility V UN (a', 0',d'). His saving problem is the following
W BC (a, 0,d) =  m ax \ u  (c) +  0U  (CE* [,oVBC (a', O', d f) +  (1 -  g) V UN (a', O', tf')]) }
s.t. c +  a' =  wd  +  ( l  +  a
a' >  0
Entrepreneur At the beginning of the period the borrowing constrained entrepreneur decides 
how much to invest in his firm I  (< a) and how much to save a —I. In addition, he must decide 
how much risk <r£ to take on. After he has invested, each unit of investment is transformed 
in x  units of capital (k =  x-0 -
After the shock x  is realized he will decide how to allocate his resources {x^Y 0 + { l  — 6) X-f— 
( l  +  r d j^ (a — I) between consumption and savings. His saving problem, after uncertainty is 
resolved,6 is
N b c  (a, 0, x) =  m ax [ u  (c) +  0U  (CEj [gVBC (a', 9', 9') +  (1 -  e) V UN (o', 9')]) }
s . t . c  +  a' = ( x I Y e  + ( l - S ) x I ~  ( l  +  r'*) ( a ~ I )  
a' >  0 .
Therefore the optimal investment decisions of the agent at the beginning of the period is
N bc  (a, 0, d} =  max U (CE* [ n bc  {a, O',d', X) })
I,(TX
s.t. I  <  a and aJx £ [cr*, ax, ..., cr^ j .
Thus, the agent chooses the size of his project and the variance of the distribution from 
which the shock will be drawn.
3.2.7 The problem of the unconstrained agent
At the beginning of the period the unconstrained agent faces the following occupational choice 
V UN (a, 0, d) =  max [ w UN (a, 0, d ) , N un (a, 0, tf)}
6 I denote w ith a all the value functions, a fter  uncertainty (about x )  is resolved. The value functions 
without are before uncertainty is resolved.
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where W UN (a, 0 ,d) is the utility of becoming a worker and N un  (a, 0 ,d) of becoming an 
entrepreneur.
Worker The problem of the unconstrained worker is identical to the borrowing constrained 
one except that the agent will be unconstrained in the future for sure. His saving problem is
W UN(a,0,d) =  maxU(c)  +  p u (C E t [ v UN(a,,e','&,j\')
s.t. c +  a' =  wd  +  ( l  +  a 
a' > 0 .
Entrepreneur The unconstrained entrepreneur decides how much to invest in his firm 
I  =  a 4 - b by choosing how much to borrow (b >  0) or save (b <  0). If he borrows he can 
choose from the menu {b, r  (a, 0, d, 6 , X )}  offered by competitive banks. If he saves, i.e. b >  0, 
r(-) =  rd.7 In addition, just as the constrained entrepreneur, he has to decide the riskiness 
of his project. After the shock x  is realized he can choose whether to default or whether to 
repay and how much to consume and save. He solves the problem backwards.
If he repays his debt, he has to choose how to allocate his resources, 0[(a +  b)x]v +
(1 — <5) (a +  b) x  ~  [1 +  t (a, 0 , 6, X)] 6, between consumption and savings. Given that the
decision of repaying is done when current productivities (0 , d) and the shock x  are known, 
his utility from repaying is given by
= max{l/(c) + /3tf (CEj [vw  (o', S',»')])}
s.t. a' +  c =  0 [(a-I- b) x]" +  (1  -  5) (a +  b) x  ~  [1 +  r b
of > 0
If he defaults, his unsecured debt is discharged. But he loses all assets in excess of
the exemption level X . Thus, the resources to allocate between consumption and savings 
are min {0 [(a +  b) xV  +  (1 — (5) (a +  b) x, X }. Moreover if he defaults he will be borrowing 
constrained next period. Therefore, by declaring bankruptcy he gets
N bankr (a , b , e , # , x)  =  mMc{l7(c) + /8I7(CEt [vBC(o',fl',tf')])}
s .t.a ' +  c =  min{0 [(a +  6 ) x]" +  (1 - 5 )  (a +  6 ) x ,X }  
a' >  0
7 The entrepreneur is not allowed to borrow and save in the risk-free asset simultaneously. Thus, he cannot 
engage in hidden savings. This assumption is made to simplify the computations. And, it is unlikely to be 
restrictive since the marginal product of capital is, particularly for poor agents so high that they will invest as 
much as they can in the project.
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He will file for bankruptcy if N bankr (a, 6 , 9: $  x) > N pay (a, 6 , $ ,  x) and vice versa. Thus, 
at the beginning of the period the agent choose the optimal amount of b from the menu 
{&, r (a, 9, $, 6 , X )}  and the optimal <j£ anticipating his future behavior. Therefore his utility 
is given by
N un  (a, 9 , 0) =  max CE* [max { JVpay (a, 6 , ,  x ) , # 6anfcr (a, b, 9, 0, x) }1
s.t. b >  \ a  and £ [cr*, cr£,..., cr™J
where the "max" operator inside the square brackets reflects the bankruptcy decision, and the 
"max" operator outside the square brackets reflects the borrowing decision. A is an exogenous 
borrowing limit that will be calibrated to match the observed leverage ratio.
3.2.8 The zero profit condition of the banks
Banks observe the state variables (a, 9, fl) at the moment of offering the contract. There is 
perfect competition (free entry) in the credit market. Therefore, banks make zero profit on each 
loan contract. However, banks cannot condition the contract on the subsequent technology 
choice of the entrepreneur. For any given state (a, 6, 9) and for any loan (6 ), banks know which 
technology crJx the entrepreneur will choose and in which states of the world he will default. 
Therefore, they are able to calculate the probability that a certain agent with characteristics 
(a, 0 ,$) will default for any given amount b. This default probability,7rbanfcr (a, 9, b, X) ,  
depends on the exemption level X  because X  affects the incentive to default directly.
If the agent repays, banks receive [1 +  r(a, 9, 6 , X)] b. If the agent defaults, banks sell
the firm’s un-depreciated capital. In this case banks receive: nothing if 9 [(a +  b) x]u +  
(1 — 5) (a +  b) x  < X  or 9 [(a +  b) x]u +  (1 — 6 ) (a 4- b) x  — X  otherwise. The zero profit 
condition of the banks is given by
/  [ l - 7r^ ( a , 9 , t f , 6 , X ) ] [ l  +  r (a ,9 ,1?,6 ,X )]6+  \ = ( 1  +  J.d +  T )6
(  +ivb<‘nkr(a ,6 ,T },b ,X )m ax {6 [x I ] ‘' +  ( l - 6 ) x I - X , 0 }  )  T
where I  =  a +  b and r  is a resource cost banks incur when producing credit.
3.2.9 Equilibrium
Let 77 =  (a, 9, i9, S ) be a state vector for an individual, where a denotes assets, 9 entrepreneurial 
productivity, 'd working productivity and S  the credit status. From the optimal policy 
functions (savings, capital demand, default decisions), from the exogenous Markov process for 
productivity and from the credit status shocks, we can derive a transition function, that, for 
any distribution \x (77) over the state provides the next period distribution 7/  (77). A stationary 
equilibrium is given by
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• a deposit rate of return rd and a wage rate w
• an interest rate function
• a set of policy functions g (77) (consumption and saving, borrowing, capital demand, 
bankruptcy decisions and occupational choice)
• a constant distribution over the state 77, p* (77)
such that, given rd and w and a bankruptcy regime X  and g:
• g (77) solves the maximization problem of the agents;
• the corporate sector representative firm is optimizing;
• capital, labor and goods market clear:
— capital demand comes from both, entrepreneurs and the corporate sector, while 
supply comes from the saving decisions of the agents;
— labor demand comes from the corporate sector, while labor supply comes from the 
occupational choice of the agents;
• the interest rate function reflects the zero profit condition of the banks
• The distribution p* (77) is the invariant distribution associated with the transition
function generated by the optimal policy function g (77) and the exogenous shocks.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Parametrization 
Fixed parameters
Some of the parameters are fixed while others axe calibrated to match some observed features 
of the US economy. Essentially, I follow the calibration strategy of Mankart /  Rodano [2009]. 
I choose p =  0.95 for the auto-regressive coefficient of the earnings process.8 The variance of 
the earnings process is chosen to match the Gini index of labor income as observed in the 
PSID, where it is 0.38.The process is approximated using a 4-state Markov chain, using the 
Tauchen [1986] method as suggested by Adda /  Cooper [2003].9 Total factor productivity is 
normalized to 1, while the share of capital in the Cobb-Douglas technology for the corporate
8 In a life cycle setting, Storesletten et al. [2004] and Storesletten et al. [2001] find p  in the range between 
0.95 and 0.98. I choose p  =  0.95 to take into account that the agents in the model are infinitely lived and that 
the intergenerational auto-regressive coefficient is lower. Solon [1992] estimates it to be around 0.4.
9 Floden [2008] shows that for highly correlated processes the m ethod of Adda /  Cooper [2003] achieves a 
higher accuracy than the original methods of Tauchen [1986] and Tauchen /  Hussey [1991].
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sector is set to £ =  0.36. The depreciation rate is set 6 =  0.08. The cost of credit production 
is set to r  =  4%. These parameters are summarized in table 3.3-1.
Table 3.3-1: The fixed parameters
Param eter Sym bol B aseline
TFP A
Share of capital £
Depreciation rate S
Resource cost r
Working productivities <pi < <£2 < <^3 <  <£4
Transition matrix
Preference parameters
Following Mankart /  Rodano [2009], I separate the utility function parameters. The option to 
default provides agents with an insurance against bad outcomes. The value of this insurance 
depends crucially on the agents attitudes towards risk. But the price of this insurance are 
worsened credit conditions. Agents who still borrow face higher interest rates. Thus, the 
value of the costs of the insurance depends mainly on the agents elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution. In the baseline model, I set the coefficient of relative risk aversion a =  3 and 
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0  =  0.8. In the robustness section, I investigate 
the cases a =  1.5 and 0  =  0.5. Table 3.3-2 summarizes the preference parameters.
Table 3.3-2: Preference parameters
Param eter Sym bol V alue
CRRA a 3
EIS 0  0.8
Bankruptcy policy parameters
The two policy parameters are the exemption level X  and the probability g of being able 
to obtain unsecured credit again. Following Mankart /  Rodano [2009], I set g =  0.5 which 
corresponds to an average exclusion period from credit of two years. This low value is 
warranted since there is evidence the entrepreneurs have access to unsecured credits relatively 
fast after having defaulted, see for example Lawless /  Warren [2005]. The exemption level 
differs across US sates. Using US state-level data for 1993,1 calculate the median across states
1 (normalization) 
0.36 
0.08 
0.04
(pi =  0.316, <f2 =  0.745 
<ps =  1.342, y>4 =  3.163
0.8393 0.1579 0.0028 0.0000
0.1579 0.6428 0.1965 0.0028
0.0028 0.1965 0.6428 0.1579
0.0000 0.0028 0.1579 0.8393
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of the total exemption ("homestead" plus "personal property" exemption). The resulting 
median exemption level is $47,800. Taking an average household labor income of $48,600, 
this corresponds to a value of 0 .98 for the exemption/wage ratio. Table 3.3-3 summarizes 
the bankruptcy parameters.
Table 3.3-3: The bankruptcy parameters
Param eter Sym bol V alue
Exemption/wage X f w  0.98
Unsecured credit exclusion (expressed as probability) g 0.5
Calibrated parameters
This leaves 7 parameters that have to be calibrated: high entrepreneurial productivity 
(9H), entrepreneurial productivity transition matrix {pHH ,pLL), concavity of entrepreneurial 
production function (v), multiple of assets an agent can borrow (A), discount factor {(3) and 
the minimum variance of the transitory shock (cr*). The last one warrants a discussion. I 
allow agents to take on more risk, i.e. choose a higher (cr£ ) . 10 But it is not plausible that 
agents can choose completely safe projects. Therefore, I set a minimum level of risk that each 
entrepreneur has to face. 11
I choose these 7 parameters so that the model matches the following 7 moments of the 
US economy. 12 First, I want the model to match the capital-output ratio (K /Y) in the US 
economy. I target it to be 3.0. The target for the fraction of defaults, is 2.25% of the 
entrepreneurs. The fraction of entrepreneurs in the total population is 7.3% in the Survey of 
Consumers Finances. 13 Based on PSID data the exit rate of entrepreneurs is equal to 15%. 
The median leverage ratio of entrepreneurs 14 in the SCF is around 15%.
Since the benefits of bankruptcy depend crucially on the wealth of an agent I match some 
features of the wealth distribution. The US wealth distribution is extremely skewed with the 
top 40% of richest households holding around 94% of total assets. As a last target I choose 
to match the ratio of the median wealth of entrepreneurs to the median wealth in the whole 
population. This target captures features of both the wealth distribution and entrepreneurial 
productivity and technology. I set the target to 6.3 as found in the SCF. The targets are
10 This implies a mean preserving spread in logs and therefore a positive relationship in levels. However the 
concavity in the production function counters this effect. The net effect is very small. The advantage of 
log-normality is that levels are guaranteed to be positive. The increase in the expected return is so small that 
rich agents will never choose a high a 3x . If it were otherwise, the interpretation of the results would be more 
difficult.
11 I discretize the shock realizations w ith seven nodes. The risk levels the agents can choose are discretized 
with five equidistant nodes between a x and a x = 1 .5 * a x . Later on I show that increasing the highest possible 
risk level from 1.5 to 2 does not change the results.
12 In this section, I also follow Mankart /  Rodano [2009].
13 See Mankart /  Rodano [2007, appendix B] for data sources, definitions and further details.
14 Leverage is defined as the ratio of debt to the sum of debt and equity.
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summarized in the second column of Table 3.3-5.
3.3.2 The baseline calibration results
Table 3.3-4 shows the value of the calibrated parameters in the baseline specification. Most 
of the values are similar to those of earlier studies, for example Mankart /  Rodano [2007].
Table 3.3-4: The calibrated parameters
Param eter Sym bol Benchm ark Value
High entrepreneurial productivity eH 0.739
Entrepreneurial productivity transition p h h , p l l 0.863 , 0.988
Concavity of entrepreneurial technology V 0.802
Borrowing multiple \ 18.58
Discount factor p 0.883
Min variance of transitory shock 0.025
Table 3.3-5 reports the value of the targets and the actual results achieved in the baseline 
specification.
Table 3.3-5: The baseline calibration targets
M om ent Target M odel
Fraction of Entrepreneurs (in %) 7.30 7.30
Ratio of medians (in %) 6.30 6.31
Share of net-worth of top 40% 94.0 90.7
K /Y 3.00 3.02
Exit Rate (in %) 15.0 15.1
Bankruptcy rate (in %) 2.25 2.27
Mean debt/asset ratio (in %) 0.57 0.55
The model reproduces the chosen targets rather well. Thus, it is able to reproduce the 
extreme skewness in the wealth distribution and the fact that entrepreneurs are more than 
six times richer than workers. It also gets the dynamics of entrepreneurship right.
In order to assess the model, table 3.3-6 reports some statistics that were not targeted. The 
marginal product of capital in the corporate sector is 4.7% in the model, somewhat above 
the 4% estimated by McGrattan /  Prescott [2001]. The share of capital in the non-corporate 
sector is slightly higher than what has been reported by Quadrini [2000]. The ratio of the 
mean to median firm size, measured in terms of capital, is below the data. The mean interest 
rate in the model is 9.05%, slightly below the estimate by Berkowitz /  White [2004]. Note, 
however, that their rate is an average across US states, i.e. across different exemption levels 
whereas the result here is for one particular exemption level. I will discuss the relationship 
between interest rates and the exemption level at length in the next sections.
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Table 3.3-6: Model implications
M om ent D ata M odel
MPK (in %) 4.0 4.7
Share of cap in non-corp sector (in %) 35.0-40.0 46.6
Gini of wealth distribution 0.80 0.74
Mean/median ratio of firm size 1.7 1.3
Mean interest rate (in %) 9.27 9.05
3.3.3 The behavior of the unconstrained agents
In this section, I first explain the workings of the model by showing some of the agent’s policy 
functions. I show that some entrepreneurs choose risky projects. This is due to the default 
possibility which introduces a non-convexity into the value function. The non-convexity 
coming from occupational choice as emphasized by Hopenhayn /  Vereshchagina [2009] plays 
no role here.
Figure 3.2 shows the policy function of an unconstrained agent in the benchmark case of 
X  =  0.98. The panels on the left hand side show agents with low labor productivity & =  i?i 
and with assets between 0 < a <  5, corresponding to $0-$250,000. The panels on the right 
hand side show the same policy function but focus on poor agents 0 <  a < 0.4. In addition, 
they also show agents with a higher labor productivity, =  $ 3 .
First, I will describe the panels on the left hand side: Very poor agents (a<0.1) do not 
become entrepreneurs. The firms these agents could operate are so small that they axe better 
off becoming workers. All others become entrepreneurs. Rich agents (a>4.9) have a lot of 
wealth to lose in case of a default. Therefore, they choose the least risky projects available. 
Thus, the variance of the shock they choose in the first panel of figure 3.2 is the lowest 
possible, i.e. a*. For the same reason, they will never default. Thus, their default probability 
in the second panel of figure 3.2 is zero and therefore they borrow at the risk-free rate.
Slightly less rich agents (2.7<a<4.9) also choose cr*. But, they default when the worst 
outcome is realized. The insurance provided by the default possibility leads these agents to 
borrow more than those with a>4.9 who will never default. While these slightly less rich 
agents behave in the same way over the entire range, the amount borrowed is increasing in 
these agent’s assets. This is because richer agent can beax more risk.
Agents with asset (0.22<a<2.7) axe similar. They also choose . But since they have 
fewer assets, they use the insurance provided by the default possibility in the two worst states. 
This higher default probability is reflected in a (slightly) higher interest rate. Note that these 
agents borrow as much as they can while still obeying the borrowing constraint b <  Xa.
The behavior of the poor agents, shown in the panels on the right hand side, is the most 
interesting. Entrepreneurs with assets around a =  0.2 also borrow up to b <  Xa. Thus, the
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Figure 3.2: Risk taking, interest rates and borrowing
size of their firms, the sum of borrowing and own assets, is relatively small. These agents 
choose projects with a higher variance. The reason for this behavior is a non-concavity 
in their continuation value functions.15 This non-concavity has two sources: First, the 
default possibility, which limits the amount the agents can loose. This leads agents to take 
on more risk because they are insured against the downside. Second, as in Hopenhayn /  
Vereshchagina [2009], occupational choice alone also leads to a non-concavity. Both reasons 
for the non-concavity imply a kink in the value function and make the entrepreneurs (locally) 
risk-loving.
The non-convexity of the problem coming from the default possibility is essential for the 
result. The firms of the marginal entrepreneurs employ capital around k =  3. Thus, even if 
the worst shock, which implies a loss of capital of about 50%, hits them, they are still left 
with undepreciated capital in excess of the exemption level. Thus, after filing for bankruptcy, 
they will be left with resources equal to the exemption level. This gives these entrepreneurs 
an incentive to choose projects with a high variance after having obtained credit. Banks will 
anticipate this behavior and therefore offer credit based on this. This explains the higher 
default probability and the higher interest rates in panels 2 and 3 on the right hand side of 
figure 3.2.
In Hopenhayn /  Vereshchagina [2009] agents have to self-finance. The intersection of the 
value functions of workers and entrepreneurs creates a non-convexity. Rich agents become 
entrepreneurs and poor ones workers. If entrepreneurs can choose the riskiness of their project,
15 Note that while the problem is a non-convex problem, the continuation value function becomes non-concave.
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rich agents will not choose any additional risk since they remain entrepreneurs. This is also 
the case here. All entrepreneurs with a > 0.22 choose the lowest possible risk.
repay
default
0 2 3 41 5 6 7 8 9 10
Assets
Figure 3.3: Continuation value functions for repaying and defaulting
A lower labor productivity implies, since labor productivities are persistent, a lower worker 
value function. The value function as an entrepreneur is not affected that much. Therefore, 
agents with low labor productivity $ =  $ i enter entrepreneurship at a lower level of assets 
than agents with higher labor productivity, e.g. $ =  d 3 . The difference in the point of the 
intersection of the two value function and therefore entry behavior of agents can be seen in 
the left hand panels of 3.2. Agents with d =  $ 1  enter entrepreneurship already with a =  0 .1 2 , 
while agents with d =  $ 3  enter only with a =  0.25.
Since the exemption level X  is the same for everyone, the fact that agents with higher 
labor productivity choose riskier projects at a =  0.28 and not at a — 0 .2  could be read as 
evidence for the importance of the non-convexity coming from the kink in the value function 
due to the occupational choice. However, this is not necessarily true. Agents with higher 
labor productivity have, ceteris paribus, a higher default incentive since their outside option 
is better. Therefore, their incentive to take on more risk happens at higher levels of assets, 
here at a =  0.28. The outside option of agents with low labor productivity is worse, therefore 
their incentive to choose riskier projects matters at a lower level of wealth, here a =  0 .2 .
Figure 3.3 shows the continuation value function in the middle of the period after the shocks 
have been realized but before the agents have consumed. The continuation value function for 
a defaulter is drawn under the assumption that the defaulting entrepreneur has resources 
that exceed the exemption level so that he will be left with a =  X . 16 The project choice, i.e. 
the decision about how much risk to take on is taken before the production uncertainty is 
revealed. Therefore, entrepreneurs essentially decide over points on the continuation value 
function when they decide in which project to invest.
16 This is indeed the case in the benchmark case.
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The non-convexity coming from the default possibility is clearly present in figure 3.3. The 
non-convexity due to occupational choice is not visible. One reason for this is that the timing 
of the model is different from the timing in Hopenhayn /  Vereshchagina [2009]. A related 
reason is that agents in the current model face a lot of uncertainty at the moment of deciding 
whether to default or whether to repay. At that moment, they do not yet know neither 
their labor productivity nor their entrepreneurial productivity next period. This uncertainty 
convexities the continuation value function. Therefore, the additional risk-taking is not due 
to the occupational choice problem but due to the default possibility.
In addition, in the next section when I investigate different exemption levels, I will show 
the result of a model without default. In this case the only potential non-convexity is due 
to the occupational choice problem. But, in this case, every agent, including the marginal 
entrepreneur, chooses the least risky project, i.e. cr£ =  cr1. Thus, the fact that agents with a 
higher labor productivity choose riskier projects depends on the non-convexity due to the 
default option and not on the one due to occupational choice.
3.4 Policy experiment: changing the exemption level
In this section, I investigate the consequences of varying the exemption level from $0 to 
$250,000, the values observed across US states. In particular, I show that increasing the 
exemption level can increase the incentive to take on risk to such an extent that the endogenous 
borrowing constraint gets tightened so much that entrepreneurs choose the lowest level of 
riskiness and therefore have to pay relatively low interest rates. First, I focus on individual 
agents. Then, I show aggregate outcomes.
3.4.1 The impact on individual agents
Figure 3.4 shows entrepreneurial policy functions of agents with low labor productivity, 
$ =  $ i, for three different values of the exemption level: X  =  0 which implies abolishing 
bankruptcy altogether,17 X  =  0.98 which is the benchmark case and a higher level X  =  2.7.
If defaulting is not allowed, all entrepreneurs choose the lowest level of risk, i.e. a 1. Their 
default probability is zero.18 Therefore, they borrow at the risk free rate. As mentioned 
in the previous section, the occupational choice problem alone does not lead to increased 
risk-taking. The bottom panel in figure 3.4 reveals that except for the very poor entrepreneurs, 
no entrepreneur is close to the exogenous borrowing limit. The absence of the insurance of 
bankruptcy makes these entrepreneur cautious in their borrowing and investment decision.
17 This is the case because all agents have to finance their consumption after they default or repay. Thus, if an 
entrepreneur would default in the case of X  =  0, his consumption would be c =  0 too. This would yield utility 
of negative infinity. Therefore, no entrepreneur will ever choose a project which might yield that outcome.
18 The policy function in the second panel in figure 3.4 coincides with the x-axis.
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If the exemption level is increased to X  =  0.98, some of the poorest agents actually become 
workers. This is because, the default possibility leads to a tightening of the endogenous 
borrowing constraint. Poor agents have a strong incentive to default, therefore they can 
borrow only very small amounts. This makes entrepreneurship for them less attractive and 
so they become workers, despite having a low labor productivity. Thus, there is a negative 
extensive margin.19 When the exemption level is increased even further, the extensive margin 
gets even more negative.
0.05
4.50.5 2.5 3.5
■8 0.5
0.5 2.5 3.5 4.5
0.5
0.5 3.5 4.52.5
05
0.5 3.5 4.52.5
X = 0 -----------X=0.98 X=2.7
Assets
Figure 3.4: Policy functions for different exemption levels
For X  =  0.98, poor entrepreneurs, assets around a=0.2, choose risky projects. They do 
this because the non-convexity in the continuation value function makes these agents locally 
risk-loving. If the exemption level is increased to X  =  2.7, the non-convex region expands 
since now failed entrepreneur can keep more wealth. Therefore, the number of entrepreneurs 
who choose high risk projects increases. This can be seen in the top panel where agents with 
wealth 0.55 < a <  2.1 choose the high risk project. These agents are also likely to default. 
This is reflected in the interest rates, they have to pay, see the second and third panel in 
figure 3.4.
While the extensive margin here is negative, there is a strong positive intensive margin,
19 For agents with higher labor productivity, the extensive margin works exactly in the opposite direction (not 
shown). As shown in figure 3.2, agents with higher labor productivity enter entrepreneurship at a higher level 
of assets since their outside option is better. Since these agents are richer, they run bigger firms and with a 
positive exemption level they are insured against the downside. This leads them to run even bigger projects. 
This makes entrepreneurship more attractive to some agents who have been workers for X  = 0. However, for 
high levels of the exemption level, the extensive margin is also negative for these agents.
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see the bottom panel. The default possibility provides entrepreneurs with partial insurance 
against bad outcome. Therefore, they can run bigger firms, i.e. they borrow more.
The interest rate in the case of X  =  2.7 is non-monotonic. In particular, agents with assets 
around a — 0.5 pay a lower interest rate than richer agents. The reason for this can be seen 
in the top panel. These agents choose the lowest risk level possible, therefore their default 
rate is lower. This occurs because the endogenous borrowing constraint for these agents 
become so tight because banks severely ration their access to credit. This credit rationing is 
consistent with the findings by Berkowitz /  White [2004] who find that credit rationing is 
more sever in states with higher exemption levels.
These entrepreneurs can borrow only small amounts because if they were allowed to borrow 
as much as richer agents, they would choose high risk projects and default most of the times, 
making it impossible for banks to break even. By limiting the amount they lend, banks ensure 
that entrepreneurs will choose a low risk project and therefore their default probability is 
lower.
In figure 3.5, I show the behavior of three different agents for different exemption levels. 
The exemption level, which is depicted on the x-axis,20 varies from 0 to 5, corresponding to 
$0-$250,000, which is the range of exemption levels observed in the US.
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Figure 3.5: Risk taking, interest rates and borrowing for selected agents across different 
exemption levels
20 Thus, these are not policy function in the asset space
3.4 Policy experiment: changing the exemption level 107
All agents in figure 3.5 choose the lowest risk level for low exemptions, i.e. for X  <  0.5. 
The poorest agent, a =  0.1, chooses a high risk project for X  =  0.75. But if the exemption 
level is increased further, the endogenous borrowing constraint gets so tight that the agent 
can borrow only very little. This means the scale of the project he could run is so small 
that he prefers to be a worker. Thus, for any exemption level, X  > 1, this agent is not an 
entrepreneur.
The most interesting agent is the one with a =  0.7. This agent chooses a low risk project 
for low exemption levels. The reason is that low levels of X do not offer much insurance 
against bad outcomes. Therefore, this agent wants to avoid default. If X is increased, this 
agents chooses a higher amount of risk. This is because the higher exemption level, which 
implies more resources in the case of a default, implies that the randomization region now 
becomes relevant for this agent. Therefore, a higher exemption level leads some agents to 
take on more risk.
However, if the exemption level is increased beyond X  =  3.25, then the agent chooses a 
lower level of risk. The reason for this is that the endogenous borrowing limit, i.e. credit 
rationing becomes so severe that the agent cannot borrow much. This can be seen in the 
bottom panel where borrowing falls for this agent around X  =  3.25. The scale of the firm is 
so small that the agent would be left with resources that are less than the exemption level 
in bad states. Therefore this agent does not want to take on additional risk. He chooses 
the low risk project. Therefore, the interest rate in the third panel is actually declining in 
the exemption level for this agent. This non-standard result might explain the finding by 
Berkowitz /  White [2004] that the average interest rate is non-monotonic in the exemption 
level. While it is increasing for most values of the exemption level. It is declining around the 
90th percentile.
3.4.2 The impact on aggregate outcomes
In this section I analyze the effects of changing the exemption level on several aspects of 
entrepreneurship and on welfare. I compare the outcomes of the model with the findings by 
Berkowitz /  White [2004]. The model, in particular, also generates non-monotonic increases 
in the average interest rate across exemption levels. Another interesting result is that the 
optimal exemption level is the same in the current model with endogenous risk-taking as in a 
model with only exogenous risk-taking.
All figures in this section have the exemption level on the x-axis. Figure 3.6 shows several 
aspects of the effect of changing the exemption level. Panel A shows that entrepreneurship is 
declining almost monotonically with the exemption level. There are several reasons for this. 
First, as can be seen in panel B, the fraction of borrowers declines more that the fraction of 
entrepreneurs. This means that more and more entrepreneurs have to self-finance. There 
are two reasons for this. Firstly, credit rationing gets more severe. This is shown in panel D 
which shows the wealth level of the marginal entrepreneur who is just indifferent between
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remaining a worker or entering entrepreneurship. The higher is an agent’s labor productivity, 
the higher is his outside option. Therefore, the minimum wealth level at which agents become 
entrepreneurs depends positively on their labor productivity. This is the extensive margin 
discussed above. The only case where the extensive margin is positive is for agents with very 
high labor productivity in the case of low exemption levels. The positive effect of an increase 
in the exemption level leads these agents to borrow more because of the higher insurance 
provided by the higher exemption level. Secondly, as the exemption level is increased further 
more agents default and therefore do not have access to credit markets for some time.
Panel C shows that the mean leverage ratio of continuing entrepreneurs is declining 
monotonically. Thus, there is a negative intensive margin. These negative effects of higher 
exemption levels on availability and size of credit axe in line with the evidence provided 
by Berkowitz /  White [2004]. The negative effect of higher exemption levels hits relatively 
poor agents hardest because it is poor agents who are rationed out of the market and who 
subsequently become workers. The consequence is that the remaining entrepreneurs are even 
richer, as can be seen in panel E. Inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient of the wealth 
distribution, also increases significantly, see panel F.
Figure 3.7 shows the average interest rate for different exemption levels. The solid line 
shows the average interest rate for the benchmark model with endogenous risk-taking. The 
broken line shows the average interest rate for a version of the model in which there is only 
exogenous risk, i.e. when entrepreneurs can not choose cr£.21
Berkowitz /  White [2004] find that the interest rate is increasing in the exemption level, 
except for high exemption levels where interest rates actually fall in case of a further increase 
in the exemption level. The model reproduces this effect. However, the model also gets a 
non-monotonicity around X  =  1.8 which is not in the data. There are two reasons for these 
instances of non-monotonicity. First, some poor agents do not become entrepreneurs anymore 
because credit rationing becomes so severe that the scale of their potential firms is so small 
that they are better off becoming workers. And, ceteris paribus, poor agents face the highest 
interest rates. But, countering this selection effect is the fact that the default incentive of 
remaining entrepreneurs increases with the exemption level. Therefore, interest rates increase 
with the exemption level, see figure 3.5.
Second, increases in the exemption level can lead agents to take on less risk. Since they 
take on less risk, their incentive to default gets lower and consequently, they have to pay lower 
interest rates. As explained in the previous section, this happens because banks ration access 
to credit by so much that the entrepreneurs are not well insured against the bad outcome. 
Therefore, they choose low levels of risk.
Since this effect occurs at different levels of wealth depending on the agents’ labor productiv-
21 I recalibrated the model w ith only exogenous risk to  the identical targets as the benchmark model. The 
parameters I obtained for this model are very similar to the parameters of the benchmark model. The reason 
for this is that not many entrepreneurs choose (or are tempted to choose) high levels of risk. Figure 3.7 then 
shows the result of the policy experiment using the parameters for this new calibration.
3.4 Policy experiment: changing the exemption level 110
0.14
 benchm ark
 e x o g en o u s  risk only
0.13
£  0.12
aj
E
cn
_c
0)
cnro
® 0.1 
<
0.09
0.08
E xem ption level
Figure 3.7: Average interest rates for different exemption levels
ity, it is difficult to predict the exact value of the exemption level where this counter-intuitive 
effect will occur. As I have shown in figure 3.5, only some agents will take on less risk. Other 
agents will take on more. The average effect will depend on the distribution of the population 
over the state space.
The broken line in figure 3.7 shows the average interest rate in a model without endogenous 
risk-taking, i.e. in a model with exogenous risk only. In this variant of the model the average 
interest rate increases monotonically. The selection effect, i.e. the effect that some poor agents 
who previously faced the highest interest rates are rationed out of the market is still existent 
in this version of the model. But, by definition, the endogenous risk-taking channel is not 
present. The fact that the average interest rate in this variant of the model is monotonically 
increasing supports the hypothesis that it is the endogenous risk-taking channel that explains 
the non-monotonicity of the interest rate.
Figure 3.8 shows the effect of different exemption levels on welfare for both versions of 
the model. Welfare is expressed in terms of the change in annual consumption that would 
make agents indifferent between living in the benchmark economy which features endogenous 
risk-taking and has an exemption level of X  =  0.98 or in an economy with a different 
exemption level.22 Welfare in the economy with endogenous risk-taking is uniformly higher 
than welfare in the model with exogenous risk-taking. This is not obvious ex ante since the 
possibility to take on more risk acts as a constraint on lending by banks. If endogenous 
risk-taking is possible, banks have to ensure that an agent who is applying for a certain
22 Note that welfare of the model with exogenous risk-taking only is also expressed relative to the benchmark 
exemption level X  =  0.98 in the model with endogenous risk-taking.
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amount of credit under the assumption that he will choose a low risk project will behave 
accordingly. If that agent found it optimal to choose more risk, the contract would not be 
incentive compatible. And therefore the contract would not be viable anymore. But, since 
markets axe still fax from being complete in this model, most agents do not want to take on 
moxe xisk. Thus, the additional incentive compatibility constraint is slack for most agents.
Welfare in the model with endogenous risk-taking is higher because it expands the choice 
set of agents while the additional constraint it imposes does not matter. As shown in the 
previous section, it is the marginal entrepreneurs, i.e. relatively poor agents, who engage 
in additional risk-taking. This is because these agents axe the ones who are closest to the 
non-convexity in the continuation value function and therefore they want to take on more 
risk. The possibility to take on more risk leads poorer agents to enter entrepreneurship 
earlier in the model with endogenous risk-taking compared to a model with only exogenous 
risk-taking. Thus, the wealth level of those who enter entrepreneurship in panel D of figure 
3.6 is uniformly higher in the model with exogenous risk-taking.
This is similar to Hopenhayn /  Vereshchagina [2009]. In their model entrepreneurs choose 
higher risk due to the non-concavity of the continuation value function that comes from the 
occupational choice problem. There is no borrowing and therefore no default in their model. 
But the non-concavity of the value function in their model also matters mostly for agents who 
are close to the entry threshold, i.e. who are relatively poor. Richer agents have sufficient 
wealth to remain entrepreneurs even when they are hit by a bad shock. This implies that 
their continuation value function is concave and therefore rich entrepreneurs do not engage 
in additional risk-taking. The possibility to take on more risk, i.e. the randomization device 
of choosing a higher level of risk increases the welfare of those agents who are close to the 
non-concavity.
The second surprising result is that the two welfare fines are almost parallel to each other. 
In particular, the optimal exemption level is almost the same in both models. This implies 
that models that do not incorporate endogenous risk-taking when investigating the optimal 
exemption level, i.e. as has been done in the previous literature, might give unbiased results. 
But, of course, the current model is just one example and it remains to be seen whether this 
result also holds for other environments.
The optimal exemption level with endogenous risk-taking would be twice as high as the 
current one. Increasing the exemption level to X  =  2 would yield welfare gains of 0.45% of 
annual consumption, a small but not negligible increase in welfare.
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3.5 Robustness checks
In this section, I briefly discuss slight variations of the model. First, I show how the results 
change if the upper limit of risk-taking is increased from 50% of the exogenous risk level to 
100% of the exogenous risk level. This change does not affect the results much. Then, I change 
the risk aversion coefficient to 1.5 and change the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to 
0.5.
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3.5.1 Higher upper limit of risk-taking
In the main section, entrepreneurs could choose among risk levels ranging from a minimum 
amount of (exogenous) risk,cr£ — a* and a maximum amount that was set at 50% above the 
minimum level, =  1.5cr .^ In this robustness check this maximum amount is doubled to 
100%.
The policy functions are very similar to the benchmark case. Those agents who are credit 
rationed and still remain entrepreneurs choose high levels of risk. Therefore the interest 
rate is non-monotonic in the exemption level. Figure 3.9 shows that the average interest 
rate increases with the exemption level. But, as in the benchmark model, this increase is 
non-monotonic. Comparing figure 3.9 with figure 3.7, one can see that the increase in the 
interest rates is higher in the former case. This is intuitive since now the agents take on more 
risk and therefore are more likely to default. Other results are similar to the benchmark case. 
Welfare, for example, follows an inverted U and peaks around X  =  2.
3.5.2 Lower risk aversion
Risk aversion in the benchmark model was set to 3. In this section, I lower it to 1.5 while 
keeping the elasticity of intertemporal substitution constant. Figure 3.10 shows that in this 
case the non-monotonicity at high exemption level disappears and the one at intermediate 
levels is lessened. The policy functions reveal that only those agents with the lowest labor 
productivity show a decrease in risk-taking when the exemption level is increased further. 
One reason could be that the value function has less curvature with lower risk aversion.
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Welfare (not shown), again, follows an inverted U, albeit the effect is more dramatic in this 
case. And, it peaks at a lower exemption level. This is consistent with Mankart /  Rodano 
[2009] who also find this effect. The reason is that, the less risk averse the agents are, the
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less they value the insurance provided by the exemption level. Therefore, they demand less 
insurance so that the optimal exemption level is lower.
3 .5 .3  Lower elasticity o f intertem poral substitution
The effects of lowering the elasticity of intertemporal substitution from 0.8 to 0.5, while 
keeping the coefficient of relative risk aversion constant, is shown in figure 3.11. Again, 
the non-monotonicity at high exemption levels disappears while the one at intermediate 
exemption levels gets lessened. If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is increased to
1.1 (not shown), the non-monotonicity is the same as in the benchmark case.
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Thus, the non-standard result that an increase in the exemption level can lead to less 
risk-taking by entrepreneurs is fragile when it comes to average interest rates. However, 
it is always present in some entrepreneurs’ policy functions. Welfare is not affected much 
by changes in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The optimal exemption level is 
increasing in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The quantitative effects are small 
however. For ^ =  0.5, the optimal exemption level is 1.6. The reason for this result is that a 
higher exemption level leads to higher interest rates. The value agents attach to this negative 
effect depends negatively on the agents’ elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
3.6 Conclusion
This is the first paper that investigates the effects of different exemption levels in a model 
with entrepreneurs when these choose the riskiness of their projects. The model features 
tow potential sources of non-convexity: occupational choice and the default option. I show 
that the non-convexity due to occupational choice is not present because the uncertainty at
3.6 Conclusion 115
the time of the default decision convexities the continuation value function sufficiently. The 
non-convexity due to the default option is present and leads some agents to choose risky 
projects.
An increase in the exemption level leads some agents, ceteris paribus, to take on more risk 
at first. As the exemption level is increased further, credit rationing becomes sever for some 
agents so that they run only very small firms and therefore will be left with only very few 
resources in bad states of the world. This leads these agents to choose the least risky projects. 
I have shown that while the average interest rate is increasing in the exemption level most of 
the time, occasionally it is decreasing.
In order to investigate further whether the mechanism outlined in my paper is behind the 
non-monotonicity in the average interest rate, it would be useful to analyze firm level data as 
in Hopenhayn /  Vereshchagina [2009]. But, due to confidentiality issues, these data are not 
publicly available. Also, it would be interesting to see whether the effect on risk-taking is 
also present in models of European economies where the main difference is the length of the 
garnishment period.
Chapter
The optimal Chapter 7 exemption level in 
life-cycle model with asset portfolios
4.1 Introduction
The steep increase in consumer bankruptcy filings in the 1990ies and early 2000s led to an 
increased interest in the workings of personal bankruptcy laws.1 On the one hand there has 
been a public debate leading to a reform of the US bankruptcy law. On the other hand there 
has been a growing interest among economists in models that are able to explain observed 
behavior and that can be used to evaluate different bankruptcy policies. I contribute to this 
debate by examining the effects of different wealth exemption levels on economic outcomes 
and welfare in a life-cycle model.
In order to investigate the effects of changing the exemption level, I use a heterogenous 
agent life-cycle model. In addition to facing uncertainty over their labor income, agents 
also face wealth shocks that stem from unexpected changes in family composition or from 
unexpected medical expenses. The latter are an important reasons for bankruptcies [Sullivan 
et al. 2000] in the US. The model features incomplete financial markets. But, I allow for two 
assets: unsecured debt and savings. The possibility to default introduces some contingency 
and therefore moves the financial system closer to complete markets.2
The default option gives consumers insurance against the economic consequences of the 
aforementioned shocks to their income or wealth. A more generous bankruptcy system, 
respectively a higher exemption level to be precise, will provide more of this insurance. This 
comes however at the cost of deteriorated credit market conditions, higher interest rates and 
possibly complete credit rationing.
In addition, the possibility to shield some assets in the case of default increases the incentive
1 I am grateful to  Alex Michaelides, Giacomo Rodano and Stephan Mankart for very helpful comments.
2 For a theoretical evaluation of that trade-off see Dubey et al. [2005]
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to save of those agents who might default. Suppose that the wealth exemption level is zero 
and an agent knows that he will default if he is hit by a bad shock. This agent will lose 
his savings when he defaults, i.e. the realized rate of return in this state of the world is -1. 
Therefore, he is unlikely to save in the first place. If, however, the exemption level is positive, 
the agent is more likely to save since the realized rate of return in the bad states now is the 
normal risk-free interest rate, at least for savings up to the exemption level.
The exemption level differs widely across US states, ranging from a few thousand US 
dollars, for example, in Maryland to an unlimited amount in, for example, Florida. Higher 
exemption levels increase the incentive to default. Therefore one would expect to see a positive 
relationship between the exemption level and default rates, unless credit rationing becomes 
so severe that a significant number of households are excluded from borrowing altogether. 
A strong positive relationship is predicted by previous papers that investigated the optimal 
exemption level of the Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy code, see for example Athreya [2006].
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Figure 4.1: Bankruptcy rates for different exemption levels
Figure 4.1 however shows that there is no significant relationship between the exemption 
level and bankruptcy filings. 3 Even though my model, which is built on Livshits et al. 
[2007b], also has a positive relationship between the exemption level and bankruptcy rates, 
the effect is very small, in particular for exemption levels above a relatively modest value of 
$20,000. Thus, the model is consistent with the data. Moreover, my quantitative evaluations 
show that the welfare difference between different exemption levels are rather small, less than 
0.1% of annual consumption. This might explain why the differences in the exemption level 
across US states have persisted for such a long time. If the welfare differences are small, 
voters are almost indifferent between different exemption levels. Thus, if the political process
3 The data are are the average per capita filing rates between 1995-2003.
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is rational, there is no pressure to change the law.
Almost all variables of interest follow a similar pattern as the bankruptcy rate. There are 
significant changes when the exemption is increased from zero to some small positive level. 
However, there are almost no further effects when the exemption level is increased further. 
The main reason for this is that almost no household is affected by an even higher exemption 
level. Households who default when they are hit by bad shocks have assets that are below the 
exemption level. And households who have assets above the exemption level do not default 
even for intermediate exemption levels. Therefore, if the exemption level is increased further, 
asset holdings and consequently none of the results change by much.
The quantitative literature on consumer bankruptcy has increased substantially since 
Athreya’s original paper in 2002. He found that eliminating the default option would be 
welfare increasing. Chatterjee et al. [2007] show that the recent tightening of the law in 
the US implies large welfare gains. Livshits et al. [2007b] compare the US system under 
which future earnings are exempt after having declared bankruptcy with a European type 
of system under which future earnings are garnished to repay creditors. They find that 
the welfare differences between the systems depends on the persistence and variance of the 
shocks. Mateos-Planas /  Seccia [2006] compare different credit market exclusion periods in 
a model with endogenous borrowing limits stemming from the default option with a model 
with exogenous borrowing limits. All of these models are one goods models. Hintermaier /  
Koeniger [2008], however, examine the reasons for the increase in consumer bankruptcies in a 
model with durable and nondurable goods.
My paper is closest to Livshits et al. [2007b] in that I follow their set up with labor income 
uncertainty and wealth shocks. Livshits et al. [2007b], however, have only one asset in their 
model and ignore the exemption level all together. This means that they set it implicitly to 
zero. However, as my result indicate, this omission makes their welfare results slightly spurious 
since a positive exemption level has a particularly positive effect for very low exemption levels. 
My modeling of the asset market is close to Li /  Sarte [2006] who also have both, unsecured 
debt and savings. Their model, however, uses an infinite horizon framework with the only 
uncertainty coming from changes in labor productivity. This is also the case in Athreya [2006] 
who investigates the optimal exemption level in a model with secured and unsecured debt.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 explains key features of the US bankruptcy 
code. Section 4.3 shows the importance of including the exemption level in a model the 
features wealth shocks. In particular, I focus on the impact on savings. Section 4.4 lays out 
the model and the computational algorithm. Section 4.5 shows the benchmark calibration and 
discusses the main mechanisms of the model. Section 4.6 shows the main policy experiment. 
I examine the impact of changing the exemption level on default rates, default reasons, 
borrowing and savings decisions and welfare. Section 4.7 concludes.
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4.2 Consumer bankruptcy
Personal bankruptcy law in the US consists of two different procedures: Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 13. Under Chapter 7, all unsecured debt is discharged immediately, and future 
earnings cannot be garnished. This is why Chapter 7 is known as providing a "fresh start". 
At the same time, a person filing for bankruptcy has to surrender all wealth in excess of 
an exemption level. The exemption level varies across US states, ranging from $8,000 in 
Maryland to unlimited for housing wealth in some states, for example Florida. A person can 
file for Chapter 7 only once every six years.
Under Chapter 13 agents can keep their wealth, debt is not discharged immediately, and 
future earnings are garnished. A person can file for Chapter 13 every six moths. In the 
model, I follow Livshits et al. [2007b] and let agents file first for Chapter 7 and if they want 
to default again soon afterwards they have to file for Chapter 13.
4.3 An illustration of the importance of wealth exemptions
In this section, I show a simple example that demonstrates that wealth exemption levels 
are particularly important in the presence of wealth shocks, stemming from, for example, 
unexpected medical expenditures. The reason for this is that the option to default can 
encourage savings of, particularly, the poor.
Suppose an agent lives for two periods. His initial wealth is ao =  1 For simplicity, I assume 
that the agent has no income, that the risk free interest rate r? =  0 . 0  and that his discount 
factor (3 — l.O.4.
In the second period the agent might face a health shock that requires him to spend e in 
order to survive. This health shocks acts as a wealth shock and occurs with probability p. 
However, the agent can default on these expenses. If he defaults, he will lose all his assets 
up to the exemption level X .  For simplicity, I set the value of the health shock e =  1. This 
ensures that the agent will always default on his expense debt.
The agent maximizes lifetime utility
max U =  log (ci) +  E log (c2)
=  log(a0 -  s) +  (1 -  p) log (s) + p log (min[s, A])
The solution to this problem will depend on the exemption level A  in a non-trivial way. 
There are three possible cases. First, the agent might choose a level of savings that is higher
4 None of the results of this section hinges on any of these assumptions. Their sole purpose is to make the  
analysis more transparent.
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than the exemption level. In this case, the solution is
„ ( l ~ p ) a 0  -
s = —o— r -  =  X l2 - p
This situation is likely for low exemption levels. Note, that this implicitly defines a value for 
the exemption level until which this situation can occur, call this X l If the exemption level 
is higher, the second case might occur and the optimal saving will be equal to the exemption 
level. The last case is when the exemption is so high that it becomes non-binding and the 
agent implements his first best level of savings
s =  sFB =  -ao =  X h
Note again, that this implicitly defines the critical exemption level X h  until which this 
situation can occur. This yields the following result.
R esu lt 4 If the expense shock is so high that the agent cannot repay it, his savings are 
(weakly) increasing in the exemption level.
s =
(1— p)aO 
2 - p
X
2 a°
for
for
for
^  — 2 -p
(l-p)qQ  y
2 - p  ^  2 0
4ao < X
Formal details are relegated to the appendix. In the first and in the last case, an increase 
in the exemption level has no effect. In the second case, however, savings increase one-for-one 
with the exemption level.
Of course, a higher exemption level can induce people to default even if they could afford to 
repay their expense debts. If they plan to do so, their savings will be lower than in a situation 
in which they had to self-insure. This is the well-understood negative effect of generous 
exemption levels on savings. It is important to note that the positive effect is particularly 
relevant for poor agents, whereas the negative effect is relevant for richer agents. Thus, it 
is important to use a heterogenous agent framework in order to investigate the aggregate 
effects on savings and welfare. In the next section, I will present a heterogenous agent model 
in which agents face uncertainty with regards to income and expense (wealth) shocks. This 
is not the case in Li /  Sarte [2006] and Athreya [2006]. They both infinite horizon models 
without expense shocks. On the other hand, setting the exemption level to zero as is implicitly 
done by Livshits et al. [2007b] will probably bias welfare results since positive exemptions are 
particularly valuable if agents face wealth shocks.
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4.4 The model
My model framework is a partial equilibrium overlapping generations model based on the 
model by Livshits et al. [2007b]. Each household lives for J  periods. Each generation consists 
of households of measure 1. All households are born equally without any wealth. There is 
no bequest motive. Therefore each household maximizes its own expected lifetime utility. 
There is no disutility of labor. Households face uncertainty with respect to their future labor 
productivity and with respect to small and large wealth shocks, reflecting family risks and 
health risks.
Financial markets are incomplete, in particular there are no insurance markets in which 
households could insure themselves against their labor income, family (divorce, unwanted 
pregnancy) or health risks. There are two assets in the economy. First, households can save 
any non-negative amount by buying a risk-free bond. This bond pays an exogenous interest 
rate r*.
Second, they can also borrow non-negative amounts from financial intermediaries. This 
borrowing is done through notionally non-contingent debt contracts on which the household, 
however, can default. This default option makes these bonds partially contingent. I abstract 
from any issues of informational asymmetries. At the point of signing the debt contract, 
financial intermediaries have the same information set as the households themselves. Therefore 
all debt contracts are household specific in that financial intermediaries price these debts 
according to the characteristics of each specific household.
4.4.1 Households 
Preferences
Households live for J  years. For simplicity I abstract from labor-leisure choice.5 All agents 
supply their unit of labor inelastically, i.e. there is no disutility of labor. Households maximize 
their discounted expected utility of consumption. However, in order to take varying household 
sizes into account, household size is expressed in terms of equivalence scale units r i j .  Felicity 
is standard, non-decreasing and concave
" -S  '’” ■(*) ■
5 I ignore labor-leisure choice mainly because the current model is already quite complicated and not because 
it is not interesting (see on that matter for example Li /  Sarte [2006]. )
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Productivity
Labor productivity of household i at age j  is the product of three components: an age 
specific component ej, a household specific persistent component z lj, and a household specific 
component transitory component rfj
y) =  ejZjrfj.
The age specific component ej is chosen to reflect fife cycle income patterns that are common 
across households. The household specific components reflect uncertainties over the fife cycle. 
For example, Storesletten et al. [2004] estimate an AR(1 ) for log earnings of the following 
form
ln(yj) =  ln ( 4 ) + l n ( i ) j )  +  ln5 (x;) 
ln ( 2j) =  p ln (2j ) + 4
where g (•) reflects the deterministic component of earnings. The persistent component Zj 
follows an AR(1) process with a very high autocorrelation. Storesletten et al. [2004] estimate 
it to be 0.99. The variance of the transitory shock is about six times as high a the variance 
of the persistent shock. As is standard in the literature, I will discretize the income process 
by using a Markov chain.
Wealth shocks
In addition to income uncertainty, households also face idiosyncratic wealth shocks. These 
wealth shocks represent expenditures that have to be incurred due to, for example, a divorce 
or some necessary medical treatment. It is important to note that these expenditures do not 
yield any utility, therefore they simply reduce the wealth of the household. If the household
does not hold sufficient wealth he will have to default on these expenditures. As in Livshits
et al. [2007b], I assume that these shocks are i.i.d. and uncorrelated to income. It is important 
to note that these expenditures are due to third parties, e.g. hospitals in the case of a health 
shock. Thus if the agent files for bankruptcy, and he does not repay the expenditure shock, 
it is the hospital that loses money and not that bank. The bank only loses the amount of 
unsecured credit. 6
6 W hile this assumption is plausible for health shocks, it is less plausible for e.g. the expenditures for a 
divorce since households have to pay these costs themselves. One way to model this would be to  model the  
debt contract as a credit card contract w ith a pre-specified credit line (credit limit) that the household can 
draw on in case he faces an expenditure shock.
4.4 The model 123
4.4.2 Credit market
I assume perfect competition (free entry) in the credit market. Therefore, banks must make 
zero expected profit on each contract. The opportunity cost of lending is the safe rate of 
return on capital which is taken as exogenous. I assume that financial intermediation incurs 
real resource costs.
Households, who have not defaulted in the past, can hold two types of assets or any one of 
them: savings a and unsecured debt d. Savings earns the household rate of return rF on his 
savings. Unsecured credit requires transaction costs r u that reflects the higher information 
costs that banks incur in the data when producing unsecured debt.
Furthermore, I abstract from information asymmetries in the credit market.7 Each bank 
knows the borrower’s age j  and his the persistent component of his labor productivity z \ 8 
Therefore, by anticipating the behavior of the borrower, the banks are able to calculate the 
probability of default and how much they will get in the case of default. Perfect competition 
implies that they set the interest rate, r ( j ,z ,d ,  7 , X ), such that they expect to break even. 
This interest rate depends on the exemption level X  because it affects the incentives to default 
and the amount the bank recovers in this event. The banks offer a menu of one period debt 
contracts which consist of an amount lent d and a corresponding interest rate r(j, z,d , 7 ,X )  
to each agent (j , z ) .
Households who have just defaulted are excluded from borrowing. However they can still 
save.
4.4.3 Timing
The sequence of events is shown in figure 4.2. A household of age j  brings forward from last 
period: a certain credit record S, a value for the persistent component of labor productivity 
zt~ i, debt d and savings a. At the beginning of the period the expenditure shock k and his 
labor productivity z, 77 is realized. Since the household can default on the expenditure shock, 
this expenditure shock is simply added to the household’s debt holdings. All households who 
carry some debt, either because they have borrowed in the previous period and (or) they 
have been hit by an expenditure shock then decide whether to repay or whether to default. 
The credit record of households who had not defaulted in the previous period and who repay 
also this period remains clean. The credit record of households who default this period is 
reflects their default. A household who had defaulted in the previous period will have no 
debt d =  0. If this household is however hit by an expense shock, it might default again. 
This behavior will also be reflected by the credit record.
All households with a clean credit record can borrow d in the unsecured credit market.
7 For an analysis of bankruptcy under asymmetric information see Athreya et al. [2007]
8 It is immaterial whether the bank also knows how much the borrower will save. The bank can always 
anticipate the decision of the borrower.
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Figure 4.2: Timing
At the end of the period, each household can decide how much to save a' and how much to 
consume c.
4.4.4 The Household’s problems
As usual, the household’s problem is defined recursively. In order to describe the problem 
three value functions are needed. V R is the value of repaying the debt, V D is the value of 
defaulting the first time under Chapter 7, and V DD is the value of defaulting again after the 
household has already defaulted in the previous period. This last value function is needed 
since a household can default under Chapter 7 only once every six years.
An unconstrained agent of age j  with savings a, current productivity z, 7 7 , expense shock 
realization k, and debt d has to decide whether to repay or whether to default.
The value of repaying is given by
Vf* (a,d, z,ri, k) =  m a x /  r - . 1
c,a',d' |  (3E max [ v ^  (a', d ' ,  2 ' ,  77', k!) , (a', z , 77')] j
a' df
s.t. c +  a +  1 i _a +  k < ejzr) +  a +
1 +  r s 1 +  r(j, z ,d ' ,a ! ,X y
a' > 0 , d* >  0 .
where savings a' and new debt d' have to be non-negative. Since the agent repays, he will be 
unconstrained tomorrow and therefore has the option to default tomorrow, i.e. he can choose 
the maximum of defaulting or repaying. If the agent’s debt repayment and expenditures 
on the expense shock exceed his income and potential new borrowing, the constraint set is 
empty, i.e. consumption would have to be negative. In this case the value function is set to
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negative infinity and the agent will have to default. 
The value of defaulting is given by
vj j x j  /3E max [Vj+i (a7, 0 , z' , rf , k') , (a, z', rf , «/)j
s.t. c +   ^ a <  (1 — 7 ) ejZT] +  min [a, X]
a' >  0.
Since the household defaults on all unsecured debt d and all expenditures k, their values 
play no role here. However if the agent defaults, he can keep assets only up to the exemption 
level X .  In addition part of his labor income will be garnished. Event though a household 
who defaults cannot borrow in the current period, the household can save. This is in contrast 
to Livshits et al. [2007b] who do not allow defaulters to save. In their paper a household 
is in financial autarky after a default. This assumption has been used by other authors as 
well because it simplifies the analysis. However, this financial autarky assumption clearly 
overstates the punishment from a default since there is no evidence that households who 
have defaulted in the past are precluded from saving. 4/ is a utility cost of defaulting and 
reflects both pecuniary costs and non-pecuniary costs. The pecuniary costs, for example 
court fees and lawyer fees, have been estimated to exceed $1,000. In addition 4/ reflects 
the cost of the stigma of having had to declare bankruptcy. I use this parameter in the 
calibration to tie down the default rate. If the continuation value of defaulting exceeds the 
value of repaying, i.e. V ?  (a,z,rj) > Vj1 (a, d, z, 77, /c), the household will default. I denote 
this decision by I?  (a, d, z, 77, k).
In the next period, the household will have no debt but he might be hit by an expense 
shock. If he is unable to repay the expense shock, he will have to default again. In that case, 
I assume that he has to surrender all his wealth and part of his income will be garnished. 
Therefore the value of not repaying expense debt after having already defaulted is
Vj°D (a, z, 77, k) =  u - $  +  /3Emax[ [ ^ 1 (0 , d', z ',? /,«/) ,V ^ i (0 ,*',?/)]
where c =  (1  — 7 ) ejzrj, d' =  {k — a — 'yejzrj) ( 1  +  r)
where debt is rolled over to the next period at an exogenous interest rate f. This agent has 
no choice problem. Similarly to the agent who has not defaulted in the past, if the continuation 
value from defaulting exceeds the value of paying off expense debt, i.e. V®D (a,z ,r j , k) > 
,Q,z',r)',k'), the agent will default a for second time. I denote this decision by 
1f D (a,z,ri,K).
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4.4.5 The zero profit condition of the banks
There is perfect competition (free entry) in the credit market. Banks make zero profit on 
each savings contract and on each unsecured loan contract. All agents, except those who 
default twice, can save at the risk free interest rate r f .
Since I abstract from asymmetric information, banks observe the household fully. This 
means they know the household’s age j , cash on hand ejzrj +  a — d — k and persistent 
component of productivity 2 . In addition they know how much the household is going to 
save, i.e. they know Given a savings level and productivity level 2  the bank
knows in which future states of the world the household will be willing to repay and in which 
the household will default Therefore, for each amount of unsecured credit df, the bank can 
calculate the default probability 7r (d1, a', z , j , 7 , X ) and the amount the bank recovers in each 
default state. This will depend on the exemption level X  , the fraction of labor income that 
can be garnished 7 9 and on the amount the household owes in expense debt k! . I assume that 
all assets above the exemption level X  and the garnished labor income are split proportionally 
in the repayment of the bank and expense debt. So, the bank receives a fraction -d'+K' 
labor income ejzrj and of the savings above the exemption level, if these savings exceed the 
exemption level. In addition, the credit production process incurs real costs r u which are 
assumed to be proportional to the loan size. The zero profit condition is given by
( l  +  4- r u j^ d' =
(1 -  7T {d',a',z, j , 7 ,^ ) )  (1 +  r { d ' ,a ' , z , j ,X ) )  d!
+  7T (d', a', 2 , j, 7 , X )  E {^ d, d+ K , { l^ jz,n +  max [a' -  x , 0 ])) •
4.4.6 Equilibrium
Let =(a, d, z , j ,  S ) be a state vector for an individual, where a denotes savings, d unsecured 
borrowing, 2  the persistent component of labor productivity, j ,  the age of the household, 
and S  the credit status. Let rf  be the exogenous interest rate, r u the resource costs of 
producing unsecured credit, 7  the proportional garnishment and X  the wealth exemption 
level. A competitive recursive equilibrium is then given by:
• value functions V?1, V ? , V®D that solve the households problem and lead to optimal 
policy functions c, d! , a', I D, I DD,
• an interest rate function that satisfies the zero profit condition,
9 If there was no garnishment, households would not repay any fraction of the loan. This is not according to 
the US bankruptcy law which requires bankruptcy filers to have acted in good faith and therefore denies filing 
for bankruptcy immediately after having taken out a credit.
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• and correct default probabilities 7r (df, a', z, j ,  7 , X ) =  E  [ i^  (a',
4.4.7 Computational algorithm
In this section, I present an overview of the computational algorithm. As is standard in the 
literature, I solve this program by backward induction. I assume that the household faces no 
uncertainty in the last period of his life and cannot default. I discretize the asset space, the 
persistent state of productivity, the temporary productivity and the expense shock.
A lgorithm  5 1. Solve the value functions for the last period T.
2. Given the values in T, I  solve the households problems in T  — 1 . Since agents are not 
allowed to default in period T, this is simple.
3. In period T  — 2, I  set up a grid of savings values a1 and borrowing values d!. These two 
grids form a matrix.
a) Then, I  calculate the default probabilities and associated recoveries for each entry 
of this matrix and each level or persistent productivity by using the continuation 
values in period T  — 1 by looping over persistent and transitory productivity and 
the expense shock. These default probabilities imply an interest rate for each pair 
of values a',d',z.
b) Given this array, I  solve for the optimal decision of the households. Since households 
who have defaulted cannot borrow, calculating their value functions is standard.
4- I  repeat this until the first period.
5. I  simulate the model for 10 million households in order to obtain default rates, default 
reasons, savings and borrowing rates etc.
4.5 Calibration
In this section, I first show the parametrization. Afterwards, I describe the results and 
compare the model’s implications to the data.
4.5.1 Parametrization 
Fixed parameters
Since I want to compare my results to the results obtained by Livshits et al. [2007b], I follow 
their parametrization in all respects with one addition. Their model does not have the utility
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cost 4/ which I need to calibrate the default rate. In essence, all of the parameter values are 
based on empirical studies. The only exceptions being the garnishment rate 7  and the utility 
cost 4/ which are calibrated to match the average debt to income ratio and the observed 
default rate.
In order to simplify computations, each model period corresponds to three years. Households 
are born at age 20, retire with 65 and die at age 74. This implies that a life in the model 
has 18 periods, where the last three periods are spent in retirement. As already mentioned, 
households face no uncertainty in retirement. 10 In the following, I report only annual values 
since these are more familiar than triennial values.
The felicity function features constant relative risk aversion
where a  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and set to 2.0. The discount factor is equal 
to 0.94. The family size life-cycle comes from Fernandez-Villaverde /  Krueger [2007] which in 
turn is based on the US Census data for 1990.
The interest rate on saving r f  is set to 4.0 percent. This is in line with estimates of the 
average return to capital in the US. The transaction cost for unsecured credit r u is based on 
the costs of producing credit card debt and is also set to 4.0 percent Evans /  Schmalensee 
[1999].
The AR(1) income process
In (y*) =  In (zj) +  In (ijj) + ln9 (xj)
ln(zj) =  p ln (z j )+ e j
is parameterized by the following values which are based on Storesletten et al. [2004]: 
The autocorrelation coefficient p is set to 0.99. Its innovation is assumed to be normal, 
£j ~  N  (0, cre), with variance <7 % =  0.007. That transitory shock 77 is also assumed to be 
normal rjj ~  N  (0, a^) with variance =  0.043. All these annual values are mapped into 
triennial values and then discretized into a Markov process with five states . The transition 
matrix n  (z'\z) is assumed to be age-independent. The transitory shock is discretized using
three states where ten percent of the population receive a positive and ten percent a negative
shock.
Upon entering retirement, there are no further shocks. In order to make retirement income 
(social security) dependent on earnings, it has two components: first a lump-sum component
10 This assumption is innocuous for income uncertainty since retirees receive social security benefits. It is less 
plausible for expense shocks. But I maintain it for computational simplicity. Since old people do not borrow 
much and hardly ever default in the data, this assumption is unlikely to bias the results.
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Table 4.5-1: The fixed parameters
P arm eter Sym bol Value
CRRA
Risk free rate 
trasaction cost 
expense shocks 
probability of expense shocks 
Transitory states 
Transitory probabilties 
Persistent states
Transition matrix
r J 
r u 
«1 , « 2  
^ 1 , ^ 2  
1^,772,^3 
Prji j Pr) 2 1 Pr)3  
Z l , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 , Z 5
Exemption level
T(z'\z)
X
2
4%
4%
$10,973,$34,154 
2.369%, 0.153% 
[0.6151,0.9785,1.5568] 
[0 .1, 0 .8 , 0 .1]
0.3799 0.6311 0.8613 
0.1351 0.0011 
0.6778 0.1838 
0.1838 0.6302 
0.0034 0.1838 
0.0 0.0011
0.8638 
0.1351 
0.0011 
0.0 
0.0 
$47,800
1.1754
0.0
0.0034
0.1838
0.6778
0.1351
1.9523
0.0
0.0
0.0011
0.1351
0.8638
equal to 35% of average earnings and then an individual specific component consisting of 30 
percent of the last earning.
The expense shock k, can take three values {0, « i, k2}. The first value means no shock. The 
small shock, k \, is set to $10,973 annually and has probability tt\ =  2.368 percent. Livshits 
et al. [2007b] aggregate three different shocks of similar size. First, a divorce shock which has 
probability 1.244 percent which leads to expenditures on the divorce and a loss in economies 
of scale. Second, an unwanted pregnancy which occurs with 0.5 percent. Lastly, medical 
shocks that are not too big and which affect 0.625 percent of households each year. The big 
shock k2 is purely a large medical expense shock. This is set to $34,154 annually and has 
probability tt2 =  0.153 percent. This means that a small fraction of households are hit by 
very large medical expenditure shocks.11
As shown in fig 4.1, the wealth exemption level X .  varies tremendously across states. It 
ranges from a few thousand dollars to an unlimited amount in some states. I set it to the 
population weighted median value of $47,800. This value is a higher than what is mostly 
used in the literature (see for example Athreya [2006]). One reason for the difference is that I 
include all exemption levels and not only the homestead exemption. Thus while it is true that 
the homestead exemption in Maryland is zero, there is an exemption on personal belongings 
of $2,500 and one on tools of trade of $5,000. Moreover, since it is easy to hide some assets, 
I think that very low exemption levels are not plausible. A second reason is that I use a 
higher value for top-coding of the exemption levels in states that have an unlimited homestead 
exemption. However as a robustness check, I recalibrated the model to a low exemption level 
and the results do not change much. Table 4.5-1 summarizes all the parameters.
11 For details on these data see Livshits et al. [2007b], and also the working paper version.
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Calibrated parameters
The remaining parameters to be set are the utility cost of bankruptcy ^  and the garnishment 
parameter 7 . Livshits et al. [2007b] do not include the utility cost in their model. They 
calibrate 7  in order to match the observed debt to earnings ratio of 8.4 percent. The default 
rate is then endogenously determined in their model. Their model does very well and manages 
to explain 85 percent of observed chapter 7 defaults. However, the result is not robust. My 
model nests their model as a special case. In particular, if I set the exemption level to zero, I 
am able to reproduce their results. But if I set the exemption level to a plausible one, I get 
way too many defaults. Therefore, I calibrate 4/ to match the observed default rate of 0.84 
percent. The calibrated parameters are shown in table 4.5-2.
Table 4.5-2: The calibrated parameters
P arm eter Sym bol Value
Garnishment 7 34.6%
Utility cost 0 .1
As can be seen in table 4.5-3, the model matches the targeted moments very well. The 
bankruptcy target are all non-business related Chapter 7 bankruptcies, averaged between 
1995-1999.
Table 4.5-3: The targets
Target D ata M odel
Debt to earnings ratio 8.4% 8.39%
Chapter 7 bankruptcies 0.84% 0.85%
4.5.2 Benchmark model
In this subsection, I first present some implications of the model. Then, I will discuss some 
policy functions. Lastly, I will show some life-cycle implications of the model.
Model implications
In order to assess the model, I present some further comparisons between the model and data 
in table 4.5-4. The average interest rate is similar to the average interest rate the Federal 
Reserve Board reports on two-year personal loans. The fraction of households with negative 
net wealth is too high in the model. Wolff [2007] reports that 18 percent of households have 
negative net wealth. However, he also shows that 27 of households have wealth of less than 
$5,000.
The earnings of defaulters are about one half in the model and in the data. The amount 
of debt households hold at the time of filing for bankruptcy is a bit too high in the model
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Table 4.5-4: Model implications
Variable D ata M odel
Average borrowing rate 1 1 .2 % 10.3%
Households with negative net worth 18% 27.5%
Relative earning of defaulters 49.1% 52.9%
Average debt to income ratio of defaulters 187% 232.5%
Recovery probability <5% 1 .8 %
compared to the data. However, the numbers from Sullivan et al. [2 0 0 0 ] are based on a 
relatively small sample of bankruptcy cases. In the model, the lender almost never collects 
anything in case the household defaults. This is because households who default do not have 
savings in excess of the exemption level. This is consistent with the data. Empirically, there 
are very few cases in which the lenders recover anything. Thus, overall the model fits the 
data rather well.
Policy functions
In this subsection, I first show how the possibility to save affects the price and availability of 
credit. Then I show examples of policy functions of the household.
 b=0.1
-  -  b=0.20.95
0.9
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Figure 4.3: Bond prices for b =  0.1 and b =  0.2 for different levels of savings
The prices at which households can borrow depend on their default incentives. As usual, 
the more households borrow the higher is the incentive to default and therefore the lower will 
the price of a bond that is a promise to repay a fixed amount be. In addition, the incentive to
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default also depends on the exemption level. There are two opposing effects that play a role. 
On the one hand, the more a household has saved, to better it can afford to repay its debt. 
On the other hand, for savings up to the exemption level, the more the household has saved, 
keeping the repayment requirement constant, the better off the household will be in default.
Figure 4.3 shows the price of bonds with repayment requirement b =  0.1 and b =  0.2 
respectively, for different levels of savings of agents with low labor productivity. If the 
household has no savings, it will default in some states. If savings are positive but below 
the exemption level, the household is better off defaulting, therefore the bond price falls. In 
this case banks will recover nothing in case of a default. Once savings exceed the exemption 
level, banks recover part of the loan because assets in excess of the exemption level go to the 
bank. This is reflected in an increase in the price of the bond. Since the household loses all 
its assets above the exemption level, default becomes costlier. This lowers the incentive to 
default. If the household has saved a lot, it will actually never default and therefore it will be 
able to borrow at the risk free rate.
Figure 4.3 also shows that these incentives depend on the amount borrowed. If repayment 
requirements are high, as is the case when the household borrows b — 0 .2 , then the default 
incentive is already high without savings. An increase in savings increases the default incentive 
further. And, similar to the case of borrowing only 6  =  0.1, once the household saves more 
than the exemption level, the recovery rate of the bank increases and therefore the loan price 
increases. It is important to note that these pricing functions pertain to particular bonds. 
Agents might or might not choose an element of this particular pricing function. Equilibrium 
choices are shown in figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4 shows several policy functions of households aged 26, have a low persistent labor 
productivity and that have not defaulted in the previous period. All panels have the cash 
on hand of the agent after the current shocks were realized, production has taken place and 
previous debt (or assets) has been repayed on the x-axis. Panel A  shows the amount they 
borrow. Panel B  shows the (annual) interest rate they have to pay on these loans. Panel 
C  shows their savings decision. Recall that they save at the constant risk-free interest rate. 
Panel D  shows their consumption decision.
Poor agents, those with cash on hand less than —0.075 cannot borrow more than 0.18. 
Since they will default when they receive a bad shock, they have to pay a higher interest rate. 
These agents prefer not to save since their marginal utility of consuming immediately is so 
high. Agents with cash on hand of more than —0.075 start borrowing less. Therefore the 
interest rate declines.
The most interesting agents are those with cash on hand between 0.08 and 0.27. These 
agents borrow at an (annual) interest rate around 10.5% and save at the lower rate of 4% 
simultaneously. They do this because they can default on the unsecured debt in bad states. 
Agents with cash on hand around 0.25 are actually net savers. Nevertheless, they are willing 
to pay the high interest rate on their debt because of the insurance offered by its partial
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contingency. If they default, they can keep all of their savings since these are less than the 
exemption level. And, conversely, the banks will recover nothing in case of a default.
Agents with cash on hand above 0.27 do not borrow. Therefore, the interest rate in panel 
B  is not shown. These agents only save at the risk-free rate. However, those who have cash 
on hand less than the worst expenditure shock, which has a value around 0.82, might have 
negative cash on hand next period. In this case, they might default on this expense debt. 
After defaulting they can keep their savings up to the exemption level.
0.6
0 . 1 1 -  ------------------------------
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Figure 4.4: Policy functions of an agent aged 26 and with low persistent labor productivity 
Life cycle implications
Income and consumption of the model have the observed hump over the life-cycle. In this 
subsection, I show the fraction of borrowers, the amount borrowed and the interest rates 
over the life-cycle. Since the key contribution of this paper is to introduce two assets into a 
life-cycle model, I show how these variables differ across agents who either only borrow or 
who borrow and save simultaneously. The left column of figure 4.5 shows households who 
only borrow. The right column shows households who borrow and save.
The first row of figure 4.5 shows tha t the fraction of agents who only borrow is higher 
across all age groups. The second row shows that these household borrow substantially more 
than households who borrow and save. Both these quantities show a hump-shape with an
0.2
C: Savings
A: Borrowing
B: Interest rates
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increase at the end of the working lives.
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Figure 4.5: Fraction of borrowers, average debt and interest rates of borrowers who do not 
save and of borrowers who save
In figure 4.4, we saw that it is the very poor agents who only borrow. They do this because 
their current marginal utility of consumption is so high that they prefer not to save at all. 
Since these agents are also likely to default, they have to pay higher interest rates, as can be 
seen in the last row of 4.5. The incentive to default of these agents rises almost monotonically 
over their life cycle. The main reason for this is that there is less time left and therefore the 
punishment of being excluded from the unsecured credit market has a declining impact. The 
second row shows that an increase in borrowers at age 62, and in particular an increase in 
the amount they borrow. This higher level of borrowing combined with no further concern 
for the future, because there is no uncertainty after 65, explains the sharp increase in interest 
rates in the last periods of life.
The interest rates of borrowers who also save is lower, even though conditional on the 
loan size, they have a higher incentive to default. But as we have seen in 4.4, agents who 
borrow and save are relatively richer than those who only borrow. Their default incentives 
are relatively constant over their life-cycle, therefore the interest rate they have to pay do not 
change much.
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4.6 Policy experiment
In this section, I present the implications of varying the exemption level from zero to high 
levels. In particular, I will investigate the following exemption levels: The lowest level is 
X  =  0, the case implicitly analyzed by Livshits et al. [2007b] because they do not have an 
exemption level in their model. A low levels X  =  0.063 which corresponds to the observed 
minimum of $8,000 found in Maryland. Then the benchmark value of X  =  0.38 corresponding 
to $47,800 which is the population weighted median level. And a higher level X  =  1 which 
corresponds to about $124,700. I will report the maximum of almost $250,000 found in 
Kansas only occasionally since these results are usually the same as the one obtained for 
X  =  1.
4.6.1 Default rates
Since the incentive to default increases with the exemption level, default should be positively 
correlated with the exemption level. 12 However, as shown in figure 4.1 there is no positive 
relationship between the exemption level and the occurrence of default. In fact, the correlation 
is slightly negative. My model does not produce a negative relationship. It produces a small 
positive one with non-linear effects. However, a regression on the data shows that a positive 
coefficient cannot be excluded. In particular, the correlation my model produces is within 
the 95 percent confidence interval.
Previous models, for example Athreya [2008] for consumers or Mankart /  Rodano [2007] 
for entrepreneurs, find a strong positive relationship between the exemption level and default 
rates. The reason my model predicts only modest increases in the default rate when the 
exemption is very low and almost no increase once it exceeds $30,000 is that almost no 
household is affected by such high exemption levels. Households that might default have 
assets that are below the exemption level. This is explained in more detail later on.
The non-linear effect at low exemption levels indicates that not including the exemption 
level might lead to spurious results. My model nests the model by Livshits et al. [2007b]. In 
particular, setting the exemption level to zero makes my model equivalent to their model. 
Therefore, I also contrast their results with mine. 13
In addition to looking at average default rates, it is instructive to look at default rates 
over the life-cycle. Figure 4.6 shows default rates for three different exemption levels and the 
default rates observed in the data. 14 While the benchmark model gets the hump-shape over
12 This is unless credit rationing is so severe that the most risky borrowers are excluded from the market 
completely. In this case the selection effect might overturn the positive relationship between the exemption 
level and the default rate.
13 Since I do not recalibrate the model for each exemption level, the results that I report for X  =  0 and their 
results differ. However, these differences are very small since the value of my calibrated variables are very 
close to the values in their calibration.
14 For observed bankruptcies, I used the data from Sullivan et al. [2000] and adjusted the mean.
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Figure 4.6: Defaults over the life cycle: Data, benchmark model (X  = 0.38), low exemption 
(X  =  0 ) and high exemption (X  = 1)
the life-cycle right, the peak in the default rate occurs too early compared to the data. In 
addition, defaults pick up at the end of the life in the model.15
The case of X  = 0 is the case analyzed by Livshits et al. [2007b]. In this case the peak 
occurs in the first period in which default is possible in the model. 16 Thus, this version 
of the model does worse in describing default rates over the life-cycle. Even a very small 
exemption level 0.06 (not shown) already implies a peak in the third model period, i.e. at 
age 29.
The main result that increases in the exemption level beyond an intermediate level do not 
lead to an increase in bankruptcies can also be seen in figure 4.6. The case of a high exemption 
level X  == 1 is almost indistinguishable from the benchmark case X  =  0.38. Default rates are 
only marginally higher during the last periods of life.
4.6.2 Default reasons
Households in the model are exposed to three types of uncertainty: expense (wealth) shocks, 
changes in persistent labor productivity and transitory income shocks. In this section, I 
compare the default reasons across two exemption levels, X  = 0 and X  = .38. The former is
15 The model produces this marked increase because everyone retires for sure at 65 and I assume that there is 
no further uncertainty. If the model included heterogeneity with respect to retirement age and additional 
uncertainty this peak would flatten out.
16 See also figure 1 in Livshits et al. [2007b].
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Table 4.6-5: Default by reason for X =0 and X=0.38
A: E xem ption  X = 0 Expense shock
Low High None Total
No income fall 63.8% 1 0 .2 % 1 .0 % 75.1%
Fall in persistent income only 8 .1 % 1 .6 % 4.9% 14.6%
Fall in transitory income only 7.3% 1 .2 % 0 .2 % 8.7%
Both fall 0.9% 0 .2 % 0 .6 % 1.7%
Total 80.2% 13.2% 6 .6 % 1 0 0 .0 %
B: E xem ption  X = 0 .3 8 Expense shock
Low High None Total
No income fall 55.1% 8 .8 % 2.3% 6 6 .1 %
Fall in persistent income only 8 .6 % 1.4% 11.7% 21.7%
Fall in transitory income only 7.4% 1 .1 % 0.9% 9.4%
Both fall 1.3% 0 .2 % 1.3% 2 .8 %
Total 72.4% 11.4% 16.2% 1 0 0 .0 %
the case implicitly analyzed in Livshits et al. [2007b], the latter is the benchmark case.
The biggest difference between the two panels in table 4.6-5 is that the fraction of defaulters 
who have experienced no wealth shock more than doubles from 6 .6 % to 16.2% when the 
exemption level is increased from X  =  0 to X  =  0.38 . In particular, defaulters who have 
experienced no wealth shock but whose persistent productivity has dropped compared to the 
previous period increases from 4.9% to 11.7%. In the data 17, the fraction of defaulters who 
report job reasons is at least as high as those reporting expense shocks. Thus, the benchmark 
model with a positive exemption level probably still overstates the role of expense shocks. 
But it is a significant improvement over a model without any exemption. Further increases in 
the exemption level (not shown) do not lead to any significant changes in the default reasons.
4.6.3 Debt and savings
Figure 4.7 shows the average debt over the life-cycle. Panel A  shows debt of agents who do 
not save. Panel B  shows debt of agents who save. Panel C  shows total debt.
First, if the exemption is 0, no borrower will ever save. This is because, in case of a default, 
he has to surrender all assets above the exemption level which in this case simply means all 
assets. Therefore, in panel B  the line for X  =  0 corresponds with the x-axis. If the exemption 
is positive, for example X  =  0.38 as in the benchmark case, some agents will borrow and 
save simultaneously (see panel B ). But since this is mainly a substitution, this lowers the 
borrowing amount in panel A  of figure 4.7.
The net effect can be seen in panel C. A positive exemption leads to slightly more borrowing 
in the first half of the life-cycle and to slightly less in the second half. Figure 4.7 shows again
17 See figure 1.2 on page 16 in Livshits et al. [2007b].
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Figure 4.7: Debts over the life cycle: Benchmark model (X  — 0.38), low exemption (X  = 0) 
and high exemption ( X = 1)
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that a further increase in the exemption level from X  = 0.38 to X  = 1 leads to almost no 
change. The two lines are indistinguishable in all three panels. This can also be seen in figure 
4.9.
Figure 4.8 shows the assets held by households at the moment of filing for bankruptcy. 
If the exemption level is zero, less than six percent of households have positive savings at 
the time of default. If the exemption level is increased to a still very low level of 0.06, the 
distribution shifts outwards. This means agents hold more wealth at the moment of default. 
The reason for this is tha t being able to keep some wealth leads agents who might default 
to increase their savings since they can keep it. Further increasing the exemption level to 
X  =  0.38 alters the distribution somewhat. But an increase to X  = 1 has again almost no 
additional effect.
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Figure 4.8: Distribution of assets of defaulters for different exemption levels
Figure 4.9 shows aggregate savings and aggregate borrowing for exemption levels, ranging 
from $0 to $250,000. Borrowing increases rapidly for low levels of savings before it falls back 
to a smaller level. And then, it remains unchanged for exemption levels higher than X  — 0.2.
Savings however keep on increasing for all levels of the wealth exemption, even though 
the increases get smaller. Nevertheless, it is almost the only variable that keeps changing 
even for high exemption levels. This confirms the discussion in section 4.3 tha t savings can 
increase when the exemption level increases. The reason is tha t the insurance through a 
high exemption level now is available also for relatively richer households. This leads these 
households to increase their savings supply.
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Figure 4.9: Debts and savings for different exemption levels.
4.6.4 Welfare
The top panel in figure 4.10 shows the welfare impacts of changing the exemption level. As 
utilitarian welfare measure, I use the percentage increase in lifetime consumption necessary to 
make the households equally well off under both regimes (ECV). X  =  0.38 is the benchmark 
case. A negative number here means that this particular exemption level is worse than the 
benchmark and vice versa. The bottom panel shows the variance of log consumption. A 
lower variance means that consumption is more equally distributed which, from an ex ante 
perspective, makes (ceteris paribus) households better off.
Figure 4.10 shows that there are welfare gains from moving from a very low level of the 
exemption (X  =  0) to an intermediate level (X  =  0.3). The bottom panel shows that these 
welfare gains are obtained by decreasing the variance of log consumption, i.e. by distributing 
consumption more equally. Thus, a positive exemption level allows for more risk-sharing in 
this economy. The welfare gains from further increases are extremely small.
Livshits et al. [2007b] compare a US style system in which debt is wiped out upon default 
(fresh start) with a European style system where this is not the case. They find that the fresh 
start system is better by about 0.06% in terms of ECV. Incorporating the second important 
feature of the US system, a positive exemption level, doubles this welfare differences.
The net supply of savings, aggregate savings minus aggregate debt, in figure 4.9, is increasing 
in this model. While the model is a partial equilibrium model, this, at least, suggests that 
general equilibrium effects are unlikely to overturn the case for high exemption levels.
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In figure 4.1, I have shown that the model implies only small differences in bankruptcy 
rates for different exemption levels. I have also shown that this is consistent with the data. 
In addition, figure 4.10 shows that the welfare differences between positive exemption levels 
are very small. The very fact that there are huge differences in exemption levels across US 
states suggests that the welfare implications are probably not that big. Otherwise, at least if 
the political process were efficient, a convergence of exemption levels should have occurred 
over the last decades.
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Figure 4.10: Welfare and variance of log consumption for different exemption levels.
4.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a heterogenous agent life-cycle model in which agents are subject to 
three types of shocks: persistent and transitory labor productivity shocks and expense shocks. 
Financial markets in the model are incomplete but agents can insure themselves against risks 
by holding a portfolio of unsecured debt and savings. I show that including the possibility to 
keep some of the assets, i.e. a positive wealth exemption level, as is the case in all US states, 
is important.
A positive exemption level increases aggregate savings and welfare. However, I also show 
that increases in the exemption level beyond $25,000-$30,000 have hardly any effect. The 
default rate does not increase any further. This is consistent with the data which show no
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positive correlation between the exemption level and default rates. Additionally, the wide 
variation in exemption levels across US states is consistent with a rational political process if 
welfare differences are small. This is indeed the case in the model.
One limitation of the model is that it assumes that both types of expenditure shocks are 
born by someone else in case of default. This is plausible for high medical expense debts 
where hospitals often do not get paid. However, for divorces, unwanted pregnancies etc. it is 
more reasonable to assume that households have to bear these costs themselves. They could 
do this if they had access to a credit line on which they could draw in these situations. In that 
case the loan pricing would be more difficult since the loan would actually resemble a credit 
card with a credit caxd limit. Incorporating this into a life-cycle model with expenditure 
shocks is left for future research.
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4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 Derivations of result 1 in section 3
This is a partial proof of result 1 in the section 3. The utility function is
max U =  log (ci) +  E log (c2)
=  log(a0 -  s) +  (1  -  p) log (s) +  plog (min[s, X])
Proof. There are three possible cases
'  for X  <
s* =  < X  for < X < \ a 0
7}ao for |ao  <  X
If min[s,X] =  X , then the last term in (4.8-1) is independent of s, therefore the first order 
condition with respect to s is
1 ( - 1 ) +  -^  =  0ao — s 
solving for s yields
* _  (1  - p )  aO 
S 2 - p
Now, note that this was obtained under the assumption that min[s, X] =  X . Therefore, this 
results holds only for >  X
If min[s, X] =  s, then the problem is actually a standard problem
max U — log(ao — s) +  log (s)
with first order condition
- 1 + i  = o
ao — s s
and therefore
*  1
S = 2 ° °
Note, that this case was obtained under the assumption that min[s, X] =  s. Therefore, it 
holds only |ao  <  X .
Lastly, note that for any p G (0,1)
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therefore, as long as there is a positive probability for an expense shock, there will be an 
exemption level such that ^2 -^ °  < X  <  ^clq. In that case s* =  X .  ■
Chapter
Joint Search and Aggregate Fluctuations
5.1 Introduction
The idea that economic agents lack sufficient access to markets to insure against misfortune 
has been one of the founding blocks of modern macroeconomics. 1 By now the literature 
assigning a central role to heterogeneity and postulating that risk sharing is far from perfect 
is voluminous and has addressed many interesting aspects of macroeconomic theory.2 For 
instance the baseline incomplete markets paradigm in the tradition of Aiyagari [1994] and 
Krusell /  Smith [1998] builds on the assumption that households are formed by bachelor 
agents who by trading claims on the aggregate capital stock can self-insure against shocks in 
labor income.
Over time alternative sources of insurance (either private or government provided) have 
been introduced into this framework. Much less common is the idea that a considerable 
amount of insurance against employment and productivity risk can be provided in the form 
of adjustments of the family members’ labor supplies. This form of insurance within the 
family is the focus of our paper. We investigate the differences between economies where risk 
sharing is limited because agents stand alone against uncertain contingencies, and those where 
households are formed by unions of two ex ante identical (ex post heterogeneous) members 
who can mutually insure against economic risks.
Any realistic modeling of labor supply decisions should take the importance of trading 
frictions into account. Therefore, we are taking stock of the large literature of search models 
of the labor market. The risks that arise naturally in this environment are uncertainty about 
the match quality and the possibility of rationing of employment opportunities. On both 
these margins joint labor supply decisions present households with economically meaningful
1 We thank Chris Pisssarides, Franceso Caselli and Alex Michaelides for their continuous support and valuable 
comments. We are also grateful to Wouter Den Haan, Rachel Ngai and participants at the LSE macroeconomics 
seminar.
2 See Heathcote et al. [2008] for a survey.
145
5.1 Introduction 146
opportunities that we explore.
Naturally this analysis lends itself to the possibility of tackling many interesting questions 
with which modern macro labor economics is confronted. From our part we want to use 
this model to understand whether granting joint insurance and labor supply possibilities to 
couples can help disassociate the search behavior of economically active (those in the labor 
force) from that of economically passive (out of the labor force) agents.
Generally traditional theories of the labor market have had a hard time matching the low 
procyclicality of the labor force and in the presence of frictions the business cycle correlations 
of key labor market statistics Veracierto [2008]. The reason is that the strong intertemporal 
substitution motive convinces agents to flow into the labor force in good times and abandon 
it in bad. Our main theme here is that if recessions are periods of high incidences of 
unemployment or low opportunities to find work then this induces household members to 
search jointly and intensively to insure against potential earnings losses. By contrast in 
bachelor household frameworks inactive workers are either those who have experienced a 
sequence of bad shocks or those who have accumulated sufficient wealth to finance leisure 
or both. We do not believe that either is realistic but rather view inactivity as part of a 
specialization pattern in which one partner provides market income and the other focuses on 
producing home goods.
In section 5.2 of our paper we use the data from the Current Population Survey to show 
that joint insurance though adjustments of labor supplies of household members can explain 
the low procyclicality of the US labor force. Then we turn to theory and build a general 
equilibrium framework to contrast the properties of two economies (bachelors and families) 
and demand that they be consistent with a broad range of empirical targets. When we 
introduce aggregate fluctuations in this environment we find that joint insurance and in 
general the structure of the household unit can have a large impact on the business cycle 
properties of key labor market statistics. Nonetheless, the effect on the cyclical properties 
of the labor force is limited. Our couple economy can do better in terms of employment 
and unemployment volatilities and correlations with output but only marginally reduces the 
cyclicality of the labor force. We argue that these predictions axe consistent with two main 
implications of our theory: joint insurance against unemployment risk within the household 
and a reduction in the reliance on precautionary savings to self-insure.
5.1.1 Related literature
This paper is related to several strands in the literature: First, there has been an enormous 
interest on the implications of heterogeneity and incomplete insurance markets for the 
aggregate labor fluctuations, for example Gomes et al. [2001] and Chang /  Kim [2007] . These 
papers, however, build on the bachelor household paradigm which is precisely our point of 
departure. Interestingly, Chang /  Kim [2007] develop a framework where families consist of 
two members (a male and female) and use it to address how individual supply rules affect
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the value of the aggregate elasticity of labor supply. As far as incomplete markets models go, 
this work is closest to our intentions but many of the ingredients are different.
First, we emphasize the role of family in circumventing frictions in the labor market such 
as the limited availability of job opportunities whilst in Chang /  Kim [2007] the role assigned 
to frictions is secondary. Second, contrasting the properties of two economies, one with 
bachelor households and one with couple households, in various environments is one of the 
main themes that we pursue. Most importantly none of the models of incomplete insurance 
markets from this literature takes up seriously the task of matching the patterns of worker 
reallocation between employment unemployment and inactivity. This is exactly what we 
do. For this reason we introduce a different shocks to make our model consistent with the 
relevant empirical flows.
There is a sizeable literature that highlights the role of family labor supply as a mean 
of insuring against idiosyncratic labor income risks. In Attanasio et al. [2005, 2008] and 
Heathcote et al. [2008] an additional margin of insurance provided by female labor market 
participation becomes a valuable instrument to buffer shocks to labor income. These papers 
analyze the effects of various changes in the economic environment on the historical trends of 
female labor supply. This is not the interpretation we want to give to our theory however.
Our model is one of complete markets within the household and incomplete markets outside 
the household. Closer to our attempt is recent work by Guler et al. [2008] who characterizes 
the effects of joint search on optimal reservation wage policies. In contrast to them, we use 
a more realistic search model and we build a general equilibrium framework with realistic 
heterogeneity that accounts for observed labor market flows as well as for the effects of shocks 
to aggregate productivity.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 uses the estimated flows from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) to provide evidence that joint insurance and labor supply are key 
factors that explain the low procyclicality of the US labor force participation. In section 5.3, 
we develop the bachelor household model and the couple household model. In section 5.4, we 
show and discuss the basic results and implications of our theory. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Labor Market Flows in the US
Table 5.2-1 summarizes the US labor market business cycle statistics. The data are constructed 
from the CPS and they correspond to observations spanning the years 1976 to 2005. They 
are logged and HP filtered and all quantities refer to quarterly aggregates and are expressed 
relative to a de-trended measure of GDP. Unemployment is extremely counter-cyclical and 
more than six times as volatile as aggregate output. Aggregate employment has two thirds of 
the volatility of output at business cycle frequencies and is very procyclical. The labor force 
is not volatile and its contemporaneous correlation with GDP is low (0.22).
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Table 5.2-1: US Business Cycle: Labor Market Statistics
Employment Unemployment LF LF Couples LF Wifes
Aged 16 and Above Aged 2 2  to 55
Zx.
ay
0 .6 6 6 .6 8 0.34 0.35 0.47
Px,y .81 - . 8 8 .2 2 .05 .2
The last columns of Table 5.2-1 present a breakdown of the relevant quantities into 
demographic groups that are of particular interest to us. For married couples aged 22 to 55 
in our sample, aggregate statistics are no different than those of the full population, aged 16 
and above. The labor force for this demographic is somewhat less procyclical, and hence even 
more puzzling from the point of view of theory, owning to the strong acyclical attachment of 
males in the sample, but also to the low contemporaneous correlation with GDP of female 
labor force participation. The volatility of both males (not shown) and females are higher 
than the aggregate volatility for this demographic group as can be seen in column 4. In turn 
this might suggest that there is some negative correlation of labor force participation of wives 
and husbands in our sample.
We note that this breakdown corresponds to an imperfect measure of our notion of couples 
in the model. Ideally we would like to have duads of agents who are linked with near perfect 
insurance opportunities and make labor supply decisions jointly, but the data preclude us 
from doing so. In what follows we treat household units that are comprised of two spouses as 
an ideal ground to provide evidence for our theory.
5.2.1 Implications for models: Fixed participation?
Are these observations consistent with the tendency of macro labor market theory to restrict 
attention to environments where economic agents can be either employed or unemployed 
at any point in time? We provide an answer to this question by looking at the monthly 
transitions of the US workforce across adjacent labor market states.
In table 5.2-2 we summarize the relevant flows estimated from the CPS. Each month 
roughly 7 % of out of the labor force workers join the labor force , and 3 % of employed 
workers quit and become inactive. Further on to dilute the suspicion that these results are 
driven by demographics Table 5.2-3 presents the analogous matrix for the sub-sample of 
married couples aged 22 to 55.
A point that merits some attention is the fact that roughly 5 % of out of the labor force 
workers find a job and become employed in the following month. There are two relevant 
possibilities: The first is that this is an immediate consequence of time aggregation since 
monthly horizons are more than enough for a worker to make a transition between inactivity 
and employment without having a recorded unemployment spell. The second pertains to 
the search behavior of passive searchers, marginally attached and discouraged workers. For
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Table 5.2-2: Matrix for Flow rates of Agents Aged Above 16
E U I
E .9543 .0146 .0311
U .2743 .4983 .2274
I .0466 .0245 .9289
Table 5.2-3: Matrix for Flow rates of Married Couples Aged 2 2  to 55
E U I 
E .9662 .0112 .0226
U .2891 .5159 .195
I .0623 .0282 .9095
these groups the work by Jones /  Riddell [1999] demonstrates that they have transition 
probabilities into employment that are half as large as those of unemployed workers which in 
turn implies that some of the flows between states U and I can be broadly interpreted as 
evidence of optimal time variation in search intensity for these groups. These implications 
have already been explored in the literature, see for example Hornstein et al. [2007], and 
adjusting the transition probabilities to embrace the idea that marginally attached workers 
should be treated as unemployed rather than inactive doesn’t make a big difference in the 
matrices of tables 5.2-2 and 5.2-3.
Hence we draw two conclusions from these calculations. First that the line between 
economically active and inactive workers is somewhat arbitrarily drawn by the theoretical 
models of the labor market and second that our model, calibrated at monthly frequencies 
should allow all agents (independent of their labor market status) to receive job offers and to 
experience transitions between nonemployment and employment.
5.2.2 Empirical evidence
One possibility to investigate our mechanism empirically would be to run limited dependent 
variable models (such as linear probability or probit models) and to estimate the effect of the 
husbands employment status, on the wife’s labor force transitions, and this would allow us to 
control for some relevant aspects of heterogeneity. Such attempts to determine the magnitude 
of added worker effects are numerous in the literature and we can summarize these estimates 
without relying on our own empirical work. Moreover, this kind of analysis would have very 
little to say about the contribution of the joint labor supply on the low procyclicality of the 
labor force which is our focal point here.
Contrasting the cyclical behavior of singles versus couples, even after controlling for 
demographic characteristics, would fare no better as an alternative, since our notion of singles 
is a very different one from what the data could potentially suggest. In our framework singles
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are those agents who have an own idiosyncratic productivity and more importantly don’t 
possess ties with any other agent in the economy that could alleviate the risk from this 
process. In the data however, unwed agents or even those who form a household unit on their 
own, are very likely to have joint insurance with other agents in the economy, for example 
their extended family. This consideration would cloud the conclusions we could potentially 
draw.
We treat the two spouses, husband and wife, in the household unit as the closest data 
analogue to our notion of partnerships with joint labor supply and insurance. Using data on 
individual transitions we want to test the following prediction: If it weren’t for employment 
fluctuations over the business cycle of primary household earners, the labor force participation 
of secondary earners would be considerably more procyclical. We focus on individuals aged 
22 to 55 and for this demographic group married agents account for roughly 60 % of the 
population. 3 In our sample we treat husbands as primary and wives as secondary earners.
For each period t we estimate the transition probability of a wife from state z to state j  
conditional on her spouse making a transition from state k to I. We denote this probability 
by p { ( i , j ,k , l )  and analogously we let be the unconditional probability that the
husband, who is the household head in our sample, makes the transition from state k to state 
I over the course of a month. Due to data limitations we cannot define conditional transition 
probabilities for all relevant labor market states. For this reason we restrict our attention to 
i , j  G {LF ,O L F }, that is wives can either be in the labor force or inactive, and husbands 
can either be employed or not (we denote this by k, I 6  {E , N }). Finally, let n*(i, k) be the 
share of the population of couples with a secondary earner is state z and a primary earner in 
state k. The evolution of these measures is central to our experiment. With these estimates 
we construct counterfactual Markov transition matrices for couples over the relevant state 
space {L F ,O L F }  x {E ,N } .
The typical element of these matrices is given p { (z, j, k, I) where p771^ ,  I) denotes the
transition probability of the husband averaged over all periods. What we mean to accomplish 
by that is to have data on household transitions whereby the probability distribution of 
primary earners across labor market states is independent of time. Notice that other than 
the business cycle variation there is no secular trend or other discernible pattern of time 
variation for the transition probabilities of males in our sample.
We use these matrices to construct population measures at one and three month ahead 
horizons. That is to say we feed the actual populations nt once and track the measures over 
the relevant horizon using our constructed matrices. To make our comparison meaningful we 
also compute populations based on the actual transition probabilities, i.e p { (z, j, k: /)p™(fc, 
since small errors that compile over time may cloud the conclusions from this experiment. We 
denote by nt the constructed measure based on the time averaged probabilities for husbands, 
and by nt the analogous object based on the actual estimated transitions. Figure 5.1 shows
3 For the entire sample of agents aged above 16 they form 36% of all individuals.
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Figure 5.1: Actual and Counterfactual Labor Force Participation Rates of Married Women
the labor force participation rate, based on measure nt that we draw from the data, for wives 
over the sample period with the three month ahead counterfactual time series, based on Tit. 
Reassuringly the correlations between actual and counterfactual measures is high above .99 
at our longest horizon. The correlation between nt and ht is even higher.
Table 5.2-4: Experiments
Actual
Population
Actual Counterfactual 
One Month Horizon
Actual Counterfactual 
Three Month Horizon
Zx.
°v
Px,y
.3604
.2963
.3770
.2988
.3805
.3703
.4294
.2570
.4362
.3216
In table 5.2-4, we summarize the results from this experiment. We compare the relative 
standard deviations and contemporaneous correlation with a de-trended measure of GDP. The 
first column refers to the cyclical properties of the labor force participation rate of married 
wives based on the actual population measure nt.4 Columns 2  to 3 and 4 to 5 compare 
the analogous objects based on the measures fit and Tit, for one and three months horizons 
respectively. As the horizon expands the errors that compile over time make the processes 
display considerably more volatility and smaller cyclical correlation with GDP.
4 The differences in the quantities ^  and pn,y relative to tables 5.2-2 and 5.2-3 stem from the fact that the 
population is normalized to unity.
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The result is both qualitatively and quantitatively encouraging. The cyclical correlation of 
labor force participation for wives jumps from 0.2988 to 0.3703 in columns 2 and 3 and from
0.257 to 0.3216 in columns 4 and 5. Further on in light of this higher correlation with GDP 
we can argue that the increase in volatility from our actual to our counterfactual measures is 
mostly due to the business cycle.
5.2.3 Implications for the model
Our hypothesis is that in recessions secondary earners flow into the labor force to insure 
the family against the possibility of a job loss of it’s main earner. We find indeed that 
the probability of a wife entering the labor force, or the probability that she experiences 
a OLF  —► LF  transition is higher when the husband looses his job, and effectively this 
defines an added worker effect. But recessions are times when the event of a job loss 
becomes considerably more likely, and analogously the possibility that a job is found becomes 
considerably lower. With more husbands in the pool of nonemployed in recessions, wives flow 
in the labor force with higher rates. By shutting down time variation in the transition of 
primary earners we seek to isolate this effect and in fact our results confirm our hypothesis.
An important consideration pertains to heterogeneity in our sample which arguably we are 
unable to control for. If, for example, wives that are more likely to make transitions between 
labor market states are matched with husbands that are more probable to experience a loss 
of employment, then the added worker effect that we identify could be spurious. We address 
this possibility by making the following points:
First, not all of the relevant conditional probabilities in the data tilt in our direction: 
For instance we find that in our sample the probability that a wife exits the labor force is 
higher when her spouse experiences an employment to nonemployment transition, which is 
a counterfactual implication according to our reasoning. Heterogeneity therefore could go 
either way. More substantively we can argue the case baaed on the empirical estimates from 
the relevant literature. Working with the CPS flows, the closest to our attempt, Spletzer 
[1997] identifies sizable and significant added worker effects. In his sample the probability 
that a wife flows in the labor force when her husband looses his job is estimated to be .08 log 
points higher than the average of the population in a limited dependent variable model and 
when he adds household characteristics this difference falls to .06, still sizable nonetheless.5
Further on, although our calculations may be fraught with some heterogeneity, they are 
also unable to identify other important issues such lags in labor adjustments of household 
members or even responses to anticipated shocks which might reinforce our results. Both of 
these possibilities are clearly relevant. Stephens [2002] uses data from the PSID to argue that
5 In this study the husband’s recent history of unemployment spells (the number of weeks spend in unemploy­
ment in the previous year) appears to  be a key variable that reduces the relevant probability. In our view  
this should not be interpreted as evidence against the existence of an added worker effect since even delayed 
responses to past shocks or front-loaded labor adjustments to anticipated shocks may be interpreted as joint 
insurance.
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post displacement, substantial earnings losses due to unemployment spells of male earners 
lead to near permanent increases in female labor supply.
5.3 The model
We develop two related models in which households face uninsurable idiosyncratic labor 
income risk. In the first model a household consists of one agent, a bachelor. In the second 
model, and this is the key contribution of our paper, a household consists of two agents, a 
couple, who share their income risk.
5.3.1 Bachelor economy
We consider an economy populated by a unit mass of strictly risk averse bachelor households 
that are identical in preferences and value the consumption of a general multipurpose market 
good c. We denote the discount factor for these agents by fis and the period utility deriving 
from consumption by u(c).
At any point in time a household member can be either employed, unemployed or out of 
the labor force. We assume that labor supply decisions are formed at the extensive margin 
and are subject to the frictions that impede instantaneous transitions across these adjacent 
labor market states. In particular employed agents spend a fraction h of their unitary time 
endowment each period in market activities associated with a utility cost which we denote by 
$(/i). Job availability for non-employed agents in the economy is limited: They are endowed 
with a technology that transforms units of search effort s into arrival rates of job opportunities 
p (s) at a cost k(s) per unit of time. As will become clearer below, based on these optimal 
choices, we classify household members as either unemployed (active searchers) or out of 
labor force workers.
Further on we assume that households face idiosyncratic labor productivity risks and 
we summarize this risk in two independent stochastic processes e and x. The former,e, 
is an agent specific process, an own labor productivity component, that is a persistent 
state variable in the agents value function independent of her labor market status. The 
latter x is a job specific component that pertains to the quality of active jobs and available 
job opportunities in the economy. These characteristics evolve stochastically over time 
according to the transition cumulative distribution functions 7iy)e =  Pr(et+ 1  < e', e* — e) and 
ttx ',x — Pr(xt+ i <  x',xt =  x) respectively. Further on, we assume that the initial assignment 
of job quality x derives from a general density H{x).
Financial markets are incomplete and agents can self-insure by trading non contingent 
claims on the aggregate capital stock. These earn a return Rt each period. Agents are subject 
to an ad hoc borrowing limit at >  a V t. Wages per efficiency units of labor wt as well as 
rental rates Rt are determined in competitive factor markets where it is assumed that a
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representative firm aggregates all inputs into a multipurpose final good. The technology is 
of the standard form Yt =  K^(LtXt)1~a , where capital K t depreciates at rate S each period 
and Lt =  J f  J exha>€}XIha £ i=^dTt denotes the aggregate efficiency units of the labor input. 
Finally, T* is the density over the relevant state space of employment status, productivity 
and wealth and A* is the TFP process which evolves according to the transition equation 
7T\/|y =  P rob(\t+ i <  A71 A* =  A'). The law of motion for the distribution of workers is defined 
as: Tt+i =  T{TU At) where T  is the relevant transition operator.
Timing of events
Each period £, and after the resolution of all relevant uncertainty, a non-employed agent 
chooses optimally the number of search units s* to exert and finances her consumption out 
of the current stock of savings. Her choice of St maps into a probability p(st) of receiving 
a job offer in the next period. When this opportunity arrives the new values et+i and xt+i 
are sampled and the aggregate state vector {Tt+i, At+i} is revealed and the agent will decide 
whether she wants to give up search and become employed. Notice that given that all jobs 
entail a fixed cost ${h) the realization of the relevant state vector might be such that the 
prospective match, i.e. the job, does not generate a positive surplus for the worker.
Similarly for an employed agent, the sampling of the new values for xt+ 1 and e*+1 generates 
the risk of separation. The worker may decide that it is not worthwhile to spend h of her 
time working and would rather search for new opportunities next period. For this worker, 
optimal consumption and savings decisions are borne out of the stock of wealth and labor 
earnings, conditional on her keeping her current employment status.
Value functions
Consider the problem of an agent with a stock of wealth at and a productivity endowment 
et who is currently not employed. She must optimally allocate resources between current 
consumption and savings and choose the number of units of search effort to exert to maximize 
her well-being. We denote the lifetime utility for this worker by V n. We also define an 
auxiliary object Qe — m ax{Fn, V e} which is the outer envelope over the relevant menu of 
choices for this worker conditional on her receiving a job offer next period.
Applying standard arguments we can represent her program recursively as:
V n(a, e,T, A) =  max u(c) — k(s) +  (3s( [  p(s) / x /Qe(a/,e/,x /, r /, A')) d H(x')
a ' > a , s  J
+  (1 - p ( s ) )  V’n(a,,e, , r ,,A/) dire,\edirx'\\ (5.3-1)
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subject to the constraint set:
a' = R \ ,r a ~~ c• (5.3-2)
Notice that the distribution T becomes a state variable in the workers value function. In
order to forecast factor prices next period and to make optimal savings and labor market
search decisions knowledge of T' is necessary since this object determines the economy’s 
aggregate capital stock and effective labor in the next period. 6
In a similar fashion we can represent the employed workers lifetime utility as a solution to 
the following functional equation:
V e(a, e, x,  T, A) =  max u(c) — $>(h)
a '> a
+  P s ( [  Qe{a',e, ,x ' ,r ' \ \ ' ) )  d7re,\ed7rx>\\dirx,\x) (5.3-3)
Je1, A; ,x '
subject to
a' = R Xj?a +  w x^ h e x  — c (5.3-4)
Our classification criterion for nonemployed workers is the following:
< s m in  Worker is OLF
> Sm in  Worker is Unemployed
We classify an agent as unemployed if she chooses effort above a given threshold smjn, and 
as out of the labor force otherwise. This mapping is consistent with the notion that inactive 
agents search less intensively in the labor market and as coarse as this classification rule may 
be it is very close to the analogous criterion used in the CPS.
We normalize the flow value of income for both unemployed and out of the labor force 
agents to zero so that their consumption is financed exclusively out of the stock of savings. 
This assumption is made mainly to avoid the complications of having to deal with eligibility 
for a government insurance scheme as it is not clear how benefits would be distributed across 
the population. For instance inactive workers in principle should not receive any sort of 
replacement income but in our model there is a considerable amount of mobility between 
the two non employment states. In turn keeping track of benefit histories would add to the 
computational burden of our exercise without being clear how it would affect the main results.
6 We vise primes to  denote next period variables. Furthermore, we chose to use integrals instead of the  
conventional expectation operators to highlight that the relevant uncertainties faced by employed and non 
employed workers differ in the current context. The initial draws of x  derive from the general distribution 
H ( x ) and the continuation match qualities are determined by ^x'\x so that in general:
Q e( a ,  e \  x ,  U , A'))*rx,|*d x>) *  /  Q V .  e'> x '> r '> A0 ) d H {x ' )J x'
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Competitive Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of a set of value functions {V n, V e}, and a set of decision rules for 
consumption, asset holdings a'e(a,x, e, A,T and a'n(a, e, A,T), search s(a, e, A,T) and labor 
supply h(a, r, e, A, T). It also consists of a collection of quantities {K t, L t} and prices {wt, R t} 
and a law of motion of the distribution Tt+i = T (T t,X t)  7
such that:
• given prices, households solve the maximization program in 5.3-1 and 5.3-3 and optimal 
policies derive;
• final goods firms maximize their profits;
wt =  K ? \ t l -°‘L t a and rt =  Kt- aAt1-aXt1“a
• goods and factor markets clear;
Yt + (1 — S)Kt =  J l h= (^a!w(at,e t ,xt ,r t ,Xt) +  (^(at i t t iXt^t iXt))  dTt
+  J%h=o{P'n(9jt'> r*t5 At) -(- cn{(it, Cf, Tt, A^ )) dTt (5.3-5)
Rt =  J  ex^a.e,x,A,r^a e x A r= )^ dTt (5.3-6)
Kt =  J o t  dTt (5.3-7)
• and individual behavior is consistent with the aggregate behavior.
The equilibrium conditions are standard. Equation 5.3-5 is the resource constraint of the 
economy. Equation 5.3-6 represents the labor market equilibrium. Equations 5.3-7 represent
7 The law of motion of the measure T can be represented as follows:
T e ( A , £ , X )  =  I r\V)=7i d n e>\ed n x /\x d T e
Ja'e eA,e'ee,x'ex
+ I  X h ( a ' , e ' , x ' , r ' , \ ' ) = h  P ( s (a i e> x i Fj A)) d,Tr£>\e d H ( x  ) d T n
J a'neA,e'e£ ,x’ex
T n ( A , £ )  — I -^h(a',e ',x r,r ' , A ' ) = 0  dTTe/ \ed7tx >\x d T e
Ja'eeA,e'e£
- |“ J  Z h ( a ', e ', x ',V , \ ') = 0  P (® (® >  X , T ,  A ))d 7 T e' \ ^ d H (x ) ( f r n
Ja 'n e A , t ' e £
-|- J  ■^h(a',e', x ' , r ',\')=0 (1 p(s(fl, £, X , T, A)))d7Te/|ed/f (x )dTn,
J a’neA,t'e £
where r n and Te denote the marginal cdfs for non-employed and employed workers respectively and A  S  
X  are subsets of the relevant state space.
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the capital market equilibrium.
5.3.2 Couple households economy
We introduce households that consist of two members in the economy retaining as many 
elements from the singles environment as possible. In particular we have a measure one of 
agents (so a total mass of one half of households) and each one of them is endowed with 
a unit of time. Household members derive utility from the consumption and the felicity 
function is given again by the general form u(ct). We denote the time preference parameters 
for households in this case by fie-
As far as intra-household allocations are concerned we adopt the unitary model whereby 
the household as a whole is treated as a decision unit and the members share the same 
common utility function. Income and wealth are pooled and consumption and labor supply 
or search decisions are formed jointly to maximize the households’ well being. Each agent in 
the economy has her own idiosyncratic productivity and consequently household members 
differ in their productive endowments and we denote by e* and xt the vector of productivities 
of the members of a generic household. To economize on notation, we let n e/|e be the joint 
cdf for the household members’ own productivities.
Having labor supply decisions formed jointly within households that are comprised of two 
members gives rise to opportunities of specialization in market and non-market work that 
were absent in a world of bachelor agents . Ideally a household would like to have at any point 
in time, the most productive agent in the market but it cannot do so without confronting the 
frictions that impede instantaneous transitions across labor market states. In what follows 
we adopt the convention that the array (k , I) k ,l G {E , N }  denotes a household whose first 
and second member are in states k and I respectively. Also, it will prove useful to define the 
following objects beforehand:
Qen =  m ax{F n7l ,V en} (5.3-8)
Qne =  max {V nn, V ne] (5.3-9)
Qee =  max {Q en, Qne, V ee} (5.3-10)
These objects define the relevant menu of choices for our households. For instance a 
household with one employed member can in any given period decide to withdraw her from 
the labor market and allocate both agents to search. This option is described in equation 5.3-8. 
Analogously in equation 5.3-10 a household with both members employed, can withdraw them
to non-employment, or keep one working or both. With these definitions we can represent
the dynamic programming problem of a household with two non-employed members as:
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V™,\,r =  max u(ct) - J 2 k(si)a'>a,si,S2
%
+ P c ( [  p(si)p(s2) [  Qee(a,,e,,x'1,4 ,A ,,r ,)dFW),di/(x/2)
Je',X' Jx'x,x '2
+  P( s i ) ( l ~ p ( s 2 )) [  Qcn(a,,e,Ja i,
Jx'x
+ p(s2)(l-p (« i)) /  Q” (a',£,,i'2>A'>r')dff(i'2)
J i'2
+  ( 1 - p ( s 2) ) ( l - p ( s i ) ) Q nn(a/,e/,A/,r')d7re/|ed7rA/|A) (5.3-11)
subject to:
a' =  tfA)ra -  c. (5.3-12)
Optimal choices for these agents consist of current consumption and a pair of search intensity 
levels. Note that nothing precludes household members from setting s* ^  Sj, although with 
standard convexity assumptions this can only be the case if the productivity endowments e* 
and 6j axe unequal. Further on, with probability p(si)p(s2 ) both members receive an offer 
and the sampling from the distribution of qualities H(x) is independent. Both, joint search 
coupled with the limited availability of job opportunities, and the independent sampling 
introduce risk sharing possibilities to households through adjustments of labor supply that 
were nonexistent in the singles economy.
The lifetime utility for a household with the first member employed solves the following 
functional equation:
K Z x iX r  =  max u(ct) -  k(s2) -  $(/i)
a '> a ,s  2
+ P c { f  (p{s2) [  Qee(a^e/,x/1,X2,A/,^/)d7r!1./|a.1dfl'(a;,2)
+  (1 ~ P M )  [  Qen(a/,e/,x i,A , , r /)d7ra./|x l)d7r€/|ed7rA/|A) (5.3-13)
J
subject to
a7 =  R \ tpa 4 - w \^ hx\e\ — c. (5.3-14)
For the sake of brevity we omit the value function V ne since the recursive representation is 
similar to that of equation 5.3-13. Finally, for a household with both members employed we 
can write:
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VaX xi,x2,\,r  =  max u ( c t ) - £ $ ( h )
CL CL“ I
+ P c { [  ' { [ '  i Qe%a\^\^i,X2A\^')d7rxfi\X1d7rx^X2)dne>led7ry( .^3-15)
J J ,J?2
subject to
a' =  i?A,rfl +  w\,rh  ^ 2  x%ei — c. (5.3-16)
i
The definition of a competitive equifibrium is similar to the one in section 5.3.1 and for the 
sake of brevity is omitted here.
5.3.3 Shocks and search technology
Our model builds on Chang /  Kim [2007] and Gomes et al. [2001] who assess the labor market 
implications of models with heterogeneous agents and aggregate uncertainty. There, as well as 
in our case, the distribution of match (job) rents is governed by the idiosyncratic productivity 
endowments. And, according to their realizations agents adjust their labor market status in 
each period. Our model goes beyond that by adding the following features: we introduce 
both own productivity shocks e and match quality shocks x. And we assume that search in 
the labor market is subject to a technology that maps search effort s into arrival rates of job 
offers p(s).
Shocks
We introduce this rich structure of shocks for two reasons: First, decomposing the overall 
labor market risk into these two processes seems to be empirically relevant since in the data 
firm effects as well as individual effects both account for substantial fractions of the individual 
earnings uncertainty.8 Second, we want to match the worker flows reported in tables 5.2-2 
and 5.2-3. Since our model has to disassociate the behavior of agents who make frequent 
transitions between employment and unemployment from those who move in and out of the 
labor force it is imperative that we introduce both own productivity and match quality shock. 
For instance in our calibration we choose the moments of the two processes in such a way 
that the transitions between unemployment and employment are governed by the x type 
shocks and those between unemployment an inactivity by the e type shocks.
See Abowd et al. [1999].
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Search technology
We adopt a very parsimonious representation of the search technology. In particular we 
assume that there axe two levels of search intensity that a worker can exert s £ {s /, Sf/} 
where the subscripts I  stands for inactive agents, i.e. those out of the labor force and the 
subscript U stands for unemployment agents, i.e. active job searchers. Associated with these 
choices are the following probabilities of receiving a job offer next period:
p i  if s — s i 
pu  if s =  su
The search costs are assumed to be of the form: k(s) =  0 if s =  si and k(s) =  k if s =  su- 
These discrete choices are enough to capture our division between workers who search actively, 
and hence are counted as unemployed, and those whose optimal choice of search does not 
translate into a large enough contact rate with potential employers and hence are considered 
to be out of the labor force. Adding more thresholds would in general complicate things for 
us by requiring that the model be consistent with a larger set of targets. For instance, if we 
included two thresholds of search for inactive workers we would have to make the model match 
the populations of agents who don’t search at all (and this is a large fraction of respondents 
in the CPS) and those who do search albeit in a passive way. We do not believe that these 
considerations are important and that they would alter our results. Notice that there is in 
general nothing that precludes us from setting pi =  0. But in order to match the observed 
flows from inactivity to employment in our model’s horizon it must be that p i >  0 .
We give the following interpretation to our technology: pu and pi  are treated as technological 
upper bounds to the number of matches that are possible each period from states U and I  
respectively. When we increase the values of these parameters we also need to increase the 
variance of the x shocks to keep the transition rates close to the data, since by the standard 
intuition a mean preserving spread in a match quality distribution would make searchers 
more selective.
Generally, we set pu <  1 in all our calibrations. The reason being that with limited job 
availability we want to give couples meaningful insurance opportunities against unemployment 
spells. Further on, these bounds must not be too tight since in our model these probabilities 
are constant over the business cycle. That is, we do not assume exogenous changes in this 
probability. If we were to set pu =  .28, the steady state unemployment to employment (UE) 
transition rate in the data, there would be no room for an increase job finding rates when an 
expansion arrives, and unemployment in the economy would be counter-factually procyclical.
This last point merits some attention. If in our model the flows between labor market states 
were governed by the firms’ willingness to create jobs over the business cycle, as for example 
in Mortensen /  Pissarides [1994], then the probabilities p i and pu would change over time. 
However the implications of such a model would be no different from ours since search and
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matching models generate procyclical search intensity (so agents would flow from inactivity 
to unemployment) which is precisely what we want to avoid by introducing couple households. 
In addition, our model generates endogenous separations and job findings by virtue of the 
processes x and e and the fixed cost of participation in the labor market. Whether firms 
bear the costs of investment in search, as is the case in Mortensen /  Pissarides [1994], or 
workers as we assume here is completely irrelevant. The only thing that matters is how these 
investments change over the business cycle.
5.4 Calibration and Results
5.4.1 Parametrization
We briefly discuss our choice of parameters and functional forms. We adopt a period utility 
function of the form:
u{ct) =  log(Cf).
T’l+'Y
Following Chang /  Kim [2007] we set the disutility from working equal to £ 3 +— and we 
normalize 7  to unity.9 Parameter B  is chosen to target the average employment population 
ratio of 60 % in the data. Since we draw no distinction between male and female population 
in the economy we don’t have to worry about matching the division of employment between 
these two demographics and we set the disutility of labor for a household that comprises of
T’l+'7
two employed members equal to We do, however, show how the model faxes in terms
of the specialization of home vs market activity in primary and secondary earners against the 
data.
For the search technology we set pu =  0.5 and p i =  0.1 in our benchmark which, given the 
empirical labor market flows, axe reasonable values. We also experiment with a model where 
Pu is set equal to 0.4. The cost of search for unemployed workers k is chosen to target the 
fraction of the population of nonemployed workers that are unemployed, i.e. those that set 
s =  su . In turn in the US data the unemployment rate is 5.5 % over our sample period.
Given that the models horizon is one month, we fix the time preference parameter for 
couple households Pc to 0.995 and the depreciation rate 6 to 0.0083. These values turn out 
to be consistent with an average (steady state) interest rate R =  1 +  r — 5 of 1.0041. The 
annual analogue is 5 %. The discount factor for singles Ps is chosen so that the resulting 
capital labor ratios (and hence the interest rates) in the two economies axe equal.
The capital share a  is calibrated to 0.33 and we assume that the employed agents spend 
roughly one third of their time endowment in market work h =  0.33. Following Chang 
/  Kim [2007] the aggregate TFP process is calibrated such that the quaxterly first order
9 This is unimportant in the current context.
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autocorrelation is p \ =  0.95 and the conditional standard deviation is <t\  =  0.007. Table 
5.4-5 summarizes these choices.
Finally our idiosyncratic labor productivity processes are of the following form 10:
log(rf) =  px log(zt_i) +  vXjt 
log(et) =  Pe log(et—i) +
Table 5.4-5: The model parameters (quarterly values)
Param eter Sym bol B aseline
std of TFP shock cr\ 0.007
AR1 of TFP shock P\ 0.95
Share of capital a 0.33
Depreciation rate 6 0.025
Discount Factor Couples Pc 0.995
Fraction of time working h 0.33
Offer Rate: OLF Pi .1
Offer Rate: Unemployed PU policy paratmeters
Labor Disutility B
Discount Factor Singles Ps
Search cost k jointly calibrated
Moments of x Px (see text)
Moments of e Get Pe
Our calibration procedure is as follows: For each of the models (singles, couples pu  £ 
{0.4,0.5}), we choose the moments of the idiosyncratic productivity processes p and a  along 
with B  and k to match the observed labor market flows. We have six parameters for six 
targets. We treat pu =  1/2 as the economy where frictions are important gives rise to risk 
sharing opportunities against prolonged non-employment spells in the couple economy.
Solution method
We solve the model with aggregate uncertainty using the bounded rationality approach 
whereby agents forecast future prices using a finite set of moments of the distribution T*. As 
in Krusell /  Smith [1998], we find that 1st moments (means) are sufficient for very accurate 
forecasts in our context. This means approximate aggregation holds. A detailed description 
of the algorithm is delegated to the appendix.
10 This choice is standard in the literature, see for example Heathcote et al. [2008]
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5.4.2 Steady State Findings
We use this section to provide information on the models’ performances in a number of 
relevant dimensions.
Table 5.4-6: Estimated Labor Market Flows: Singles vs. Couples
Bachelor Households Couples Households
E U I E U I
E .9507 .00432 .0450 .9515 .00567 .0428
U .2801 0.5831 .1368 .2830 .5051 .2119
I .0503 .0322 .9175 .0507 .0381 .9112
In Table 5.4-6 we summarize the estimated worker flows from the bachelor and the couple 
economy. 11 In both cases the decomposition between movements in and movements out of 
labor market states is such that the model output is consistent with an employment population 
ratio of 60 %, an unemployment rate of 5.5 %, and a outflow rate from unemployment to 
employment of 28 %. These values correspond to the respective values in the data.
Both models can match the total outflow from employment to non-employment. But 
the composition between the number of workers who leave their jobs to search intensively 
(unemployed) and those who leave their jobs but do not search is off target. In particular, in 
the data the EU rate is around 1.4% on average and the El rate is 3.11% but even the couple 
economy produces values of 0.567% and 4.28% respectively. This in turn might suggest that 
our model already featuring two independent stochastic processes for labor income risk is yet 
too parsimonious to match some aspects of the data.
A striking difference in terms of the performance of the two models is the resulting UI flows. 
We find that the couple model economy can easily attain a target of 21%, which corresponds 
to the value found in the data, whilst with bachelor households the best we can do is a value 
of 14%. This discrepancy is at the center of our notion of joint insurance. In the steady 
state there is a large fraction of families where one member is employed and another not. 
For the non-employed members the choice of search intensity, and consequently the choice 
of their labor market status, is affected by their own productivity state and the composite 
productivity of their partners. Changes in household income in this case entail a wealth effect 
on the labor supply of non-employed agents which could induce them to drop out of the labor 
force. 12 In contrast, in a bachelor household economy this channel is absent and the two 
factors that determine the choice of labor market status are wealth and productivity. Since
11 We use the CPS flows of table 5.2-2 as our targets, i.e the ones that refer to all agents aged above 16 
independent of marital status. The reason is that we don’t possess aggregate statistics (especially GDP) 
decomposed for different demographic groups. It would be meaningless to target say flows for married agents 
aged 22 to 55 as in table 5.2-3 and calibrate technology parameters (factor shares and Solow residuals) based 
on the estimates of an aggregate production functions
12 The same applies when there are two searchers in the family and one of them receives a job offer. In most 
cases the second earner will drop out of the labor force.
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wealth is run down in non-employment, productivity must be less persistent to match the 
data.
To see how specialization in market work respectively leisure is determined within the 
household consider the decomposition of inactivity and unemployment in the steady state 
summarized in Table 5.4-7. Roughly 35% of all agents who are out of the labor force in 
the economy live in households where both members are inactive and the remaining 65 % 
percent are in families where one member is either unemployed or employed. In the data the 
analogous fractions are 24 % and 76 % respectively for a population aged between 16 and 65 
and 50 % for ages 16 and above. Clearly demographics play a significant role here but we 
think that our model strikes a good balance between the two samples in the data.
An important insight from table 5.4-7 is that the vast majority of the working age population 
in the US live together with someone who provides a market income. Models of labor force 
participation that incorporate only bachelor households cannot address this important feature.
Finally, insofar as the cross section of unemployed agents is concerned we observe that our 
model overestimates the fraction of agents that are part of households where both members 
are unemployed. Again this probably is symptomatic of the fact that independent shocks 
and identical agents exacerbate the role of insurance in the couple economy.
Table 5.4-7: Decompositions of Unemployment and Inactivity
U nem ployed U U U I U E
Bechmark Model .2 .27 .53
US Data: Ages 16-65 .07 .19 .74
US Data: Ages >16 .1 .2 2 .6 8
OLF II U I IE
Bechmark Model .354 .026 .62
US Data: Ages 16-65 .24 .026 .734
US Data: Ages >16 .5 .0 2 .48
How readily can household members substitute in terms of their labor income?
To answer this question we look at the persistence of employment status over time in a cohort 
of agents simulated from the steady state distribution. We use a sample of 5000 families for 
the simulation. For each period we assume that a family’s primary earner is the agent that 
had the highest recorded annual labor income. Annual horizons on the other hand serve to 
mitigate the effect of frictions on recorded employment histories. To uncover the persistence 
we simply estimate the Markov transition matrix of primary and secondary earners. This is 
the probability that the identity of the household head changes from one year to the next. 
Using this metric we find that roughly 30% of our families alternate roles as primary and 
secondary earners in the labor market each year. Furthermore, when we use the number
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of hours as our index, and drop productivity from the calculation we find that this rate 
decreases to 2 0 %.
Arguably the employment status of agents is a much more persistent state, and the reason 
that our theory cannot match this aspect of the data is precisely that we put two ex ante 
identical agents within each household. In reality agents differ in fixed productivity and 
command different rewards in the labor market based on age, sex, and experience among 
other things. We can only do so much as to summarize some of these features in our two 
stochastic processes. However, our model requires low persistence in the e risk to match the 
flows between inactivity and unemployment.
The implied stochastic processes and other calibrations
Since in our model idiosyncratic labor incomes confound risks from various sources (search 
frictions and the joint stochastic processes of productivity) the only way we can assess whether 
our choices axe consistent with the data is by estimating the realized profiles of wages for 
individuals in our economy. We use a simple representation of the logarithm of annual (time 
aggregated) wages: lniy* =  (f)\nwt-i +  vt and use a sample of 1 0 ,0 0 0  individuals over 2 0  years 
to estimate the implied values for 0 and the variance of the shock av. Since in our model the 
distinction between household heads and secondary earners seems to be virtually irrelevant, 
given that we have two ex ante identical agents, we pool the estimates from all household 
members in the simulated population.
Both of these values are far away from the data. Our estimates are <j>s =  0.1 for the singles 
economy and 4>c =  0.4 for the couple economy. Notice that the value for couple economy is 
much closer to the high persistence process that is empirically relevant. Further on, there is 
a wealth of estimates for the data analogues for these statistics, see for example Heathcote 
et al. [2008], and all of them yield a value for </> in the neighborhood of 0.9 . 13 Given that 
both of our models imply that labor income is less persistent than what is found in the data 
we conclude that only temporary components of shocks are important in matching the labor 
market flows. In the data for instance the UI flows are high at monthly horizons but their 
quarterly counterparts are much smaller indicating that there is a lot of temporary variations 
in search intensity for a large group of non-employed workers.
What happens when we increase the persistence of the process to match the data?
In this case the distinction between heads and spouses becomes more important in the sense 
that the most productive agents are allocated to market activities and less productive agents 
to leisure. When the value of pe is 0.7 (it is 0.3 in the baseline calibration of the couple 
economy) the UI flow becomes 0.14, which is what we get in the bachelor households economy,
13 In Chang /  Kim [2007] a model that accounts for selection effects yields a value for the persistence component 
of 0.73.
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and the EU flow rate increases to 0.008. Thus the model clearly features a tradeoff between 
matching these two targets. The reason is that with a low persistence of the e shock only 
match quality shocks x matter for employment decisions. The market allocation is such that 
on average equally productive, in the e dimension, agents are employed and non-employed 
and substitution possibilities in the identity of the main earner of the household are ample. 
In contrast when shocks are persistent each agent’s own productivity becomes an important 
determinant of his labor market status, and agents who loose their jobs remain in the labor 
force to get a new draw next period. We use this alternative calibration below to contrast 
the cyclical properties of the two economies, one where insurance is more (when pe is low) or 
less meaningful.
What happens when we change the pu parameter?
With tighter frictions pu =  A we need to recalibrate the stochastic processes to match the 
worker flows. Joint search becomes more important for couples that want to maximize the 
probability of receiving a job offer but also unemployment is a less attractive state since the 
duration of spells is higher. It turns out that the properties of the calibrated shocks axe 
similar (lower volatilities of the two shocks are required since frictions axe tighter) to the 
baseline in this case. The implications of this model version axe no closer to (or further from 
) the data than our benchmark. In section 5.4.3, however, we treat this case as an economy 
that helps us understand whether the extend of frictions matters for our results.
5.4.3 Cyclical properties
Table 5.4-8 presents the results from our baseline calibration with pu =  0.5 and p i =  0.1 for 
both the couple and the bachelor household economies. We restrict attention to key labor 
market statistics and all quantities are expressed relative to a detrended measure of GDP . 14 
The data axe quarterly aggregates of the simulated aggregate paths.
In the single economy unemployment is extremely procyclical (contemporaneous correlation 
with GDP is 0.65) and so is the labor force. It is clear that this is due to the joint impact of 
search frictions and intertemporal substitution. When an expansion occurs agents flow in 
the labor force since job opportunities axe relatively more attractive. Due to the existence 
of frictions the reallocation of these workers to employment takes time and the pool of 
unemployed searchers increases.
The couple model (columns 3-4) produces a different set of statistics. Unemployment now 
becomes acyclical. The contemporaneous correlation with GDP is near zero. In addition, 
unemployment also becomes more volatile than with bachelor households. It is closer to the 
data, even though it is still not high enough. Aggregate employment is more volatile and
14 They are logged and HP filtered with a parameter A =  1600.
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equally procyclical and the labor force is more volatile and only marginally less procyclical 
than in the previous case.
Table 5.4-8: Results with search friction p=0.5
Bachelors Couples Benchmark Couples Calibration 2
% P*>v
£jl<Jy P x ,y Zx.a v P x ,y
Unemployment 1.78 .65 2.7 .0 2 3.5 -.15
Employment 0.54 0.96 .85 0.97 .77 .96
Labour Force 0.32 0.97 .62 0.93 .41 .9
These results can be explained by the following observations: Firstly, our calibration is 
such that the idiosyncratic process of labor productivity is considerably more volatile in the 
bachelor household economy. In this case aggregate shocks don’t have an important effect in 
guiding individuals optimal decisions. Although the family in the couple model, may face a 
comparable amount of uncertainty overall, there axe more instruments, the additional labor 
supply margin, to hedge and not all of this risk is important for individual labor supply 
decisions which axe formed primarily on the basis of an agent’s own productivity process. 
Hence cyclical volatilities axe indeed lower in the bachelor economy.
Secondly, the distribution of agents across the relevant state space differs considerably 
in the two models. For instance in the bachelor household economy inactive agents have 
accumulated sufficient wealth to finance leisure, whilst in the couple economy there is a large 
fraction of households where wealth is low and one member is employed and the other one 
inactive. Therefore, in the former case a smaller fraction of agents is induced to participate 
in the labor force when the expansion arrives and hence the cyclical volatility is lower.
Although our couple model engineers a lower contemporaneous correlation of the labor 
force paxticipation with GDP, the difference is rather small. We anticipated that the joint 
insurance would induce inactive agents to flow into the labor force in bad times to minimize 
the duration of non-employment spells but this does not seem to happen in our baseline 
calibration. The result suggests that there is indeed a wealth effect from employed household 
members to non-employed ones which reduces their desired supply of labor (when wages rise 
consumption of non employed members rises since risk sharing is perfect within the family) 
but this is overwhelmed by the motive to increase search intensity in view of the higher 
returns in expansions.
Alternative calibrations
Columns 5-6 of table 5.4-8 present the outcome of an alternative calibration in which the e 
shocks are more persistent (we set pe =  0.7). There unemployment is more counter-cyclical 
since the household allocates the most productive member to the market and this member’s
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labor market status is more persistent. Adjustments in family labor supply take place by 
withdrawing productive agents from employment in recessions and placing them in the pool 
of unemployed until aggregate conditions improve. In equilibrium the allocation entails fewer 
movements in and out of the labor force and hence the labor force participation volatility 
drops. But there is only a minor improvement in the correlation of the latter quantity with 
GDP. Notice that when these flows become zero, which is equivalent to having a fixed labor 
force, the model should have no difficulty in matching the data. But, off course, this will 
have nothing to do with joint insurance in families.
Further on when we lower pu , thus making job opportunities more scarce we find that 
the model’s implications are not too different compared to our baseline. Unemployment is 
slightly more procyclical in both the singles and the couple economies since now workers 
that enter the labor force in expansions encounter tighter frictions and spend more time in 
unemployment and the cyclical properties of the labor force are similar to the benchmark. 
In this economy the idiosyncratic uncertainty faced by agents is lower, we decrease ae and 
ax to hit our targets since job opportunities are limited exogenously and reservation wage 
policies are not important to match the average job finding rate in the economy. This seems 
not to make a difference for the results and we conclude that the way frictions are modeled is 
irrelevant here.
Other Models
Can insurance markets within the household be the answer to the low procyclicality of 
the labor force? Certainly the evidence presented in section 5.2 seem to suggest that joint 
insurance is important. But our model cannot yield reasonable elasticities. We use the 
following paragraphs to investigate what key ingredients need to be added to the framework 
to bring the statistics closer to their empirical counterparts.
In the discussion of section 5.4.2, we saw that the model features too much insurance 
possibilities due to the fact that agents are ex ante identical and shocks are not persistent 
enough and joint labor supply adjustments can effectively remove a large fraction of the 
underlying risk. In reality, however, household members differ in permanent components of 
earnings and allocations to market activities, which member works and which does not, is 
much more persistent. By calibrating the earnings risk to match the worker flows we have 
taken our economy away from a realistic account of family structure but there is no reason 
to anticipate that this will be crucial for our results. Search intensity would continue to be 
procyclical for the marginal worker and so would be the labor force.
A more promising avenue is to reconsider the nature of labor market risks in our model. 
Since separations and job finding rates represent partly risks and partly choices, movements 
in and out of employment are the outcomes of endogenous decisions which makes the joint 
insurance channel we highlight less meaningful. In our model workers sample their own 
productivity and the match quality each period and determine their labor supply. But in
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reality there are involuntary aspects associated with job losses, which our modeling of frictions 
does not allow us capture. This is a possibility that we address in future work. In a companion 
paper we analyze a model where frictions play a dominant role. They are summarized by a 
search technology as here. However, there are no match quality shocks. We experiment with 
a model where both job finding probabilities and job separations are exogenous, and in some 
cases vary exogenously over the business cycle. We document the differences in the search 
behavior of the couple and the single economies.
Finally another important extension is to incorporate a departure for complete insurance 
within the household unit. There is a lot of empirical evidence against that model, see for 
example Chiappori [1988] and Bourguignon et al. [2009]. In our model allocations in the 
household unit feature too much risk sharing since we use the unitary framework but if this 
assumption is abandoned (in favor of a limited commitment or collective alternative) it is not 
so clear how the equilibrium quantities will be affected.
5.5 Conclusion
In this paper we contrast the properties of economies where lack of insurance possibilities 
means that agents stand alone against uncertain contingencies with those where risk sharing 
opportunities exist within households that are comprised of two members. We ask how 
the implications for the labor market in an otherwise standard incomplete market model 
with search frictions and endogenous labor force participation are affected depending on the 
structure of the household, and especially how the bachelor and the couple economy respond 
to fluctuations in aggregate productivity.
We find that with these ingredients the economy with bachelor agents produces counter- 
factual cyclical correlations and volatilities for key labor market statistics, upon which the 
couple model is able to improve. However, the cyclical properties of the labor force still he 
away from the data.
Admittedly, there is a number of dimensions in which our theory is incomplete. Our 
framework abstracts from many important features in the sense that we have two ex ante 
identical agents in the household that differ in their labor market productivity. In reality 
some components of the differences in productivity of household members are permanent 
and this generally reduces risk sharing opportunities relative to what our findings suggest. 
Furthermore, agents command different rewards in the labor market based on their age, 
gender, experience etc or even idiosyncratic risks may be correlated. We think of our economy 
as one that simply allows for complete insurance markets within the household and incomplete 
outside.
Patterns of specialization in work versus leisure and in general intra-household allocations 
have a large impact on equilibrium allocations and thus far these features have been cast aside
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from macroeconomic theory. Our model can be viewed as a necessary step to a more ambitious 
research agenda. We do not have a clear understanding of how allocations are affected in 
economies where insurance is abundant in the family. What are the implications of having 
one, two or even an infinity, as in the social planning economies, family members? There 
axe many policy or welfare related questions where these alternative environments produce 
different answers. For instance, in incomplete market models with bachelor households wealth 
encodes the history of productivity and those agents who build up a stock of wealth can 
finance leisure and drop out of work. In contrast in social planning economies most productive 
agents are always send to work. We suspect that allocations in couple economies will be 
somewhere in between these two extremes.
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5.6 Appendix
5.6.1 Computational strategy for steady-state equilibrium
In steady state, factor prices are constant and the distribution of agents over the relevant 
state space T is time invariant. The calibration consists of three nested loops. The outer 
loop is the estimation loop where we set the endogenous parameters {B ,k , pe,cr€, px,crx}. We 
solve the model and check whether the generated moments (labor market flows) are close 
enough to their empirical counterparts. If not, we try a new set of parameters.
The middle loop is the market clearing loop. We guess an interest rate r which implies a 
wage rate w and then solve for the value functions and the steady state distribution T). The 
steady sate distribution yields an aggregate savings supply. If the implied marginal product of 
capital is equal to the guessed interest rate, we found the equilibrium. If not, we update our 
interest rate guess. For the singles version of our model instead of changing interest rates to 
clear the market of savings we adjust the discount factor (3s and keep constant the aggregate 
rate of return R. The inner loop is the value function iteration. Details are as follows:
1 . We choose an unevenly spaced grid for asset holdings (a) (with more nodes near the 
borrowing constraint) and a grid for individual productivities e and x. We experiment 
with different numbers of nodes for the asset grid, usually between Na =  101 and 
Na =  161. The number of nodes for the idiosyncratic labor market risks are Ne =  5 and 
Nx =  2. These are equally spaced and the transition matrix of idiosyncratic shocks is 
obtained by the discretization procedure described by Adda /  Cooper [2003].
2 . Given our guess for the interest rate r, we solve for the individual value functions, 
V n, Ve in the bachelor model and V nn, V en, V ee in the couple model. This is done by 
finding the optimal savings and search intensity choice at each node. Values that fall 
outside the grid are interpolated with cubic splines. Once the value functions have 
converged we recover the optimal policy functions of the form a1 (a, e), s(a, e) and h(a, e).
3. The final step is to obtain the invariant measure T over the relevant state space (asset 
productivities and employment status).
a) We first approximate the optimal policy rules on a finer grid which NaBIG =  2000 
nodes and we initialize our measure IV
b) We update it and obtain a new measure Ti
c) The invariant measure is found when the maximum difference between To and Ti 
is smaller than a pre-specified tolerance level.
d) By using the invariant measure, we compute aggregate labor supply and asset 
supply. This implies a new marginal product of capital which we then compare to 
our initial guess.
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5.6.2 Computational strategy for equilibrium with aggregate fluctuations
Aggregate shocks imply that factor prices are time varying. When solving their optimization 
program agents have to predict future factor prices. Therefore they have to predict all the 
individual policy decisions in all possible future states. This requires agents to keep track of 
every other agent. Thus in order to approximate the equilibrium in the presence of aggregate 
shocks, one has to keep track of the measure of all groups of agents over time. Since T is an 
infinite dimensional object it is impossible to do this directly. We therefore follow Krusell /  
Smith [1998] and assume that agents are boundedly rational and use only the mean of wealth 
and aggregate productivity to forecast future capital K  and factor prices w and R.
Compared to the steady-state algorithm we now have two additional state variables that we 
must add in the list of the existing state variables in the inner loop: aggregate productivity 
A and aggregate capital K . As the outer loop, we iterate on the forecasting equations for 
aggregate capital and factor prices. 15 The details are as follows:
1. We approximate the aggregate productivity process with 2 nodes and use again the 
methodology of Adda /  Cooper [2003] to obtain the values and transition probabilities. 
We choose a capital grid around the steady-state level of capital K ss, particularly we 
iVjfc =  6 equally spaced nodes to form a grid with range [0.95 * K ss; 1.05ATSS].
2 . As already mentioned, we choose the means of aggregate capital and aggregate pro­
ductivity as explanatory variables in the forecasting equations. We use a log-linear 
form
InK t+ i =  Kq +  Kiln  K t +  t^ln  A* (5.6-1)
Inwt =  cjq +  U\ln Kt  +  u^ln At (5.6-2)
InRt =  Qq g ^ l n K t X t  (5.6-3)
3. We initialize the coefficients so that K t+ i,w ,R  are equal to their steady state values.
4. Given the forecasting equations, we solve the value function problems as before, just 
that now the state vector is four-dimensional. Values that are not on the asset grid are 
interpolated using cubic splines. Values that are not on the aggregate capital grid are 
interpolated linearly.
5. Instead of simulating the economy with a large finite number of agents we use the 
procedure of Young [2010] and simulate a continuum of agents. This procedure has 
the advantage of avoiding cross-sectional sampling variation. We simulate the economy 
for 10,000 periods and discard the first 2,000. In each period we get an observation 
for K , w and R. We use the simulated data to run OLS regressions on the forecasting 
equations which yield new coefficient estimates /cl 5s, o;l 5s, ^1 ,s. If these coefficients are
15 In the steady state  algorithm, there were three loops. Since we use the steady state  values for the endogenous 
param eters, we do not have an estim ation  loop here.
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close to the previous ones we stop, otherwise we update the forecasting equations with 
the new coefficients and solve the problem again.
The convergent solutions for the forecasting equations our models are as follows:
Table 5.6-1: Couples p =  1 / 2
E quation C onstant In (K t ) ln(At) H2
H K t+ i) 0.0841 0.9802 0.0379 0.9999
In (wt ) -0.59839 0.4304 0.4598 0.9917
H R t) 0.0504 -0.0108 0.0136 0.9874
Table 5.6-2: Singles p =  1 / 2
E quation  C onstant ln(Kt) ln(At) B '2
]n(Kt+i) 0.0734 0.9820 0.0303 0.9999
ln(wt) -04691 0.4427 0.4766 0.9805
In (Rt) 0.0387 -0.0090 0.0107 0.9714
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